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Pilots who earn an instrument rating must learn a lot.   They must also 
demonstrate that knowledge during a practical test, which is the last major hurdle en 
route to certification.  This test - the instrument rating “checkride” - is commonly 
considered one of the most difficult flight tests in airman training.  In fact it should be, as 
instrument flying can be quite difficult, and the breadth of required theoretical knowledge 
and applied skill, along with the complexity of the modern air traffic control and airspace 
system, has grown incrementally over many years.  During those same years, however, 
some testing procedures (and certification requirements) have remained mostly 
unchanged and may be somewhat artificial.  A possible result is that some training for the 
instrument rating has devolved into preparing students for the difficult practical test in 
and of itself, instead of preparing them for actual operations under instrument flight rules 
(FAA-Industry, 2003).  Indeed, Federal Aviation Administration pilot examiners 
sometimes refer to a new certificate as a “license to learn.”  This light-hearted admonition 
from examiners may suggest that there is much more to learn, and many experienced 






 For many years, the Federal Aviation Administration has served as the overseer of 
airman certification in the United States.  The FAA‟s congressional mandate (in Section 
44701 of Title 49 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958) to do so stems from the awkward 
requirement to differentiate between air transportation and “other air commerce.”  The 
modern codified authority of the FAA to do so by issuing “rules regarding safety” is 
found in Title 49 of the United States Code.  Section I, item 106 of Title 49 describes the 
authority of the FAA to issue, rescind, and revise these rules.  Subtitle VII, Aviation 
Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the agency‟s authority.  Included within 
this authority, and codified in Subtitle VII, Part A, Chapter 447, is the FAA‟s authority to 
“issue an airman certificate to an individual when found, after investigation, to be 
qualified for, and physically able, to perform the duties related to the position authorized 
by the certificate.”   
Obviously, the FAA does more than just test airmen.  Indeed, the FAA has 
established a “safety oversight system” for airman certification and regulation based upon 
“regulations, certification, inspection, surveillance, and enforcement” (FAA-Industry, 
2003).  Most of the various components of this FAA oversight are codified in 
publications called Advisory Circulars, handbooks, Title 14 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations Parts 61, 91, and 141, and other materials.  Elements of airman certification 
oversight include knowledge and practical tests, the certification and delegation of pilot 
examiners, and publication of Practical Test Standards.  Various elements of the FAA‟s 





The intent of this study is to call the instrument rating into question, and the question that 
will be asked is this: are new instrument pilots really ready to use their new rating? 
 
Statement of the Problem 
 A concern within the airman certification process, and one that will receive 
considerable attention in this study, is the possible “artificiality” of some flight training 
and airman certification practical tests.  General aviation training and certification has 
traditionally been predicated upon pilot applicants meeting specific aeronautical 
knowledge, flight proficiency, and aeronautical experience requirements, a successful 
training paradigm with roots that can be traced back to the “Bingham Plan” of World 
War I (Durden, 1998).  Current airman trainees must demonstrate their knowledge and 
skill on “written” (actually computer based) tests and practical tests, frequently called 
“checkrides.”   Unfortunately, the training and testing process still contains vestiges of 
WWII era training, including maneuvers that are rarely or never performed during routine 
flights (Blickensderfer, Summers, and Schumacher, 2005).  At least a few researchers 
question whether or not time spent teaching these maneuvers, to be conducted only on the 
checkride, might not be better spent in teaching actual flight operations.  Perhaps even 
more significantly, some of the operations that are routinely performed by holders of 
advanced airman ratings are discouraged from being performed during the practical test 
at all. 
 The Instrument rating is a good example of a level of airman certification that 
involves skills and knowledge that may be difficult to measure during the practical test.  





IFR flight plan, contact the appropriate ATC facility to get an IFR clearance, restate the 
clearance back to ATC, and then comply with (or seek modification of) all elements of 
the clearance throughout the flight.  Compliance may require the interpretation of 
complex (and cryptic) aeronautical charts, ongoing communication with the appropriate 
(and changing) ATC facility, and an “on-the-fly” application of a host of rules and 
regulations.  Further, any element of the clearance may change en route, requiring a 
change in routing, altitude, type of approach, necessity to “hold,” or other surprises, all of 
which must be received and implemented while flying the airplane.  Despite (or because 
of) the weighty responsibility that the instrument pilot assumes, “filing IFR” is prohibited 
for the not-yet-certified airman and thus is not allowed on the practical test (14 CFR 61.3 
(e)).  Without actually filing an IFR flight plan, there is no real clearance to receive, 
copy, read back, execute, or amend.  Thus, many of the above tasks are frequently only 
simulated during the Instrument rating practical test (Flight Standards Service, 2004), and 
the simulation of them may involve oral questioning only.  Further, many instrument 
rating practical tests never leave the vicinity of the airport at which they begin.  Without 
an actual en route portion of the flight, some en route tasks and procedures are likewise 
simulated only.   
It should be noted that generally few of the above tasks, by themselves, are 
particularly difficult.  However, most of the tasks are done in flight, while the pilot is 
dividing his or her attention between other things, not the least of which is controlling the 
aircraft!  As most instrument rated pilots know, it is frequently the sum of cumulative 
tasks that makes IFR difficult.  Further, experienced instrument pilots know that all of the 





may be deferred to a low-workload phase of flight or may be simplified by savvy 
dialogue with Air Traffic Control.    New instrument pilots may not know how or when to 
juggle tasks, and this may cause them to prioritize the wrong ones, do all of them poorly, 
or commit other errors.  Therefore, evaluating a pilot‟s knowledge of tasks through oral 
questioning before or after flight may not accurately reflect a pilot‟s ability, since this 
“task juggling” is rarely required in a question-answer session.  Again, it is often the 
required cumulative skill and applied knowledge that makes instrument flying difficult.   
 It should be noted that the administrator of the practical test (the FAA Designated 
Examiner or FAA Safety Inspector) may file IFR on behalf of the applicant, and thus 
require all IFR procedures to be executed.  However, this practice is expressly 
discouraged by the FAA (Federal Aviation Administration, 2004).  It should also be 
noted that the FAA is sensitive to the need to administer a realistic, rigorous test.  In a 
section of the PTS entitled “Use of the Practical Test Standards,” the FAA mandates the 
use of a written “plan of action” (for the administration of the test) that includes one or 
more “scenarios.”  The FAA further requires examiners to “include as many of the 
TASKs into the scenario portion of the test as possible,” with the intent being that the 
execution of the flight be more “real” than the performance of stand-alone tasks.  Further 
still, the examiner is required by the PTS to evaluate applicants‟ “ability to use good 
aeronautical decision making procedures,” and suggestions to incorporate scenarios 
requiring “weather decisions and performance planning” are provided (Flight Standards 
Service, 2004).  In other words, the FAA wants the test to simulate a real IFR flight.  





 Anecdotal evidence at a flight school may be evidence that the training and 
testing for the instrument rating are insufficient.  Having served as a Chief and/or 
Assistant Chief Flight Instructor at an FAA Certified school for several years, the 
principal investigator of this study has administered literally hundreds of End-of-Course 
flight tests.  An end-of-course test is a practical test administered at an FAA approved 
flight school to document that all elements of the skill and knowledge within a course of 
training have been assimilated by a student.  Usually, the test result reveals that they 
have been.  However, experimentation with that same student in a non-testing 
environment, or in an unpredicted phase of the test, frequently suggests otherwise, 
leading to interest in this study.  Others have observed the same thing.  Consider the 
following anecdotal evidence from a popular aviation periodical.  The article, which 
deals mostly with creating meaningful “practice challenges” during routine flights to 
maintain proficiency, suggests that many pilots lack basic skills, particularly in regard to 
instrument flying.  Even some instrument instructors, the article contends, have not 
developed basic real world instrument skills and are thus in no position to pass them on.  
As evidence, the article‟s author relates his own experience of overseeing an 
intercollegiate flying competition in which instrument rated pilots and instructors were 
first required to perform difficult instrument pilot tasks in VFR weather under simulated 
IFR conditions.  “The kids,” the author concluded, “were astonishingly good at every 
kind of simulated IFR procedure that we could think of and had clearly been practicing a 
lot under the hood…”  However, when the weather deteriorated and the competitors had 






We decided to ask the participants to file a flight plan to a nearby airport 
and we would get a regular IFR clearance and make the trip in the 
system.  The results were amazing.  More than half of the pilots, 
including the instrument instructors, were totally befuddled.  They 
demanded to know in advance the route they would fly and altitudes, 
and what approach would be at the destination.  We told them we had no 
idea, but to file a flight plan that looks logical and see what clearance the 
controllers issued.  When the controllers read something different than 
what the contestants filed, they were indignant, and some even insisted 
that ATC couldn‟t do that.  We assured them that ATC can offer any 
clearance that works for it, and the option remaining for a pilot is to 
reject the offer and stay on the ground.  In flight most had trouble 
copying ATC instructions and were constantly surprised by what they 
were asked to do, such as change altitude.  Even vectors to final proved 
to be a challenge to some pilots who could fly a DME arc on their own 
to perfection.  What became clear is that the students had mastered the 
textbook world of IFR flying, but had little or no real-world experience 
in the system (McClellan, 2008). 
 A casual reader might be surprised that both instrument rated pilots and 
instrument instructors mentioned in the article exhibited the same problems, as it would 
be logically assumed that the latter would be much more experienced.  In reality, there is 
sometimes little difference in knowledge or experience between the two.  Indeed, a flight 





hence the authorization to teach the instrument rating) to an existing instructor certificate; 
there are no requirements to build experience under IFR before doing so (14 CFR 61.183 
(a-h), 61.191 (a)).   Further, the written test comes from the same bank of FAA questions 
that the applicant studied during the training for his own initial instrument rating (to hold 
an instructor certificate with an airplane category requires a prior instrument rating as per 
14CFR 61.183 (c)), and the instrument instructor practical test commonly involves 
similar tasks that the applicant performed during his own instrument checkride.  Indeed, 
since both the instructor certificate and the instrument instructor rating are often earned 
during a “time building” phase of a pilot‟s career, the instructor may earn both within a 
brief period of time, at the same airport, conducting the same approaches, studying the 
same body of knowledge.  Exposure to real-world IFR flying for both instrument-rated 
pilots and their teachers may be very limited! 
 
Purpose of the Study 
 The purpose of this study is to provide information that will assist in evaluating 
the efficacy of airman instrument rating training and testing.  Specifically, the study is 
designed to determine if there is a significant performance difference between 
experienced and inexperienced instrument pilots and whether the null hypothesis that 
there is not should be retained or rejected.  Stated more succinctly, the null hypothesis for 
this study is this: there is no difference between the experienced pre-test group pilots and 
the less experienced test group pilots in regard to basic instrument pilot competencies.  
Note that wording of the null hypothesis is very deliberate; it does not suggest that there 





basic instrument pilot competencies (the tasks extracted from the FAA Practical Test 
Standards which are the “learning objectives” noted below) there is no difference 
between the aforementioned groups of pilots.  Indeed, all have passed the FAA practical 
test by demonstrating these competencies and hold an instrument rating as proof.   
More specifically, information gathered during this study will help determine the 
degree to which a newly rated instrument pilot‟s training has equipped him/her to: 
 Acquire, copy, understand, execute, and amend, if appropriate, an IFR route 
clearance. 
 Control an aircraft using instrument references only while performing other tasks 
required during single-pilot IFR operations. 
 Copy and execute a holding clearance using correct entry, timing, and reporting 
procedures. 
 Tune, identify, interpret, intercept, and track ground-based navigational systems 
and use information gleaned from them to attain and maintain adequate situational 
awareness. 
 Execute a precision instrument approach, applying charted courses and 
minimums, as well as stated clearances and procedures. 
 Plan for, initiate, and execute a missed approach. 
 Select an alternate destination with consideration given to legalities, weather, and 
practicality. 
 
Objectives of the Study 





 To establish the historical background and subsequent evolution of the airman 
instrument rating. 
 To provide an overview of the knowledge, skill, aeronautical experience, and 
testing required to earn an airman instrument rating.  
 To test a sample of newly rated instrument pilots on the conduct of an accurately 
simulated IFR flight requiring all of the above tasks. 
 To answer the following research questions:  
o Does the newly rated instrument pilot, having demonstrated the ability to 
pass the FAA instrument rating practical test as described in the practical 
test standards and applied by a FAA designated pilot examiner, really have 
the skills and knowledge necessary to successfully complete a simulated, 
non-training, point-to-point, IFR flight? 
o Did the training of the newly rated instrument pilot adequately prepare 
him or her to apply the skill and knowledge required by 14 CFR FAR 
61.65 (b) and (c) to successfully surmount common challenges during a 
real-world IFR flight? 
 To offer recommendations to improve the effectiveness of airman instrument 
rating training and testing. 
 
Definition of Terms and Acronyms 
Aviation terminology is laden with acronyms, abbreviations, and technical 
language, making their use unavoidable in this study.  Appendix L provides definitions 






For the purpose of this study, the following assumptions have been made: 
 The intent of instrument rating training is to equip pilots to operate in instrument 
meteorological conditions in the modern airspace system under instrument flight 
rules.  The intent of instrument rating testing is to confirm that all required 
knowledge and skills required for doing so have been assimilated by the 
instrument rating applicant. 
 Pilots who have earned an instrument rating should be able to operate under 
instrument flight rules safely and competently without further training or 
experience. 
 
Limitations of the Study 
The potential artificiality of the research flight, the available sample size and 
population, and potential participant skill erosion impose certain limitations on this study.  
The reader should understand that: 
 This study was limited to students at one university, all of whom followed the 
same training syllabus.  Since the FAA allows certified flight schools to create 
and submit their own syllabi for approval (within limits as defined by FAR 141 
Appendix C), the sequence and content of instrument training or testing at other 
training providers could be somewhat different. 
 The number of eligible participants during the data collection phase of this project 
was relatively small.  Therefore, the generalizability of findings from this project 





 Initial instrument currency lasts for six calendar months.  Therefore, “newly 
certificated instrument pilots” as defined by this study (certificated within 
previous six calendar months and therefore current) actually includes pilots whose 
training is not that “new” or recent.  The effect of skill erosion over the six 
months of currency is not addressed in this study.  Future research may be needed 
to determine or describe this effect. 
 It is impossible to exactly duplicate the flight environment without actually being 
in it.  Certain tasks in the flight simulator may therefore be somewhat different 
than the same tasks performed during actual IFR flight.  Also, certain pilot actions 
or decisions - since the potential of an actual crash is eliminated in the simulator - 
could be artificially influenced by simulated flight.  Further research may be 
needed to determine the psychological impact of simulated flight on pilot decision 
making and/or pilot actions. 
 
Significance of the Study 
This research was designed to provide information to assist in evaluating the 
effectiveness of airman instrument rating training and testing.  Earlier in Chapter I the 
Principal Investigator (along with the literature) expressed doubts about some current 
instrument training paradigms.  However, the findings from the study suggest that even 
those assumptions may have been underestimated!  As the study progressed, it became 
clear that several of the newly certificated instrument pilots clearly lacked certain 
fundamental competencies.  If these findings accurately represent the greater population 





assumed and certain instrument pilot training and testing paradigms, as well new 
instrument pilot privileges, may need to be fundamentally changed.  The “if” in the 
foregoing sentence, however, is not just academic; the small sample size in this study 
severely limits the generizability of the findings therein.  In fact, had the sample size been 
twice as large and the performance relationship of new and experienced instrument pilots 
been mathematically identical, the null hypothesis noted above could be rejected at 
virtually the 100% confidence level.  The rationale for doing so will be developed in 
subsequent chapters noted below and in Appendix K. 
 Following this introductory chapter, Chapter II reviews related literature in the 
evolution of, and research regarding, airman instrument rating certification, including: the 
contemporary instrument rating, scenario based training, the need of realism in training, 
and investigation of published testing procedures.  Chapter III discusses the procedures 
used to collect the data.  Attention is given to the population, the selection process and 
criteria, sample size, and experiment realism.  Chapter IV reports the data collected 
during the study, and Chapter V provides observations, examples, and commentary that 
help explain the data.  Chapter VI summarizes the major findings and conclusions, and 
provides recommendations based on them.  To begin, however, the development and 
evolution of the airman instrument rating must be considered, which is where the next 












Instrument rated pilots are allowed to fly without outside visual references.  This 
one fact mandates an entirely new set of skills and knowledge that a pilot must master 
before earning the instrument rating and the privilege to “fly blind.”  The Instrument 
rating dates back to 1933, when the Bureau of Air Commerce (a predecessor to the FAA) 
first acknowledged that certain competencies were required for pilots to fly without 
outside visual references (Milbrooke, 2000).  But the realization that flying without these 
references presented unique challenges came long before.  Indeed, flying in (or avoiding) 
instrument meteorological conditions parallels the evolution of airman certification.  The 
fundamental problem, as early airmen noted, was the inability of the human “balance” 
system to remain oriented without a visible horizon. 
  Physiologically, humans spatially orient themselves by means of vision, 
kinesthetic, and vestibular senses.  The Kinesthetic senses refer to the muscles, sinews, 





and inertia.  The vestibular system functions by reference to the same forces, but is far 
more sensitive and balance-specific.  It is comprised of multiple channels in the inner ear 
that sense the movement of fluid.  This fluid, also driven by gravitational or inertial 
forces, ultimately triggers a message to the brain that muscle movement around one or 
more axis is required to remain upright.  And, as long as the forces acting on that fluid are 
predictable gravity and inertia, humans easily keep track of up and down.  But in an 
airplane moving around three axes, all at constantly varying amounts and duration, the 
kinesthetic and vestibular systems simply cannot keep up. Without external visual 
references, the hapless human will, sometimes within seconds, become completely 
disoriented (Jeppesen Guided Flight Discovery Team, Advanced Human Factors, 2006).  
Modern aircraft have instruments that artificially provide these necessary visual 
references, but most early ones did not.  Tragically, many airmen learned that flying into 
clouds or reduced visibility could be deadly.  Not surprisingly then, once aircraft 
performance made flying in clouds a possibility, regulations were imposed to make sure 
pilots were properly trained, equipped, and certified before they did so.  The first task, 




When the Wright Brothers flew in 1903, there were few restrictions on aircraft or 
airmen, and none regarding weather.  This was soon to change, however, as the 
burgeoning field of aeronautics grew at a fantastic rate in both complexity and capability.  





government argued that the growing number of pilots and aircraft (and crashes) dictated 
the need to regulate pilots and operating procedures.  Thus began a continuing discussion 
of who should do the regulating, and what the regulations should include.  Indeed, by the 
1920‟s, several states had already created aeronautical legislation, some of it dealing with 
airman certification.  It soon became clear, however, that the boundary-crossing nature of 
flight was unsuited to a “patchwork” style of local legislation, and that centralized control 
was required.  Indeed, much of the state and local aeronautical legislation that evolved 
during this period would need to be reviewed and re-codified to create uniform federal 
law, a task that was undertaken by the Aeronautics branch and published in a non-binding 
“Aeronautical Bulletin” on Aug. 1
st, 
1928 (Federal Aviation Administration Historical 
Chronology, 1996).  By then, the federal codification and control of airman certification 
was well underway. 
The very first “Air Commerce Regulations” were created by the Aeronautics 
Branch of the Department of Commerce under the provisions of the Air Commerce Act 
of 1926 (FAA Historical Chronology, 1996).  These regulations were created from the 
pooled recommendations of many stakeholders including pilots, manufacturers, the Post 
Office Department, and the Military.  And, while these rules impacted many different 
aspects of aviation, the licensing of aircraft (at least those engaged in interstate or 
“foreign” commerce) and airmen figured prominently into the final draft of codified 
rules.  The new regulations required the pilots of all licensed aircraft (again, only those 
involved in commerce) to hold at least private or commercial licenses.  Further, holders 
of commercial licenses were classed as either industrial or transport, presumably to 





required to hold the appropriate level of certification as well, and all pilots, mechanics, 
owners, and operators had until July, 1927 to comply with the newly binding rules.  Even 
before July, however, the rules began to evolve, with the addition of the “limited 
commercial pilot license” classification to allow certain short-range flights to be 
conducted by aspiring commercial pilots for the purpose of building flight time and 
experience.  As might be guessed, this limitation dealt indirectly with weather flying as it 
represented a crude means of avoiding it.  In 1929 the rules would be further amended so 
that transport pilots could only carry persons or property for hire in aircraft types that 
were “specified on the license,” and again in 1930 to limit them to the carriage of 
passengers only with “special authority from the Department of Commerce” (FAA 
Historical Chronology). 
It was, then, in 1927 that Private pilot license #1 was issued to William P. 
MacCracken, Jr., the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Aeronautics (though during 
World War I, the military had issued pilot licenses to civilians under the exigencies of 
wartime demand).  MacCracken became the first person to be issued a civilian pilot 
license by the U.S. Government, though to his credit he attempted to defer the honor to 
Orville Wright, who declined.  With the precedent of federal airman certification in place, 
there were many to follow.  By October 1928, there were 3,695 civilian pilots holding 
active licenses, with 66% of them being transport pilots, 10% commercial pilots, 2% 
industrial pilots, and nearly 22% private pilots, with a definite trend developing in the 
increase of private flying (FAA Historical Chronology, 1996).  In response to this trend, 
the Air Commerce Act was amended in 1929 to provide for the licensing of “flying 





benchmarks be met, and both a ground and “flying” instructor rating were created, a 
paradigm that still exists.  
Other advances within the growing field of aeronautics would drive changes in 
airman certification.  Of these, few had greater significance than the flight of James H. 
Doolittle on Sep. 24, 1929.  On this flight, Lt. Doolittle used gyro-powered and pressure-
sensitive flight instruments, ground-based radio range and maker beacons, and a safety  
pilot with unobstructed vision and access to dual controls, to fly (from takeoff to 
landing!) a pre-determined course with no outside visual references (Bilstein, 1994).  
Doolittle made the flight as part of research being conducted by the Aeronautics Branch 
of the Department of Commerce, the Bureau of Standards, and private organizations, all 
anxious to develop the means to fly through clouds and demonstrate the feasibility of 
doing so.  And, as all understood, without the ability to fly in clouds all-weather 
capability and scheduled service would forever remain impractical (Bilstein).  Doolittle‟s 
flight showed that weather flying was possible, and that the technology was evolving to 
make it safe.  It was followed by a similar flight by Capt. A. F. Hegenberger in 1932 in 
which a similar course was flown without outside visual references and without any 
safety pilot (National Museum of the USAF)!  The science of “blind flying” was indeed 
advancing. 
 While Doolittle‟s and Hegenberger‟s flights showed that the technology existed to 
overcome the problem of weather, they also showed that specific and advanced pilot 
skills, as well as specialized equipment, were required for all-weather flying.  Along with 
the advancement of radio ranges and beacons for en-route operations, the first instrument 





1931 (FAA Historical Chronology, 1996).  On March 1, 1933, the Aeronautics Branch 
demonstrated a radio system that it had developed for the “blind landing of aircraft,” and 
significantly, made the system available for service testing by all aircraft equipped with 
the necessary radio receivers.  During that same month, James L. Kinney, an Aeronautics 
Branch pilot, completed the first instrument-only cross country flight from College Park, 
Md. to Newark, N. J. (FAA Historical Chronology, 1996). Thus, the elements of en-route 
and approach guidance were being incorporated into weather flying, and the promise that 
they held for all operators was clear.   
 By 1932 yet another new rating for transport pilots, entitled “scheduled air 
transport pilot” was published in the Air Commerce Bulletin.  By Jan. 1, 1933, the rating 
was required for all pilots on scheduled interstate passenger service (FAA Historical 
Chronology, 1996).  To earn it, pilots had to demonstrate the ability to use airway 
navigation aids and to fly specified maneuvers guided entirely by instruments.  The era of 
the “Instrument Rating,” by function if not by name, had begun. 
 Also during this time, the FAA Historical Chronology notes that the regulation of 
all pilot ratings and privileges came under firmer federal control.  From 1933 through 
1940 there were a great many changes regarding pilot certification, including: 
 The increase of solo flight time for a private license from 10 to 50 hours (which 
would change in ensuing years). 
 Abolishment of the grade of “industrial pilot,” and its replacement with the new 
grade of “solo pilot,” which required 10 hours of flying time and successful 





 Abolishment of the grade of “solo pilot,” and the transfer of solo flying privileges 
to “student pilots.” 
 Minimum age of 21 or consent of parents before qualifying for any type of pilot 
license.  Later, minimum age (with consent of parents) for a Private license was 
set at 16 and still later increased to 18, due to the lobbying of a parent whose 
child was killed in a plane crash.  All of these changes would evolve in the 
ensuing years, with the 21 minimum certification age, and the parental consent 
for student pilots finally dropped in 1967. 
 Creation of the new “amateur pilot license,” requiring 25 hours of solo flying 
time (compared to 50 hours for a private license) in an attempt to encourage 
recreational flying. 
 The announcement of an experimental “Civilian Pilot Training Program” 
involving 330 pilots and 13 colleges.  The intent of the program was to use 
federal funds to create new pilots so that a reserve pilot corps might be in place 
should they be needed for military service.  This program was greatly expanded 
as war in Europe loomed, eventually becoming a military program.  Due mostly 
to the CPTP, the number of pilots in the U.S. had increased to over 100,000 by 
1941 and continued to grow during the war years.  The “CPT” was an important 
step in the evolution of instrument flying because of the large number of pilots 
that it created, and because military pilots generally had exposure to flight 
simulators and “weather flying.” 
 By Nov. 1937, a complete re-coding of the old Air Commerce Regulations went 





featured the now-familiar parts and sections, along with the expansible decimal system 
to provide for inevitable future intrusions and revisions.  Most of the work of re-coding 
was done by two consultants from Northwestern University: Fred D. Fagg, Jr. and John 
H. Wigmore.  Wigmore was the Dean Emeritus of Northwestern‟s School of Law, and 
Fagg became Director of Air Commerce midway through the project, requiring his 
replacement by Howard C. Knotts, Editor in Chief of the Journal of Air Law.  Not 
surprisingly, some of the re-coded regulations dealt with flyable and non-flyable weather 
(FAA Historical Chronology, 1996).  Among the driving forces behind the project was 
the need to standardize the confusing array of rules that had been promulgated by 
individuals within the Aeronautics Branch, the Bureau of Air Commerce, and the 
Department of Commerce.  Without a system for clearance through a central office, 
many rules were unknown (published only in Department of Bureau correspondence) or 
potentially unenforceable, since they were issued by persons other than the Secretary of 
Commerce, the official designated in the Air Commerce Act.  Understandably, the 
recoding was a major step forward in the promulgation of federal aviation regulation.   
 In May, 1944, the jurisdiction of federal aviation authority would be tested.   In 
the U. S. District Court case United States v. Drumm, Andrew Drumm, Jr. had been 
charged by the authority of repeatedly violating those parts of the Civil Air Regulations 
requiring a pilot to have an airman certificate (as well as other violations).  Drum 
contended that the regulations did not apply to him since he did not fly on civil airways 
or other restricted areas, and that the Civil Aeronautics Authority had exceeded its 





federal authority to certify airmen and U. S. airspace was upheld (FAA Historical 
Chronology, 1996).   
 In 1964, the FAA would again re-code the Federal Regulations into the 
appropriately named “Federal Aviation Regulations,” or “FAR‟s.”  The major thrust of 
this re-coding was to eliminate duplicate, obsolete, and unnecessary provisions of 
multiple regulatory systems inherited from the Civil Aeronautics Board and the Civil 
Aeronautics Administration.  Further, the FAA sought to streamline all of the current and 
binding rules into a single body.  This revision of the FARs consolidated and simplified 
the former Civil Air Regulations, Civil Aeronautics Manuals, and the Regulations of the 
Administrator, and also introduced many of the now familiar “Parts” (and related 
content) of the current Chapter 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations, or “14 CFR.”  By 
1971, the “Parts” relevant to airmen were available in separate volumes. 
 Even before the recoding of 1937, the regulations governing instrument flight 
received major modification.  By August 1936, all civilian pilots who flew by instrument 
reference on a civil airway were required to have an instrument rating and a licensed 
aircraft equipped with two-way radio and approved instrument flying equipment.  
Further, pilots flying on instruments, or on a civil airway with visibility less than one 
mile, were required to file a flight plan.  These rules, however, were designed more to 
inhibit than to regulate civilian air traffic on airways, since at that time virtually no 
civilian aircraft or airmen had instrument ratings or equipment.  The new rules had the 
desired effect of keeping traffic off of the airways used by the growing fleet of air 





 By 1940, the first Pilot and Written Test Examiners were designated.  Under this 
CAA order, appropriately qualified “private persons” were authorized to conduct flight 
and written exams.  The intent of this program was to free full-time CAA Inspectors to 
do other tasks besides flight tests, though they still retained authority (and responsibility) 
to “spot check” certified pilots.  This program started a trend, and the use of designees 
would be greatly expanded over the years, with aircraft inspectors, pilot examiners, and 
(previously authorized) medical examiners doing many tasks for the agency.  Indeed, by 
1945 Private pilot examiners were added to the pool of “DPE‟s,” and by 1946 there were 
6,222 airman rating examiners in the pool (FAA Historical Chronology, 1996).
 Further, starting in 1946 CAA regional offices (rather than Washington 
headquarters) became the approving authority for flight schools, making flight training 
even more accessible.  This change was followed in 1950 by an amendment to the Civil 
Aeronautics Act that greatly expanded the Secretary of Commerce and the CAA 
Administrator‟s authority to delegate to “private persons” the authority to perform 
examinations and issue certificates.  This change was driven by the vast increase in civil 
aircraft and pilots in the postwar years, and continues with the current FAA‟s authority 
to delegate examiners.  Indeed, the FAA envisions delegating even more authority in the 
future, with the outsourcing of rulemaking and training requirements possible (FAA-
Industry Training Standards Program Plan, 2003). 
 In 1960, there was a renewed focus on instrument flying skills, driven in part by 
the proliferation of gyroscopic instruments and the instrument flying opportunities that 
they provided.  Presumably, accident statistics were also a cause of the focus on 





general aviation accidents was continued flight into instrument meteorological 
conditions by non-instrument rated pilots (National Transportation Safety Board, 2005).  
Understandably then, the instrument rating did not undergo major change, but instrument 
skills at other grades of pilot certification did.  New pilots (though the rules were not 
made retroactive to previously certificated pilots) receiving commercial certificates 
without an instrument rating were required to receive 10 hours of instrument flight 
instruction and demonstrate basic attitude instrument flight skills on the practical test.  
Similarly, new private pilot trainees were now required to receive dual instruction in 
basic attitude instrument flying, and were required to demonstrate “manual capability in 
attitude control” in simulated “loss of outside reference” emergencies.  Also, by 1966 an 
instrument rating for helicopter pilots flying in IMC was required (FAA Historical 
Chronology, 1996). 
 In 1967, in the wake of these changes, came a high-profile “instrument accident.”  
In September of that year, a Cessna 310 was involved in a mid-air accident with a 
Boeing 727, killing Secretary-designate of the Navy John T. McNaughton and 81 others.  
The National Transportation Safety Board listed the probable cause of the accident as the 
Cessna‟s deviation from its IFR clearance, but implicated the air traffic control system 
and lax requirements for instrument pilots as contributory factors.  As a result, the Board 
made recommendations regarding more stringent requirements for IFR pilots (Flight 
Safety Foundation, 2006).  Among the resulting changes were new standards for 
instrument currency, and required proficiency checks.  Although evolved in the years 
since, currency and proficiency checks remain significant considerations (and legal 





 More changes came in 1974.  These changes were not the result of any major 
accidents, but were part of a move toward tougher new rules in most areas of pilot and 
flight school training, testing, and certification.  The FAA Chronology notes the 
following changes affecting instrument training and certification: 
 All Flight Instructors in airplanes were now required to hold an instrument 
rating.  With the advent of this rule, the ATC functions related to both IFR and 
VFR were generally better understood and explained to all pilots in training. 
 Commercial pilots were required to have an instrument rating to qualify for 
unrestricted privileges.  Additionally, the total flight time requirement for new 
Commercial pilots was raised from 200 to 250 hours, and 50 of these could be 
acquired in a ground trainer.  Since ground trainers are generally more useful in 
teaching instrument skills than visual flight skills, the effect of this rule was the 
exposure of many new commercial pilots to increased instrument training. 
 More and different skills now had to be demonstrated for an Instrument Rating; 
roughly the same ones that will be discussed later in this report.  Also, new 
currency requirements for instrument pilots with experience lapses took effect. 
By 1985, the total flight hours required for a pilot to be eligible to obtain an 
instrument rating was dropped from 200 to 125, and a few years later (when the 
regulations were yet again substantially revised) the total time requirement was dropped.  
This had the effect of making instrument training available to more pilots, and would 
encourage them to acquire the rating earlier.  Both of these results directly addressed 





pilots attempting to fly in instrument meteorological conditions (National Transportation 
Safety Board, 2005). 
 
Current Instrument Rating Requirements and Privileges 
 The currently required flight times and mandated competencies reveal the breadth 
and complexity of instrument pilot certification. The Federal Aviation Administration 
requires airmen who wish to add an instrument rating to a previously earned Private or 
Commercial certificate (with airplane category privileges) to have at least 50 hours of 
pilot-in-command cross country experience (14 CFR 61.65 (d) (1) Federal Aviation 
Regulations).  Considering that only three hours of dual cross country training and five 
hours of solo cross country training are required for Private Pilot certification (less in 
approved training curricula), the 50 hour PIC requirement makes it clear that the FAA 
still deems significant pilot experience a prerequisite for an instrument rating.  Indeed, 
many of the mandated Private Pilot competencies, such as radio communications, 
recognition and interpretation of critical weather situations, preflight procedures, 
navigation and navigation systems, and other skills must be deeply ingrained in a pilot 
prior to instrument rating eligibility.  By necessity, all are practiced during the 
accumulation of 50 hours of PIC cross country.  Even many FAA certified schools that 
are exempted from the “50 hour PIC cross country rule” voluntarily retain an equivalent 
amount and type of training within their syllabi, in part so that the necessary airman “skill 
assimilation” may occur before or during initial instrument training (Jeppesen Instrument 





specifically mandated skills required for the Instrument rating, as described by 14 CFR 
61.187 (Federal Aviation Regulations) include: 
 Attitude instrument aircraft control and operation. 
 IFR weather information and interpretation. 
 Instrument-specific chart interpretation and cross-country flight planning. 
 Aircraft instrument and instrument system knowledge. 
 Air Traffic Control procedures, phraseology, and compliance, including 
procedures related to holding, en route, departure, arrival and approach. 
 Navigation and associated navigation instrument interpretation and manipulation. 
 Applied regulatory and procedural decision making skills. 
Further, an airman applying for an instrument rating must be prepared to 
demonstrate competency on certain tasks (Flight Standards Service, Instrument Rating 
For Airplane Practical Test Standards, 2004).  A listing and explanation of required tasks 
is fairly comprehensive, and includes: 
 Obtaining, interpreting, and analyzing weather reports and forecasts.  The 
instrument rating applicant must be able to make regulatory and procedural 
decisions based on the weather forecast, such as determining and designating an 
appropriate (and legally eligible) alternate destination. 
 Planning an IFR cross-country flight.  During the planning process, the applicant 
must demonstrate due consideration of real-time weather conditions, aircraft 
performance, appropriate departure, en route, arrival, and approach charts, 
NOTAM information, and related regulatory and procedural decision making. 





 Knowledge of, preflight considerations of, and operation/interpretation of aircraft 
instruments and navigation equipment (as appropriate to the aircraft flown).  
Specific equipment listed in the PTS includes: pitot-static system, pitot heat, 
altimeter, airspeed indicator, vertical speed indicator, attitude indicator, horizontal 
situation indicator, magnetic compass, turn and-slip/turn coordinator, heading 
indicator, electrical systems, vacuum systems, electronic flight instrument display, 
VOR, DME, ILS, marker beacon receiver/indicator, transponder, ADF, GPS, 
FMS, communications equipment, and traffic and terrain awareness/avoidance 
systems. 
 Knowledge and demonstrated mastery of air traffic control clearances, including 
(at least) these clearance elements: copying, understanding and reading back the 
clearance, verifying compliance capability, and executing clearance “set up” 
tasks, such as tuning frequencies and setting transponder codes.  It should be 
noted (though the PTS does not specify) that “mastery” should also include 
knowing how to amend or modify clearances if needed, as well as finding 
frequencies and the correct ATC facility and phraseology to request the clearance. 
 The ability to execute the above clearance, with consideration given to failed 
communication or navigation equipment, and the related regulatory and 
procedural knowledge. 
 Knowledge and demonstrated mastery of holding procedures, including 
appropriate speeds, holding pattern entry procedures, holding fix identification, 





 Basic instrument flight maneuvers, which includes turns, climbs, descents, 
unusual attitudes, and various combinations of all of these.  Demonstrated 
knowledge of correct power settings and configuration during these maneuvers is 
also required. 
 Demonstrated mastery of intercepting and tracking VOR, NDB, or GPS radials, 
bearings, or routes, including DME arcs, and the identification and correct 
orientation of each. 
 Knowledge and demonstrated mastery of instrument approach procedures, 
including two nonprecision approaches (NDB, VOR, LOC, LDA, GPS, RNAV, 
SDF) and one precision approach (ILS or MLS).  Many of the operations 
specified in other tasks (communication, regulatory knowledge and resulting 
implications, clearance compliance, etc.) are integral to the completion of these 
approaches, and are listed in the PTS as specific skills to be evaluated during this 
phase of the practical test.  Also, missed approaches, circling approaches, a 
“partial panel” approach accomplished with loss of one instrument system 
(usually the vacuum driven gyros), and a landing from a straight-in approach all 
represent specific tasks with their own sets of required skill and knowledge, but 
are noted here under “approaches” for reasons of brevity. 
 Knowledge of emergency procedures, dealing mostly with loss of communication 
capability. 
It should be noted that many of these tasks require applied knowledge, which the 
FAA calls “knowledge correlation,” and it is at the top of the FAA‟s “Levels of 





The FAA defines this level as “associating what has been learned, understood, and 
applied with previous or subsequent learning,” and this is an apt description of the 
knowledge and skill required to perform many of the noted instrument pilot skills.  
Acquiring this required knowledge can be quite daunting to the beginning instrument 
student, and some pilots may not learn it well.  Instead, they may learn only enough to 
earn the rating.  This is easier than it sounds, since the FAA‟s Practical Test Standards 
book not only outlines the required skill and knowledge, but may also provide a template 
for how the skill and knowledge will be tested (though the FAA warns against using it as 
such in the Airplane Flying Handbook).  The tendency for students to prepare for the test, 
not the real-world application, is ever present (Blickensderfer, Summers, and 
Schumacher, 2005).  Indeed, FAA designated Pilot Examiners sometimes construct a test 
that incorporates the most PTS tasks in the least time, and routinely employ this test on 
successive applicants.  Instrument rating trainees (and their instructors) may prepare for 
the practical test, in part, by “networking” with peers who have taken the same test with 
the same examiner.  If the test is too predictable, less actual applied knowledge is 
required, since anticipated tasks and procedures can be memorized and demonstrated 
through rote understanding (a lower level of the FAA‟s hierarchy of learning). 
Once an instrument rating is earned, as noted, a pilot may operate an aircraft 
without outside visual references.  He or she may do so in practically any phase of flight, 
from departure, through en route and approach to landing.  The tasks related to these 
different phases of flight differ greatly in difficulty.  Some require little more than the 
ability to control the aircraft solely by reference to instruments, while others combine 





situational and procedural awareness skills.  Unlike in some other countries, there is no 
“entry level instrument rating.”  An airman who holds the FAA instrument rating (and 
complies with certain currency, aircraft type, and weather requirements) may attempt 
virtually any of the tasks noted above.   
The broad range of privileges granted by the FAA instrument rating stands in 
contrast to the limitations imposed on the holders of instrument ratings granted by other 
counties‟ aviation administrators.  In Canada and the UK, for instance, there are 
graduated instrument “ratings.”  In Canada, a not-yet-instrument rated pilot may earn a 
VFR-Over the-Top rating by demonstrating his knowledge of the required subject matter 
to a qualified flight instructor (Canadian Aviation Regulations 602.116).  This rating 
allows the holder to fly without visual contact with the ground and over or between cloud 
layers, but not without at least some outside visual references.  The flight must originate 
in, maintain, and terminate in visual meteorological conditions.  While a similar privilege 
is granted in American airspace to non-instrument rated pilots, the Canadian VFR-Over-
The-Top rating is not a transitional step in American airman certification, as it may be in 
Canada.  Indeed, the FAA‟s “VFR-On-Top” clearance, may only be granted to pilots 
who have earned an Instrument rating and are instrument current.  In the UK, non-
instrument pilots are similarly prohibited from flying without visual contact with the 
surface, while instrument rated pilots (who meet the appropriate currency and aircraft 
type requirements) have broad privileges to fly in instrument meteorological conditions, 
much like American pilots.  Between these two extremes, however, lies the U.K.‟s “IMC 
Rating,” which requires considerably less training and demonstrated skill to earn, and 





conditions for take-off and landing (LASORS, 2008).  The IMC rating, interestingly, is 
considered a “national rating” only, and is generally not recognized outside of the UK.  It 
does, however, enable UK pilots to incrementally gain experience in instrument 
meteorological conditions while insulating them from the worst IFR weather. 
It should also be noted that the training and certification philosophy of the Federal 
Aviation Administration is different than that of its European counterpart, the Joint 
Aviation Authorities, an organization which represents several European member states.  
Within the FAA, practical tests have historically been emphasized.  This is due to the 
traditional “building block” philosophy of training whereby modular “tasks” are 
contained within certificate and rating-specific flight time and knowledge requirements.  
Many of these same tasks are then grouped within “Areas of Operation” and published in 
the “Practical Test Standards,” or “PTS.”  The PTS serves as a template for how the 
practical test is to be conducted and what will be included in it.  The PTS will figure 
prominently in this research project, as we will see, and a later section of this chapter is 
dedicated to it.  A PTS is published for each of the various airman ratings and grades of 
certification, and each of the levels of certification may be a stand-alone endeavor 
(though previous levels of certification are frequently prerequisites).  Aircraft type-
specific training, when required, is done the same way.  Only in certain FAA approved 
experimental syllabi (to be discussed later) are the various privileges of the higher ratings 
learned and practiced throughout an airman‟s training.   
Within the JAA, however, the airman training structure has historically embraced 
“integrated training” more than the FAA‟s task-based training and testing philosophy 





JAA-approved flight training organizations offer the JAR-FCL professional license and 
the ARP-L (which correspond roughly to the FAA‟s Commercial and ATP certificates, 
respectively) that include training in multi-pilot and, sometimes, type-specific operations.   
Regardless of training philosophies, the need for realistic instrument training in 
any setting has made the use of flight simulators very desirable.  Indeed, the capability of 
modern simulators has made possible training situations that involve realistic IFR 
scenarios that cannot be legally or safely duplicated in actual flight.  Called “Scenario 
Based Training” (or just “SBT”), this training paradigm is used more and more frequently 
in flight training and testing, and appears to hold great promise for aviation education.  
 
Scenario Based Airman Training  
Scenario Based Training may represent a major paradigm shift in flight training.  
Traditionally, aviation training has involved the learning of facts and procedures through 
memorization, correlation, and duplication, both in the classroom and the cockpit.  Once 
learned, the mastery of facts, procedures and “maneuvers” are then demonstrated on 
written and/or practical tests.  Unfortunately, many of the facts and maneuvers are “stand 
alone” items; some do not relate directly to realistic airman competencies (Blickensderfer 
et al., 2005).  Actual point-to-point operation of an aircraft, involving information 
gathering/interpreting/application skills, is not easily tested on flight and written tests, 
and the training and preparation for those tests has therefore not been incentivized to 
include them.   
Scenario based training, on the other hand, was developed to integrate real-world 





real-world experiences to address flight training objectives in an operational 
environment” (FAA-Industry Training Standards, 2003).  In fact, SBT has been used to 
train operators in diverse environments including nuclear power plants, military team 
exercises, and others.  The concept acknowledges the need for operators in complex and 
dynamic environments to “continuously adapt their operational strategies to cope with 
emergent demands” (Oser, 1999).  Specific characteristics of SBT include: a focus on the 
development of practice and feedback, an emphasis on the acquisition of complex (i.e., 
often non-proceduralized or novel) tasks, team (rather than individual) training, and the 
use of simulation in training (Oser).  Interestingly, all of these elements are assuming 
greater importance in primary flight training with the aforementioned emphasis on 
integrated training, the greater role of the team (ATC, weather briefer, etc.) even in single 
pilot operations, and the proliferation of low-cost flight simulators.   
 Notably, Line-Oriented Flight Training, or “LOFT,” has been used in airline 
training for years.  LOFT makes use of “realistic full mission situations” in contrast to the 
isolated “tasks” common to general aviation training (Lauber and Foushee, 1981).  Loft 
training includes both routine operations and non-routine emergency operations, some of 
which are reconstructed from actual accident reports.  LOFT has proven to be so 
successful in airline training that it has replaced semi-annual proficiency checks under 
certain conditions. 
Recently, the FAA has endorsed the concept of Scenario Based Training for 
general aviation with a program called FAA/Industry Training Standards, or “FITS.”  
FITS was originally envisioned by the FAA as an initiative to improve and modernize 





training process through regulations.  Technically Advanced Aircraft, as the name 
implies, employ highly sophisticated instruments and avionics to provide pilots with a 
great deal of information.  Specifically, Technically Advanced Aircraft (TAA) are 
defined as “general aviation aircraft that contain a GPS navigator with a moving map 
display, plus any additional systems” (FAA-Industry, 2003).  Traditional systems such as 
autopilots when combined with GPS navigators are included, but the term “TAA” is 
commonly used to mean “glass cockpit.”  An aircraft so equipped has little cockpit 
similarity to traditional training aircraft; virtually all of the traditional instruments are 
replaced with “TV screens” (primary and multi-function displays).  A pilot with no glass 
cockpit training or experience would be unequipped to operate one to its full capability, 
regardless of his previous “traditional” flight experience (General Aviation TAA Safety 
Study, 2003).   
As might be expected, this infusion of technology into the General Aviation Fleet 
has created major training headaches for the FAA.  Aware that TAA were continuing to 
evolve, and that TAA were representing an increasing percentage of the fleet, the FAA in 
1995 sought outside guidance to juggle the conflicting issues of rapid industry growth, 
changing technology, and declining resources (FAA-Industry, 2003).  As part of 
Challenge 2000 - the name of the FAA‟s initiative to prepare for the necessary changes in 
general aviation oversight - the Administration commissioned a national consulting firm 
to advise them on how to proceed.  The consulting firm‟s final report contained a section 
entitled “Empower Rulemaking and Evolve To Performance Based Regulation,” which 
encouraged the FAA to do just that.  Further, the report noted that “the current 





responsive to the pace of change in the aviation environment, nor to granting industry the 
operational flexibility [to evolve towards performance based regulations]” (FAA-
Industry).  In response, the FAA has created and fully endorsed FITS.   As noted, an 
integral part of FITS is to incorporate scenario based training into primary (and 
advanced) flight training.  Another characteristic of FITS is the direct input that 
manufacturers and users have on training requirements.  Indeed, the FAA has stated that 
they are deliberately “confining the scope of FITS to technical standards, rather than 
regulatory and policy issues” (FAA-Industry).  Suppliers and trainers are encouraged to 
submit syllabi to the FAA for approval, and the FAA publishes multiple approved syllabi 
to serve as templates (Federal Aviation Administration, n.d.).  The FAA‟s role is 
“primarily in the areas of technical review and as repository for the standards” (FAA-
Industry).  Once FAA approval is granted, training and standardization with FITS syllabi 
may be conducted.  This provides several benefits for both trainers and trainees, 
including reduced training time, possible insurance cost reduction, and of course, more 
realistic flight training.  Of course, the FAA will retain statutory oversight responsibility.  
Along with simply “approving” FITS syllabi submitted by industry stakeholders, a 
specially formed FAA workgroup will be trained and knowledgeable in FITS standards 
and will critically evaluate and make recommendations for approved syllabi and provide 
guidance to Aviation Safety Inspectors and Designated Pilot Examiners (FAA-Industry). 
Initial research into the efficacy of FITS-style SBT shows promise both in the 
reduction of training time and the integration of multiple airman competencies.  As noted, 
integrating real-world pilot skills into the training and testing mandated by the regulations 





technological advances of these aircraft (synthetic course depiction, moving maps, 
depicted weather and limitation information) are not fully utilized unless a pilot is 
operating under (or training for) instrument flight rules and/or conducting course-
specific, point-to-point operations.  As already noted, traditional flight training - with its 
bias towards stick-and-rudder, task-based training - does not fully take advantage of these 
technological advances.  To determine, in part, whether modern aircraft and airmanship 
had advanced beyond the traditional training paradigm, researchers at Middle Tennessee 
State University devised a study involving TAA aircraft, a training paradigm that 
involved no minimum flight times, and a scenario based curriculum.  The scenarios were 
“real-world” based; the student‟s very first flight using the syllabus involved a trip to a 
nearby airport.  And, while the syllabus still required basic stick-and-rudder skills, they 
were encompassed in a “mission” scenario.  Notably, the MTSU study involved the 
seamless training of student pilots from “zero time” up through the instrument rating, 
which is only now being considered for codification into the Federal Aviation 
Regulations through the FAA‟s proposed rule making process (Pilot In Command 
Proficiency Check And Other Changes, 2009).  We should remember that combining 
certificates and ratings is definitely not the norm, as the FAA‟s modular training 
philosophy has traditionally required Private pilot certification first, and then the addition 
of an instrument rating (General Philosophies, 2008).  Traditionally, both of these levels 
of airman certification have required distinct flight time requirements, skill sets, and 
training regimens.  Indeed, MTSU researchers had pioneered combined Private and 
Instrument training, having previously (2004) developed the first experimental combined 





certificated flight school.  Even so, the FAA was not entirely willing to combine the 
training and testing of the two levels of certification for the study, and granted the 
researchers a conditional exemption from the standard training paradigm that still 
included “…many drill-and-practice type maneuvers that do no match well with [the 
study‟s] scenario based syllabus” (Craig, Bertrand, Dornan, Gossett, and Thorsby, 2005).  
Indeed, researchers noted that elements of the FAA‟s incomplete approval to forego 
Private pilot certification en route to the instrument rating “lengthens the time of training 
and pushes instructors to „teach the test‟ rather than „teach for the real world‟” (Craig et 
al.).  Understandably, some of the “bottlenecks” of traditional flight training remained, 
particularly the difficulty of (and repetition of lessons to prepare for) first solo flight.  
However as training progressed, students involved in the study reaped major rewards as 
more advanced airman tasks such as cross country planning, navigation, and instrument 
approaches - all of which had been practiced since early in the curriculum - were 
performed with relative ease.  Indeed, student pilots involved in the study earned private 
and instrument ratings in an average time of 88.7 flight hours.  This compares favorably 
to the average of 134.3 hours for control group students who followed the traditional 
training paradigm (Craig et al.). 
It should not be assumed that the move away from traditional “maneuvers based 
training” is applicable only to TAA.  In fact, the FAA and various flight training 
stakeholders encourage the use of scenario based training for all levels of airman 
certification and for all types of aircraft.  One notable example is Jeppesen, a well known 
provider of aviation training materials and aeronautical charts.  Jeppesen impacts much of 





(all flight instructors are required to renew their certification biannually) so much of the 
Jeppesen curriculum “trickles down” to all pilots.  A core component of this curriculum 
is a lengthy section entitled “Systems Safety,” which includes the following subtopics: 
Risk Management, Decision making, Single-pilot Resource Management, and Scenario-
based instruction.  The section begins with a statement that encourages a shift away from 
isolated maneuvers-based training towards more realistic “scenario” style training:  
Your students will learn how to perform dozens of individual maneuvers and 
procedures throughout the course of their training…[but] when you incorporate 
system safety concepts into your instruction, you teach your student to look at 
the life cycle of each flight as a system that depends on the working 
relationships of a wide variety of elements (Jeppesen CFI Renewal).   
The Jeppesen text acknowledges that students are “…more anxious to learn to land, 
fly an approach, or handle a simulated emergency … than to manage risk and hone their 
decision-making abilities.”  But the text supports the necessity to do the latter with 
sobering facts and statistics, including: 
 “The Nall Report lists the pilot as the major cause in over 70 percent of all 
accidents.”   
 “Continuing VFR flight into IFR conditions result in the greatest number of 
fatal weather accidents.”   
  “Maneuvering flight is one of the largest single producers of fatal accidents.  
Many of these accidents are caused by loss of control during low, slow flight; or 





 “Personal flying averages about 50 percent of all GA flying, but is responsible 
for approximately 70 percent of all accidents and at least 75 percent of fatal 
accidents.  The Nall Report has stated: “Reasons for the high accident rate in 
personal flying include lack of experience, proficiency issues, pilots exceeding 
personal limitations, showing off, and just plain poor judgment.”   
 “Studies have shown a strong link between errors in decision making and the 
severity of accidents: simple problems with skills can produce minor injuries 
and damage, while faulty decision making often results in accidents with serious 
injuries and fatalities.” 
The Jeppesen text also supplies tools and subject matter designed to help teach 
students to see the “big picture” when conducting a flight.  One of these, as noted, is 
Aeronautical Decision Making, which borrows strongly from the scenario-based concept.  
Aeronautical Decision Making, or “ADM,” is a training philosophy that leads students 
into simulated non-emergency situations that require “on-the-fly” decision making and 
applied actions.  In short, the carefully planned maneuvers or tasks of a lesson may not 
happen, but are instead replaced by the necessity to adapt with applied knowledge of 
resources and procedures.  Indeed, the acronym ADAPT (Acknowledge a change, Define 
the problem, Analyze your options, Perform an action, and Think ahead) is one of the 
tools that Jeppesen encourages all pilots to learn.  As noted, the FAA has heartily 
endorsed the ADM concept, and requires ADM principles to be applied during all 
practical tests.  In fact, ADM appears in the special Emphasis section in the Private, 
Commercial, Instrument, and Flight Instructor Practical Test Standards (Flight Standards 





The Need for Realistic Instrument Training 
 As noted, bad weather has always been the nemesis of safe flight.  Even in the 
modern era, with weather information easily obtainable and knowledge of adverse 
weather required of all pilots, weather related accidents still occur.  In fact, while the total 
number of general aviation accidents per year has declined over the past two decades, the 
proportion of general aviation accidents that occur during instrument meteorological 
conditions has remained fairly constant, ranging from 5 to 9 per cent (NTSB Risk 
Factors, 2005).  Further, weather-related accidents that occur in IMC are much more 
likely to be fatal than accidents that take place in visual meteorological conditions.  This 
is due to the common causes of both.  VMC weather-related accidents are most likely to 
be relatively low-speed takeoff or landing mishaps, often caused by gusty wind.  
Conversely, IMC accidents are more likely to involve loss of control at altitude and 
uncontrolled descent to the ground with a correspondingly high speed (Price & Groff).  
Indeed, over the past 20 years about two-thirds of all IMC general aviation accidents 
have been fatal.  This represents a rate about three times higher than the fatality rate of all 
GA accidents (NTSB Risk Factors)!   
 Not surprisingly, much research has been conducted regarding IMC accidents.  
Researchers within the National Transportation Safety Board published reports on 
weather- or visibility-related GA accidents in 1968, 1974, 1976, and 1989.  A total of 82 
recommendations resulted from these reports, with most directed at the FAA.  Other 
recommendations were addressed to the Environmental Science Services Administration 
or the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.  The Board‟s 





weather information, air traffic control, and pilot training and operation.  Obviously, the 
category of “pilot training and operation” is most relevant to this project, and within it the 
Board‟s recommendations have included: 
 Revise the regulations to disallow takeoffs or flight beyond the final approach fix 
of instrument approaches unless the latest weather report for that airport reports 
the visibility to be equal to or greater than the prescribed visibility minimums. 
(1983) 
 Require all holders of airman certificates with instrument and multiengine ratings 
to demonstrate “ability to operate a multiengine aircraft under normal and 
emergency conditions by reference to flight instruments.” (1985) 
 Incrementally increasing requirements for airman meteorological knowledge at 
various grades of certification. (1975, 1977) 
 Issue an advisory circular stressing to all instrument-rated pilots the need for 
continuous surveillance of flight instruments when operating in IMC (!). (1973) 
 Revised limits on minimum approach altitudes and visibility. (1969, 1973) 
 The NTSB‟s research on GA weather accidents have not specifically focused on 
the level of pilot certification, probably because a general assumption is that it is non-
instrument rated pilots who are the hapless victims of VFR flight into IMC.  Indeed, the 
majority of the accidents studied involved relatively low-time, non-instrument rated 
pilots (NTSB Risk Factors, 2005).  The annual Nall report does correlate level of pilot 
certification and accident trends, but tracks grade of pilot certification rather than pilot 
ratings.  It may be that the role of instrument rating training and testing, and the impact 





 One recent study did make at least some assumptions about the efficacy of the 
instrument rating.  This NTSB study, entitled Risk Factors Associated With Weather-
Related General Aviation Accidents compared GA weather accident flights to flights on 
the same day and location that did not result in an accident.  Among the Board‟s findings 
was that of the 72 accidents studied, 68 percent of the accident pilots were rated for 
instrument flight.  This statistic, of course, does not mean that instrument rated pilots are 
less skilled than non-instrument rated pilots at flying in adverse weather.  Rather, it more 
likely reflects the obvious increased exposure of instrument rated pilots to IMC.  Indeed, 
another of the Board‟s findings was that “not having an instrument rating was associated 
with significantly higher accident risk… pilots who did not hold an instrument rating 
were found to be 4.8 times more likely than instrument-rated pilots to be involved in a 
weather-related accident” (NTSB).  Also, the 2007 Nall Report (AOPA Air Safety 
Foundation, 2007) noted that if all general aviation flight hours are lumped together, 
flight in IMC actually has a lower per-hour accident rate than does flight in VMC (5.7 
vs. 7.2 accidents per 100,000 hours). 
 Still, the fact that 68 percent of the studied weather-related accidents involved 
instrument rated pilots suggests that the instrument rating is no panacea for bad weather.  
In fact, it may suggest that some pilots who have earned an instrument rating are not able 
to use it.  Anecdotal comments within the literature seem to agree, as noted aviation 
columnist Richard Collins observes:  
Some years ago, VFR weather-related accidents outnumbered IFR 
weather-related accidents by a lot.  That has now reversed and many 





IFR flying, or maybe VFR pilots are doing a better job of risk 
management.  Whatever the reason, the potentially high level of risk is 
something to think about before taking the IFR plunge (Collins, 2008). 
 Within the NTSB‟s database of aviation accidents, certain accident reports cast 
some doubt on the efficacy of instrument training.  Some of these same accidents, 
however, may also reveal a very real element of instrument training‟s value: it teaches the 
inherent difficulty of instrument flying!  A fatal accident on July 6, 2007 is one example.  
On this date, an instrument-rated commercial pilot anxiously watched the weather and 
debated attempting an IFR flight from Waco to Lufkin, Texas.  As an area of low ceilings 
and reduced visibility moved through the region, the pilot called the Flight Service 
Station no fewer than six times to receive standard briefings and updates.  During the 
conversations the pilot revealed that he was instrument-rated but “did not want to take 
any chances,” and that his flight instructor told him not to take off if he “didn‟t feel 
comfortable.”  But, with the desire to get home building, the pilot did finally file an IFR 
flight plan and take off into the clouds.   
It was a fatal decision, as the pilot was unable to intercept and track a course or 
even maintain aircraft control.  The pilot departed normally and transitioned from Low 
Radar (Control Tower) to Approach Control High Radar, but then evidently broke out of 
the clouds and began discussing with ATC the feasibility of changing his clearance to 
“VFR on Top,” possibly implying that he was uncomfortable in IMC.  Before any change 
in his clearance was made, however, he reported that he was “back in the clouds now,” 
and would remain IFR “unless something happens.”  A few minutes later, the pilot drifted 





didn‟t know what was wrong with his Global Positioning System.  With ATC assistance, 
the pilot was turned back towards the course line to Lufkin.  However, within a few more 
minutes the pilot overshot the course to the right but then corrected back to the left.  
Then, for unexplained reasons, the aircraft entered a shallow turn to the right.  Soon after, 
a routine frequency hand-off prompted a 1,000 feet per minute descent.  Noting the 
heading and altitude deviations, the ATC controller queried the pilot and assigned a new 
heading and altitude.  Within seconds the pilot reported that he was “lost and going to 
descend.”  The right turn continued and the rate of descent increased (up to 3,600 feet per 
minute) before the aircraft contacted terrain in an uncontrolled spiral dive.  The post-
accident investigation revealed no mechanical anomalies with the aircraft, and the NTSB 
ultimately determined the probable cause to be “loss of control due to spatial 
disorientation,” with a contributing factor being “lack of flight experience in actual 
instrument meteorological conditions” (NTSB Accident Report DFW07).  In fact the 
pilot was inexperienced with only 456.7 hours total time, 105.7 hours of simulated 
instrument time, and 2.5 hours of actual instrument time.   
Of course, care should be taken that too much significance is not read into 
isolated accident reports.  However, the similarities between the preceding report and 
observations made during the research flights to be discussed later are unmistakable.  The 
pilot in the accident report cited above knew that the flight he was undertaking was risky, 
and he did so only under considerable, self-imposed duress.  The pilot‟s hesitancy to 
embark on the flight may emphasize an unintended value of instrument training: the 
breadth and depth of the required knowledge reveals just how much is demanded of the 





that single pilot IFR is something that they are “not really ready for,” and some pilot 
examiners award successful instrument applicants a new certificate while semi-jokingly 
referring to it as “a license to learn.”  Indeed, the accident rate of instrument-rated pilots 
does decrease considerably with experience after the rating is earned.  Jeppesen reports 
that “pilots with less than 50 hours of instrument time were involved in 58% of all 
weather accidents, and 47% of fatal weather accidents.  As pilots gain more experience 
(50 to 100 hours of instrument flying time) their risk decreases by more than 80% to a 
level slightly below 9% of all accidents” (Jeppesen Guided Flight Discovery Team, 
Advanced Human Factors, 2006).  Newly rated instrument pilots may be insulated from 
IMC accidents simply because they have learned first-hand how difficult it is and opt to 
not try it. 
 Another accident in the NTSB‟s database (NTSB Accident Report MIA07) may 
suggest the difficulty of single-pilot IFR for an inexperienced pilot.  The accident, which 
occurred on September 21, 2007, involved a flight from Conway, South Carolina to 
Culpeper, Virginia.  The pilot, who died in the crash, took off into solid IFR weather; 
ceilings in the vicinity were between 200‟ and 500‟ AGL, and visibility at an airport 11 
miles away (ceiling and visibility were not reported at the airport of departure) was 
reported as ½ mile.  Evidently, the pilot‟s plan was to “scud run,” which is a slang term 
meaning to stay below clouds and maintain visual contact with the surface for navigation 
and obstacle clearance.  The pilot managed to do just that for approximately 45 minutes, 
though the weather continued to worsen and terrain elevation was gradually rising along 
his route.  Radar data reflects that the flight was never higher than about 600‟AGL, and 





AGL and a water tower at 215‟ AGL) prompted an aggressive maneuver and ultimate 
loss of control.  Sadly, “scud running” is a common cause of accidents for non-instrument 
rated pilots and is frequently associated with the “VFR into IMC” accident category.  
Usually, it is done because the pilot has no other options besides staying on the ground, 
e.g. the weather is IFR and the pilot is VFR only.  The accident described above is 
therefore notable for at least one very good reason: the pilot was instrument rated.  
 Indeed, the pilot had earned his instrument rating some 23 months earlier and had 
logged three simulated instrument flights since, totaling 8.5 simulated instrument hours. 
Notably, however, he had no logged time in actual instrument conditions.  Why he did 
not elect to use his instrument rating on the accident flight to climb to a safe altitude, 
particularly as ceiling and visibility decreased, is unknown.  Possible answers, as 
suggested by Goh and Wiegmann (2001), are that the pilot‟s decision making was flawed 
by poor “situation assessment” and/or poor “risk perception.”  That is, the pilot may have 
simply underestimated the worsening weather conditions and overestimated his ability to 
compensate for them, and therefore concluded that operation under IFR was unnecessary.  
Another possible answer, however, and one that may be under-researched, is that he was 
less intimidated by the rising terrain than by the difficulty of acquiring and executing an 
IFR clearance!  Indeed, other instrument rated pilots have possibly made the same 
decision.  As noted, the NTSB reports that 68% of pilots involved in weather related GA 
accidents from August 2003 through April 2004 were instrument rated, though only 







Investigating the Practical Test Standards 
Within the flight training industry, other researchers have given thought to the 
current airman certification training and testing paradigm.  A study conducted jointly by 
faculty at the University of North Dakota and Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University 
proposes “development of a methodology for justifying the inclusion or removal of 
maneuvers from the Practical Test Standards.”  This study was published in four reports 
between April and October 2005.  Not surprisingly, the first report is an analysis of how 
the current Practical Test Standards were originally created and subsequently evolved.  
Researchers‟ telephone interviews with members of AFS 630 (the FAA branch tasked 
with oversight of the PTS) revealed that “…many maneuvers [in the PTS] had been 
„Grandfathered in‟ based on original work by the Army Air Corps.”  Further, the FAA 
acknowledged that the intent of some PTS maneuvers were designed to “teach eye-hand 
coordination, division of attention, and basic aircraft control,” and were admittedly “not 
tasks that a pilot encounters on real flights” (Blickensderfer et al., 2005).  This 
“disconnect” between PTS maneuvers and “real flights” has become even more apparent 
with the advent of FITS, as discussed earlier.  Researchers creating FITS-style syllabi 
have noted a “mismatch” between FITS training and the final Practical Test.  Researchers 
argued that the “FITS approach to pilot training trains the same knowledge and skills but 
in a different manner” (Blickensderfer et al.).   As evidence, they offer the traditional PTS 
task of “turns around a point,” a maneuver designed to acquaint the student with wind 
drift corrections and the necessary division of attention inside and outside of the cockpit.  
These same skills, researchers contend, are already developed via the accomplishment of 





times, the flight instructor must take the student‟s focus off of the “big picture” and teach 
with the “sole purpose of passing the PTS-mandated test instead of teaching the skills 
necessary for actual flights.”  Further research into the efficacy of traditional maneuvers-
based flight training led to a series of surveys in which other flight maneuvers were 
evaluated.  Flight instructors from the two aeronautical universities were asked about the 
relevance of “tasks” in the Private and Commercial PTS.  The questions were designed to 
elicit an “expert” opinion on (1) how frequently the task was required for actual flight, (2) 
how important the task was perceived to be for an actual point-to-point flight, (3) how 
“real” the task used in training was perceived to be, and (4) how redundantly the task 
was evaluated in other, but similar training tasks (Blickensderfer et al, 2005.)  As might 
be expected, many of the traditional training tasks were scored quite low in all areas, with 
ground-reference maneuvers generally fairing the worst (Blickensderfer et al.). 
Researchers from UND and ERAU note that the issues confronting practical test 
creation and application are content validity and criterion validity, and while considerable 
research exists on both topics, a simple definition of each will suffice here.  In this 
context, “Content Validity” refers to the relationship between what knowledge or skill is 
tested, and what knowledge or skill is required for the performance of the actual task or 
procedure.  Criterion validity, in this context, relates to the measurement of knowledge 
and skills, and how this measurement gleaned from the test accurately gauges actual 
performance of the task in the real world.  Blickensderfer et al. note a reported 
“mismatch” in what the PTS requires, and what is actually required in certain operations, 
particularly the operation of TAA aircraft and the training outlined in certain FITS 





by the PTS, content validity issues are certainly called into question.  She further notes 
that Craig et al. (2005) contends that artificial PTS requirements, such as the formerly 
noted “turns around a point,” are not a valid measure of an airman‟s ability to conduct 
“real” ground-reference operations (such as a traffic pattern), and that grading the former 
as a gauge of the latter represents questionable criterion validity.  This is compounded by 
the knowledge that considerable time and energy is spent training the student to perform 
turns around a point, when both the student and instructor know that the maneuver will 
only be performed on the practical test, and rarely or never in real life.  Anecdotal 
comments from the flight instructors who completed the UND/ERAU survey made 
repeated references to “wasting” training time while teaching certain maneuvers.  The 
comments include: “This maneuver in no way relates to any skill required in flight.  It‟s 
time consuming and frustrating for students to train [to] standards in these maneuvers,” 
“Never used for normal flight,” “Never performed one or needed to other than on the 
check ride,” and “Only thing I get out of this is patience!” 
It should be noted that Blickensderfer‟s work dealt exclusively with the Private 
and Commercial Practical Test Standards and their respective levels of airman 
certification.  Likewise, Craig et al‟s work deals with Private pilot operations.  And while 
their findings have great relevance to all airman certification, they may have even more 
profound implications for the instrument rating.  Indeed, content and criterion validity 
could have serious implications for instrument training since actual IFR operations 
routinely involve weather, complex ATC interaction, and decision making scenarios that 





on the Instrument rating test may be highly suspect, since certain items may never be 
tested at all! 
In fairness, it should be noted that the PTS is not a static document, and AFS 630 
does not ignore changes within the flight training industry.  In fact, each PTS (a separate 
PTS exists for each airman certificate and rating) is reviewed and updated on a 5-year 
cycle, with incremental changes occurring as needed.  The update process involves the 
solicitation of input from industry stakeholders including FAA designated examiners, 
active pilots and FAA administrators, and the general public (Blickensderfer et al., 2005).  
Indeed, the PTS is published with an introduction that solicits input from the field, and 
provides an address for interested parties to forward comments to the FAA.  Further, the 
PTS contains a section entitled “Special Emphasis Areas,” which frequently represent the 
very latest issues relevant to aviation safety, and as previously noted, makes reference to 
scenario-implied Aeronautical Decision Making principles.   
It should also be noted that scenarios, rather than tasks only, figure prominently in 
the FAA Practical Test Standards.  For instance, in an introductory section entitled “Use 
of the Practical Test Standards” in the Instrument Rating PTS, the examiner is required to 
develop a written “plan of action” that includes “one or more scenarios that will be used 
during the test.”  The examiner is further encouraged to include as many tasks as possible 
within the scenarios, but also to “maintain the flexibility to change due to unexpected 
situations,” presumably to accurately model real-world operations (Flight Standards, 
2004).  The PTS has also codified the need to evaluate “basic instrument flight 
maneuvers throughout the test instead of being treated as separate tasks” in a section 





for developing scenarios that require an applicant to apply Aeronautical Decision Making 
principles, with weather decisions and performance planning being noted.  Finally, in a 
preliminary section of the Instrument Rating PTS entitled “Examiner Responsibility,” it 
is clearly stated that “Examiners shall test to the greatest extent practicable the 
applicant‟s correlative abilities rather than mere rote enumeration of facts throughout the 
test.”  How effectively the corps of instrument examiners are integrating these 




The prospect of change to flight training is nothing new.  Indeed, changes to 
knowledge, experience, equipment, and certificate requirements have accompanied the 
instrument rating since its inception in 1933.  What has not changed is the need to keep 
flight training current with contemporary educational philosophy and technology, and the 
time may be right for a major infusion of modernity.  The burgeoning fields of scenario 
based training, sophisticated, low-cost flight simulation, and blended-rating syllabi may 
together be poised to significantly change flight training.  Certainly, cause exists to 
critically examine the present training paradigm, and see if it might be improved by an 
unflinching evaluation of current training practices.  As discussed in this chapter, current 
instrument rating test standards, and the way in which they are employed in practical 
tests, may not clearly discriminate between applicants who have adequate instrument 





a real IFR flight, with real-time application of instrument pilot skill, can provide 
satisfactory answers to the following research questions:   
 1. Does the newly rated instrument pilot, having demonstrated the ability to pass 
the FAA instrument rating practical test as described in the practical test standards and 
applied by a FAA designated pilot examiner, really have the skills and knowledge 
necessary to successfully complete a simulated, non-training, point-to-point, IFR flight? 
 2. Did the training of the newly rated instrument pilot adequately prepare him or 
her to apply the skill and knowledge required by 14 CFR FAR 61.65 (b) and (c) to 
successfully surmount common challenges during a real-world IFR flight? 
 The following chapter will describe how, in this study, a “real” flight under 
instrument flight rules, with real-world ATC interaction and common IFR procedures, 












 This study proposes collection of data to answer questions concerning the 
effectiveness of airman instrument rating training; specifically, is an airman who has 
earned an instrument rating able to successfully use it?  The information may be useful in 
evaluating the efficacy of instrument rating training and potentially improving it, and will 
also be used to address the research questions that appeared at the end of the last chapter 
and will be repeated later in this one.  Specifically, this chapter will describe in detail 
how the experiment used to answer these questions was constructed. 
 In this self-reported study, data was collected using human subjects conducting a 
simulated IFR, point-to-point, flight in a flight simulator.  The volunteer research 
participants in this study, all of whom were newly certified instrument rated pilots, were 
tasked with conducting an IFR flight with moderate, but common, “challenges” occurring 
en route.  None of the challenges were designed to constitute an emergency, but all were 
designed to represent fairly common tasks that are not easily duplicated, and possibly 





required instrument pilot competencies (referenced in this study as both “tasks” and 
“learning objectives”) with representative letter grades assigned for each required 
competency.  The relative importance of each task was assessed as well, with each being 
assigned a numeric value from 1 (least important) to 5 (most important).  The rationale 
for the foregoing task valuation assessment is discussed in the task headings in Chapter 
IV and sometimes in the text in Chapter V.  Finally, the performance of the research 
participants was measured against the performance of more experienced instrument 
pilots, and the Fisher exact test was employed to determine if a measurable performance 
difference could be detected between the two groups.  
This chapter will explain the methodology of the study and will describe the 
population represented by the sample, including its size and major characteristics, and a 
definition and justification for the term “newly certificated instrument pilot.”  The 
development of the instrument will be explained in some detail, as it is multi-faceted.  
Additionally, definition and justification for the “common challenges” will be provided.  
Documentation and explanation of “instrument pilot competencies” will also be provided, 
and an explanation of the grading process and criteria will be clarified and correlated with 
an FAA certification standard.  Finally, certain procedural details will be explained. 
 
Development of the Instrument 
 The instrument in this study is a “real” IFR flight.  The use of the word “real” in 
this context does not mean “actual,” but is designed to imply that the flight may be more 
“real” than many instrument training flights, as will be discussed later.  Indeed, the flight 





simulator that meets AATD (Advanced Aircraft Training Device) criteria.  Simulated 
flights are common within airman training as they provide efficiency of time and cost, as 
well as allow potentially hazardous routine and non-routine operations to be conducted 
safely (Flexman, Matheny, and Brown, 1993).  The efficacy of simulated flight for 
training purposes has been documented as far back as 1950 by Lintern & McMillan.  
Since then, the sophistication of simulated flight and its fidelity to real flight has been 
enhanced greatly.  Simulated flights are not only commonly used in airman training, but 
are even used for elements of airman certification tests if the “simulator” meets required 
criteria (14 CFR Part 61.65 (e) (2).  The simulator used in this study does.  It is a Fidelity 
Flight Simulation MOTUS 622i, which can be configured for multiple aircraft types and 
training scenarios.  For this project, it was configured with the permanent fixtures (yoke, 
knobs, instruments, etc.) and visual cues (computer generated instrument and terrain 
graphics) of a Cessna 172, which is the make and model of instrument trainer used at 
Oklahoma State University, the source for all participants in this study.  The simulator 
and its installation have been approved by the Federal Aviation Administration for 
instrument training and limited testing as noted in the approval letter in Appendix H. 
 Enhancing the realism of the simulated flight were non-emergency “challenges.”  
Stated more simply, the flight did not go exactly as the pilots planned.  Instead, they were 
required to apply skill and knowledge to modify the route, enter a hold, and perform a 
missed approach at the destination.  The pilots then had to decide what to do next, and be 
able to (or at least begin to) implement this plan.  All of these “challenges” were 
applications of the required competencies of instrument rated pilots.  All are tested on 





“Practical Test,” or more commonly “checkride,” is conducted in strict compliance with a 
published test guide, called the Instrument Rating Practical Test Standards.  The 
Practical Test Standards, or “PTS,” is published by the FAA.  As noted in Chapter II, it 
contains a very specific outline of the required skills and knowledge of an instrument 
rated pilot, and provides guidance on how these skills are to be tested.  The structure of 
the PTS breaks these skills down into “Areas of Operations,” “Tasks,” and “Elements.”  
The PTS ensures that all aspiring instrument pilots (and their instructors) are informed of 
the body of knowledge over which they may be tested and serves to standardize the base 
knowledge threshold required to pass the test.  It stands to reason, then, that all 
instrument rated pilots have demonstrated competency in the various tasks and elements 
of the PTS or they would otherwise not hold the rating.  Of course, no single test can 
fully measure a pilot‟s ability to apply the twenty-one tasks of the PTS to all conceivable 
in-flight situations.  Thus, the challenges of the proposed research flight are simple, 
stated elements of the PTS applied to a “real” flight.  They may be elements, however, 
that were under-practiced or under-tested during the airman‟s training.  The intent of this 
study, simply stated, is to determine if the newly rated pilot can successfully meet the 
challenge of moderate “real world” IFR problems in a “real world” IFR flight.  The 
pilot‟s new rating says that he can.  The “real” flight in the simulator was designed to 
challenge this assertion.  
 It should be noted that none of the “challenges” confronting participants in the 
simulated flight were emergencies.  That is, none of the challenges, by themselves, met 





Glossary, even if the pilot‟s possible inability to cope with the challenge did constitute an 
emergency.  The challenges for this flight were limited to: 
 Route change (PTS Area of Operation III, Task B, Objective 1, 3, 6). 
 Clearance amendment (PTS Area of Operation III, Task A, Objective 1, 2, 3, 4, 
7). 
 Unsuccessful approach due to terminal area weather and execution of missed 
approach (PTS Area of Operation VI, Task C, Objective 1, 2, 4, 5).  
 Holding clearance/entry and execution of a hold (PTS Area of Operation III, 
Task C, Objectives 1, 3, 4, 6). 
 Necessity to select an alternate destination, and make sound decisions regarding 
fuel, weather, and route in order to get there (PTS Area of Operation I, Task A, 
Objective 2 and 5). 
 As noted, enhancing the realism of the flight was its point-to-point nature.  Most 
instrument training flights depart and return to the same airport.  For instance, the 
Jeppesen Instrument Syllabus, which is a commercially produced syllabus in use at many 
collegiate flight training institutions, requires only three of the twenty-nine lessons to 
have departure and arrival points that are different, along with two other flights where 
cross-country “procedures” are to be practiced (Instrument Commercial Syllabus, 2002).  
Thus, most instrument training flights are “local” flights.  By definition, local flights 
generally do not expose students to the structure of the IFR departure, en route, and 
arrival system.  Also, local flights do not normally require en route decision making and 
amending, since there is not an en route portion of the flight. By contrast, a simulated 





and operational requirements.  Indeed, modification to routes, clearances, and terminal 
weather may be easily incorporated both visually and operationally in the simulator.  The 
actual conduct of the flight, including dialogue with ATC, specific routing and 
clearances, and the relationship of all of these to their respective learning objectives is 
published in appendix A.  Multiple documents necessary for the completion of the flight 
were presented to participants and are also published as appendices.  These include: a 
standardized pre-flight briefing issued to all participants (Appendix B), a near-complete 
flight plan form (Appendix C), Terminal Area Forecasts for weather at area airports 
(Appendix D), and applicable approach (Appendix M) and en route (Appendix N) charts. 
 
Sample and Its Relationship to Population 
 The control group participants in this study were instrument rated pilots with less 
than 25 hours of PIC (pilot in command) flight time under IFR.  Flight time was verified 
by a logbook audit before the “flight.”  All of the participants were students in the 
Oklahoma State University aviation program, an FAA approved Part 141 flight training 
provider.  The participants were recruited by use of flyers posted at the OSU Flight 
Center (Appendix D), as well as personal appeals made to certain aviation-related classes 
at OSU and to individuals.  All qualified volunteers were accepted up to a maximum of 
25.  Indeed, the randomness of participant selection was assured by the fact that all 
eligible participants who were willing to participate were included in the test group; there 
was no picking and choosing of participants!  To eliminate certain variables relating to 







.  The only inducement offered to volunteers was loggable “flight” time that they 
would acquire during the project.   
All of the participants were “newly certified,” in that they had acquired less than 
25 hours as PIC under IFR.  Statistically, it could be argued that any instrument pilot 
with less than 100 hours of “instrument time” is a “new” instrument pilot, since the 
accident rates show that “as pilots gain more experience (50 to 100 hours of instrument 
time) their risk [of a weather related accident] decreases by more than 80%” (Jeppesen 
Guided Flight Discovery Team, Advanced Human Factors, 2006).  The 25 hour limit, 
therefore, was somewhat arbitrary, but was helpful in defining an available sample of 
the population. 
 
Required Instrument Pilot Competencies 
 The required competencies that this study sought to measure are also learning 
“Objectives” stated in the PTS.  Or, as the research question asks, “Did the recently 
certified instrument pilot have the skill and knowledge required by 14 CFR FAR 61.65 
(b) and (c) to successfully surmount common challenges during a real-world IFR flight?”  
The learning objectives for this research project were supplied by the “elements,” “tasks,” 
and “objectives” within the “Areas of Operation” published in the instrument rating 
Practical Test Standards.  As noted in the PTS, “The Objective lists the important 
elements that must be satisfactorily performed to demonstrate competency in a TASK.”  
                                                 
1
 It should be noted that one participant was not legally current, but was only 4 days out of currency.  Since 
getting this participant current would have required five approaches, a hold, and other tasks which would 
allow enough practice to potentially skew research results, he was allowed to participate without meeting 
currency requirements.  It should also be noted that this participant had made a similar dual flight in actual 
instrument conditions only the day before, and had actually performed (coincidentally) the Tulsa ILS 36R 
approach.  The principal investigator deemed that this practice somewhat offset the participant‟s lack of 





And, while there are many tasks listed in the PTS relevant to the single engine instrument 
pilot, only eight of these objectives were selected for this research project.  The objective 
selection process was based upon relevance of the objective to the flight and time 
required to evaluate it.  It should be noted that specific elements within the objectives - 
such as allowed divergence criteria or irrelevant requirements - were sometimes omitted 
from the objectives or modified for this research project.  This was done to more 
accurately gauge a “real” flight, since the success of a flight is measured by its correct - 
not perfect - conduct.  For instance, a minor altitude divergence that could technically be 
grounds for failure of the practical test would likely receive no more than a reminder to 
“check altitude” from ATC during a real flight.  The eight objectives, thus excerpted from 
the PTS, are: 
  
 Learning Objective 1:  AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL CLEARANCES 
REFERENCES: 14 CFR parts 61, 91; FAA-H-8083-15; AIM 
 Objective.  To determine that the applicant: 
  1. Exhibits adequate knowledge of the elements related to ATC clearances 
  and pilot/controller responsibilities (…). 
  2. Copies correctly, in a timely manner, the ATC clearance as issued. 
  3. Determines that it is possible to comply with ATC clearance. 
  4. Interprets correctly the ATC clearance received and, when necessary,  
  requests clarification, verification, or change. 
  5. Reads back correctly, in a timely manner, the ATC clearance in the  





  6. Uses standard phraseology when reading back clearance. 
  7. Sets the appropriate communication and navigation systems and  
  transponder codes in compliance with the ATC clearance. 
  
Learning Objective 2: COMPLIANCE WITH DEPARTURE, EN ROUTE, 
 AND ARRIVAL PROCEDURES AND CLEARANCES 
REFERENCES: 14 CFR parts 61, 91; FAA-H-8083-15; DPs; En Route Low  
Altitude Charts; STARs. 
          Objective.  To determine that the applicant: 
  1. Exhibits adequate knowledge of the elements related to ATC routes,  
  and related pilot/controller responsibilities. 
  2. Uses the current and appropriate navigation publication for the   
  proposed flight. 
  3. Selects and uses the appropriate communication facilities; selects and  
  identifies the navigation aids associated with the proposed flight. 
  4. Performs the appropriate aircraft checklist items relative to the phase of  
  flight. 
  5. Establishes two-way communications with the proper controlling  
  agency, using proper phraseology. 
  6. Complies, in a timely manner, with all ATC instructions and airspace  
  restrictions. 
  8. Intercepts, in a timely manner, all courses, radials, and bearings  





   
 Learning Objective 3: BASIC INSTRUMENT FLIGHT MANEUVERS 
 REFERENCES: 14 CFR PART 61; FAA-H-8083-15. 
 Objective.  To determine the applicant can perform basic flight maneuvers. 
   1. Exhibits adequate knowledge of the elements related to attitude  
   instrument flying during straight-and-level, climbs, turns, and descents  
   while conducting various instrument flight procedures. 
   2. Maintains altitude within +/- 200 feet during level flight, headings  
   within +/- 20°, and bank angles within 10° during turns. 
   3. Uses proper instrument crosscheck and interpretation, and   
   applies the appropriate pitch, bank, power, and trim corrections  
   when applicable.  
 
 Learning Objective 4: HOLDING PROCEDURES 
 REFERENCES: 14 CFR parts 61, 91; FAA-H-8083-15; AIM 
 Objective:  To determine that the applicant: 
   1. Exhibits adequate knowledge of the elements related to holding 
    procedures. 
   3. Explains and uses an entry procedure that ensure the aircraft remains  
   within the holding pattern airspace for a standard, nonstandard, published,  
   or nonpublished holding pattern. 
   4. Recognizes arrival at the holding fix and initiates prompt entry into the  





   5. Complies with ATC reporting requirements. 
   6. Uses the proper timing criteria, where applicable, as required by altitude 
   or ATC instructions.   
     
 Learning Objective 5: INTERCECPTING AND TRACKING  
 NAVIGATIONAL SYSTEMS 
 REFERENCES: 14 CFR parts 61, 91; FAA-H-8083-15; AIM 
 Objective: To determine that the applicant: 
   1. Exhibits adequate knowledge of the elements related to intercepting and  
   tracking navigational systems (…). 
   2. Tunes and correctly identifies the navigation facility. 
   3. Sets and correctly orients the course to be intercepted into the course  
   Selector. 
   4. Intercepts the specified course at a predetermined angle, inbound or  
   outbound from a navigational facility. 
   7. Determines the aircraft position relative to the navigational facility. 
     
 Learning Objective 6: PRECISION APPROACH 
 REFERENCES: 14 CFR parts 61, 91; FAA-H-8083-15; IAP; AIM 
 Objective: To determine that the applicant: 
   1. Exhibits adequate knowledge of the precision instrument approach  
   procedures. 





   selected by the examiner. 
   3. Establishes two-way communications with ATC using the proper  
   communications phraseology and techniques, as required for the phase of  
   flight or approach segment. 
   4. Complies, in a timely manner, with all clearances, instructions, and  
   procedures. 
   5. Advises ATC anytime that the applicant is unable to comply with a  
   clearance. 
   9. Selects, tunes, identifies, and monitors the operational status of ground  
   and airplane navigation equipment used for the approach. 
   12. Maintains a stabilized final approach, from the Final Approach Fix to  
   DA/DH allowing no more than three-quarter scale deflection of either the  
   glide slope or localizer indications. 
   14. Initiates immediately the missed approach when at the DA/DH, and  
   the required visual references for the runway are not unmistakably visible  
   and identifiable. 
 
 Learning Objective 7: MISSED APPROACH 
 REFERENCES: 14 CFR parts 61, 91; FAA-H-8083-15, IAP, AIM. 
 Objectives: To determine that the applicant 
   1. Exhibits adequate knowledge of the elements related to missed  





   2. Initiates the missed approach promptly by applying power, establishing  
   a climb attitude, and reducing drag in accordance with the aircraft   
   manufacturer‟s recommendations. 
   3. Reports to ATC beginning the missed approach procedure. 
   4. Complies with the published or alternate missed approach procedure. 
   5. Advises ATC anytime that the aircraft is unable to comply with a  
   clearance, restriction, or climb gradient. 
 
 Learning Objective 8: “PREFLIGHT” PREPARATION  
 (DETERMINATION OF/PROCEEDING TO ALTERNATE) 
 REFERENCES: 14 CFR parts 61, 91; FAA-H-8083-15 
 Objectives: To determine that the applicant 
   1. Correctly analyzes the weather information pertaining to the route of  
   flight and destination airport, and selects alternate destination as  
   appropriate. 
   2. Correctly analyzes weather information (in flight), and determines  
   suitable alternate destination. 
   3. Determines the calculated performance is within the aircraft‟s capability  
   and operating limitations. 
   4. Correctly interprets (and applies) charts (and procedures) to proceed to  








 For each “flight,” each of the 40 tasks within the 8 learning objectives was 
assigned a task value.  These assigned values, ranging from 1-5, reflect the relevance of 
each task to the safe, efficient completion of an IFR flight, and are reported in Chapter IV 
and the matrix in Appendix E.  The participants in the pre-test were asked to assess the 
accuracy of the task values, and final values reflect input from these subject matter 
experts.  Approximate definitions of the assigned task values are as follows: 
1- Task/knowledge that likely would not affect safe completion of flight 
and/or facilitate its skillful completion. 
2- Task/knowledge that probably would not affect safe completion of 
flight, but could hinder its skillful completion. 
3- Task/knowledge that could affect safe completion of flight, and/or 
could hinder its skillful completion. 
4- Task/knowledge that could affect safe completion of flight, and/or is 
likely to hinder its skillful completion. 
5- Task that is likely to affect and/or hinder safe completion of the flight. 
 Throughout the exercise, participants were assigned letter grades based on their 
performance of each task.  An approximate definition of these grades follows: 
A- Task easily completed or knowledge easily demonstrated.  
B- Task fully completed and/or knowledge demonstrated, but at least one 
extra attempt/clarification/query required. 






D- Task partially completed and/or knowledge partially demonstrated, but 
elements of task not done or done incorrectly and/or gaps in knowledge 
observed or suspected. 
F- Task never completed, or knowledge never demonstrated. 
 As previously noted, certain minor pilot errors were ignored during the exercise.  
This was done so that procedural conduct of the entire flight itself could be emphasized 
over minor deviations along the way.  For instance, minor altitude deviations due to poor 
control technique might have earned the participant a “B” on learning objective #3 (Basic 
Instrument Flight Maneuvers).  But not knowing, misinterpreting, or ignoring published, 
assigned or minimum altitudes was grounds for an “F” grade on Learning Objective #6 
(Precision Approach).  Technically, the PTS is to be applied the same way, as the 
published grounds for failure includes the phrase, “consistently exceeding tolerances.”  
Further, the PTS includes the following statement: 
The tolerances [in the PTS] represent the performance expected in good 
flying conditions…  [they] are intended to be used as a measurement of 
the applicant’s ability to operate in the instrument environment.  
They provide guidance for examiners to use in judging the applicant’s 
qualifications… (emphasis added). 
  In other words, the PTS tolerances were designed to grade applicant performance 
during practical tests just as they were applied during this project.  Again, grades 
reflected both task mastery and task importance, with both described in the text 
accompanying summaries of pilot performance.  Each participant had one letter grade 





assigned task grades were tabulated and published in Chapter IV of this report, along 
with an accompanying pass/fail assessment.  Summaries of participant performance on 
entire Areas of Operation are reported in chapter VI.  A statistical analysis of the data 
collected from the exercise was conducted using the Fisher exact test, which is explained 
in some detail in appendix F.  Using results from this test, certain conclusions are drawn 
regarding new instrument pilot abilities, along with the confidence level at which these 
conclusions may be asserted.  These conclusions, along with recommendations are 
published in chapter VI.  Finally, relevant observations of pilot actions or inactions, 
apparent knowledge or skill gaps, examples, etc. are included in chapter V.  These 
observations and comments are important, because pilot actions or omissions (and thus 
grades) may have been influenced by factors not readily apparent to the reader of this 
report.   
 
Pre-Test 
 Clearly, it is important that task importance was assessed correctly.  Also, it is 
important that the flight truly represented what it was designed to represent: a moderately 
challenging IFR flight.  Obviously, a flight test in the simulator could be created that is so 
difficult that virtually no one could pass!  Conversely, a flight could be created that is too 
easy.  To make sure that this flight avoided both extremes, and to establish a performance 
standard, a pre-test was conducted.  Four subject matter experts completed the proposed 
flight and were graded exactly like the test group participants.  Their comments after the 
flight were recorded as noted, and their suggestions were used to modify the task values, 





each of the pre-test group members was required to have at least 500 logged hours under 
IFR, be certificated at the Airline Transport Pilot level, and be an active pilot, examiner, 
or flight instructor.  Since not enough pilots were available that met this criteria, the 
requirements were relaxed for one subject matter expert.  This “second tier” pre-test 
participant was an active flight instructor with over 900 hours total time, and more than 
200 hours under IFR. 
 
Research Design and Procedure 
This study was designed to answer the research questions developed from the Review of 
Literature in Chapter II.  These questions include: 
 1. Did the recently certified instrument pilot have the skills and knowledge  
 required to successfully complete a simulated, non-training, point-to-point, IFR  
  flight? 
2. Did the training that the recently certified instrument pilot receive adequately 
prepare him/her to apply the skill and knowledge required by 14 CFR FAR 61.65 
(b) and (c) to successfully surmount common challenges during a real-world IFR 
flight? 
 The answers to these questions will provide information that may assist in 
evaluating and possibly modifying airman instrument rating training.  Further, answers to 
these questions may be used to modify the Standard Operating Procedures in effect at the 
university where the project was conducted to allow or disallow IFR flight under certain 





 Permission to perform research involving OSU flight students was granted by the 
Institutional Review Board at Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, Oklahoma, where 
the study was conducted (Appendix G).  The research was conducted between May and 
August, 2009. 
 
Analysis of Data 
 Upon completion of the 15 “flights” (4 pre-test flights and 11 test group flights) 
the data collected from all participants was analyzed.  Specifically, the performance of 
the test group pilots on each task was compared to the performance of the pre-test group 
pilots, and the Fisher exact test was employed to detect statistically significant 
differences between them.  As previously noted, findings from this comparison, as well 
as an explanation of the Fisher test are published in the appropriate sections of this report. 
 
Summary 
 In summary, this chapter has given a description of the design of the study.  Major 
areas discussed were a description of the purpose of the study, research questions, 
sampling of test and pre-test participants, and development, validity, and application of 













 This chapter presents the findings from the participants‟ “flights” in the simulator.   
The data will be presented in multiple forms.  First, the grade earned by each participant 
for each task will be presented in a table.  Since the data analysis tool used in this 
experiment requires a pass/fail assessment of pilot performance, this assessment will also 
be noted in the table.  Another table will show the pass/fail data condensed into totals to 
make rapid assessment easier for the reader, and to show the relationship of data in the 
assessment tool.  A rationale for the assignment of these grades will also be provided in 
the text accompanying each task, along with relevant explanations.  The grade will be 
analyzed within the context of its importance, and the importance value will be noted in 
the task heading and accompanied by a rationale of how it was determined.  When 
appropriate, task importance will also be discussed in the supporting text.  A much fuller 
explanation of participant performance, including possible explanations and examples of 





encouraged to refer to the appropriate section of that chapter to better understand this 
one.  Finally, Fisher‟s exact test will be employed on all tasks to determine if a 
statistically significant performance difference exists between the experienced pilots in 
the pre-test group and the less experienced test group pilots.  The relevance of the 
statistical significance will be further analyzed by reference to a confidence threshold 
gradient, which is explained in Appendix K.  The cumulative p-value for each task will 
be noted in the task heading and again in the text.  Finally, an explanation of the Fisher 
exact test and the rationale used to determine its suitability for this project is provided in 
Appendix F.   
 We now turn to the data collected during this project. 
 
Area of Operation 1: ATC Clearance 
Task 1.a. Adequate knowledge of the elements related to ATC clearances and 
pilot/controller responsibilities. 
Task Importance: 4   
Rationale: The high importance value for this task is due to the foundational 
significance of the pilot’s knowledge of his/her role in acquiring, understanding, and 
implementing an IFR clearance. 
 
Fisher Test Contingency Table:  
Participant 
Number 








































 Pre-test Group Test Group 
Pass 4 8 
Fail 0 3 
 
p=.363 
 As shown by the grade table, all but three pilots demonstrated adequate 
knowledge of the pilot‟s role in acquiring and implementing an IFR clearance.  The p-
value, obtained using Fisher‟s exact test, is p=.363 so there is a 36% chance that any 
difference between the pass/fail ratios between the two groups is simply due to random 
chance.  Consequently, the “null hypothesis” (that the two group of pilots have similar 
skill/knowledge levels) cannot be rejected.   
It should be understood that this task deals only with the overall “knowledge of 
the elements related to IFR clearances.”  The execution of these elements was sometimes 
problematic, and grades for specific tasks will frequently be lower.  Specifically, six of 
the test group pilots did not set one or both navigation radios to the correct frequency 
before takeoff, eight did not pre-set navigation instruments entirely in accordance with 
clearance, six required multiple “repeats” of the clearance and/or corrections from ATC, 
and one requested the clearance on the wrong communication frequency.  None of these 
items alone necessarily demonstrates a lack of pilot knowledge regarding IFR clearances, 
thus the relatively high grade assignments for this task.  All of the pilot errors referenced 
above will be more accurately graded under the relevant task headings in this chapter, 
and will be more fully discussed in Chapter V. 
 





Task Importance: 4  
Rationale: The high importance value for this task is due to the essential accuracy of 
the pilot’s transcription of the verbally communicated clearance. 
 
Fisher Test Contingency Table: 
 Pre-test Group Test Group 
Pass 4 8 
Fail 0 1 
 
p=.692 
 All but one test group pilot demonstrated adequate ability on this important task.  
Still, the grades show that six pilots were less than perfect, with two being marginal and 
four others making mistakes of varying degrees of frequency and severity.  One pilot 
required the clearance to be read no less than 3 times, three required at least 2 complete 
readbacks, and several of the pilots had one or more corrections from ATC.  At least 
some of this difficulty should be attributed to the fact that the route described in the ATC 
clearance was not the route that the pilot had requested in his/her flight plan, which will 
be discussed more fully in Chapter V.  The p-value for this task is .692, so there is 
roughly a 70% chance that any differences between the performances of the two groups 








































Task 1.c. Determines Ability to Comply 
Task Importance: 3 
Rationale: The moderate task value of this task is due to the subjectivity of self-
assessment during a simulated flight, as discussed below. 
 
Fisher Test Contingency Table: 
 Pre-test Group Test Group 
Pass 4 7 
Fail 0 2 
 
p=.462  
This task was somewhat difficult to grade, since the clearance assigned by ATC 
required nothing with which the pilots technically would be unable to comply.  
Therefore, to provide a meaningful grade a subjective assessment was made regarding the 
ability to comply given the pilot’s individual skill level.  In other words, the question was 
whether the pilot - not the airplane or equipment - had the ability to comply with the ATC 
assignment and self-assessed this ability accurately.  Only two pilots clearly 
overestimated their ability to comply with the clearance.  However, multiple pilots 
struggled with elements of it.  Again, these elements will be more fully explained under 
the relevant tasks in this section and in the relevant sections of Chapter V.   
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 The p-value obtained for this task using the Fisher Exact Test is p=.462, meaning 
that there is a 46% chance that random chance may have determined the outcome.  
Therefore, the null hypothesis is not rejected.  
 
Task 1.d. Correctly Interprets/Requests Clarification of Clearance. 
Task Importance: 4 
Rationale: The high task value for this task is due to the logical requirement for the 
pilot to understand the clearance, as well as the legal requirement to clarify any part 
of it that is not understood. 
 
Fisher Test Contingency Table: 
 Pre-test Group Test Group 
Pass 4 7 
Fail 0 3 
 
p=.330   
 As shown by the table, three pilots failed this important task.  All three took off 
with navigation radios set incorrectly (as did others, but less egregiously) and never 
adequately demonstrated en route that they understood the routing in the clearance or that 
they were able to execute it.  Further, they did not adequately seek timely clarification.  
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 The p-value for this task, again calculated using the Fisher exact test, is p=.330 
and the null hypothesis is not rejected. 
 
Task 1.e. Reads Back Clearance 
Task Importance: 3 
Rationale: This task received only a moderate value since reading back the 
clearance is only one part of the clearance confirmation process; an accuracy check 
by ATC is still pending 
 
Fisher Test Contingency Table: 
 
p=.692  
Grades for this task necessarily reflect the grades for task 1.b., “Copies ATC 
Clearance” due to the interrelationship of both.  Only one test group pilot failed this 
moderately important task.  It was the same pilot who failed task 1.b., and for the same 
reasons.   




































 Pre-test Group Test Group 
Pass 4 8 





Task 1.f. Standard Phraseology 
Task Importance: 1 
Rationale: The low task value for this task reflects the fact that even non-standard 
phraseology may adequately communicate the clearance and/or ATC instructions. 
 
Fisher Test Contingency Table: 
 Pre-test Group Test Group 
Pass 4 10 
Fail 0 1 
 
p=.733  
As reflected by the grades, few pilots had trouble with this relatively unimportant 
task, and only one received a failing grade.  The p-value for this task is p=.733 and the 
null hypothesis is not rejected. 
 
Task 1.g. Sets Communication/Navigation Systems & Transponder in Compliance 
With Clearance 
Task Importance: 4 
Rationale: The high task value of this task is due to the fundamental importance of 













































Fisher Test Contingency Table: 
 Pre-test Group Test Group 
Pass 4 5 
Fail 0 4 
 
p=.176  
As can be seen in the accompanying grade table, several test group pilots made 
errors setting navigation instruments in compliance with the clearance.  No less than 
seven of the test group pilots took off with navigation instruments set incorrectly, six 
took off with navigation radios set incorrectly, and one pilot never set the transponder 
code.  It should be understood that the severity of these errors varied widely, as some 
were noticed and corrected almost immediately and others simply did not affect the 
outcome or progress of the flight.  Other “set up” errors were quite serious, and were 
compounded en route, leading to major course deviations and/or ATC intervention.  The 
grades in the table above reflect the disparity of these errors.  In any event, setting the 
navigation instruments and radios incorrectly (and while still on the ground!) is an 
important instrument pilot skill, and general lack of pilot expertise in doing so was 
notable. 
 The p-value for this task is p=.176, which means that the null hypothesis can be 
rejected at the 82.4% confidence level.  Although this is a large number, it still falls short 
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of the required confidence level.  However, incorrect navigation technique frequently had 
a significant impact on the completion of the flight, and the reader is encouraged to 
peruse Chapter V, section 2.c to better understand these errors and learn more about their 
possible cause. 
 
Area of Operation 2: Compliance With Clearance/Procedures 
Task 2.a. Adequate knowledge of elements of departure, en route, & arrival 
clearance and pilot/controller responsibility 
Task Importance: 4 
Rationale: The high task value of this task reflects the importance, once again, of the 
pilot’s overall knowledge of navigation fundamentals and his/her responsibility 
regarding them. 
 
Fisher Test Contingency Table: 
 
p=.524 
As can be readily seen by the grades in the table, most pilots received a passing 
grade for this important task.  The task itself, however, is quite broad and as also noted in 
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 Pre-test Group Test Group 
Pass 4 9 





Chapter V, an effort was made to evaluate only the pilots‟ knowledge of it rather than 
their skill in implementing the clearance. 
 Two pilots appeared to not understand the departure, en route, or amended 
clearances, as the compliance errors that began immediately after takeoff and continued 
throughout the flight confirmed.  Later in the flight, as the route clearance was amended, 
one of these pilots was unable to comply with the change and wound up receiving radar 
vectors from ATC as a last resort.   
 Two pilots of the test group received less than passing grades for this task and the 
p-value for this task is p=.524, thus the null hypothesis is not rejected. 
 
Task 2.b. Uses correct publication 
Task Importance: 2 
Rationale: The relatively low task importance reflects the ease of the task, and the 
fact that nominally incorrect publications (e.g., non-current) rarely affect the flight. 
 
Fisher Test Contingency Table: 
 Pre-test Group Test Group 
Pass 4 10 













































 Only one pilot failed this task, and simply because he set up for one approach and 
referenced the chart for another.  The reader is encouraged to review section 2.b. in 
Chapter V for more information on this error.   All other pilots received a passing grade 
for this task and the task itself was quite simple.  Pilots were supplied the one en route 
chart necessary, and a large photocopy of the one needed approach chart.  To pass, pilots 
had only to not go to the extra trouble of finding and using a wrong chart.   
 The p-value for this task is p=.733 and the null hypothesis is not rejected.   
 
Task 2.c. Uses and identifies correct communication and navigation facilities 
Task Importance: 4 
Rationale: The high task value of this task is due, once again, to the fundamental 
importance of understanding and correctly employing VHF navigation instruments 
and systems. 
 






































 Pre-test Group Test Group 
Pass 4 5 





As can be seen in the accompanying table, four pilots failed this important task.  
The specific task “uses… correct navigation facilities” represented a recurring problem 
for several of the test group pilots, and references to it, as well as similar grades will be 
noted in task 1.g. and 5.b.  It should be noted that two additional test group pilots made 
only marginally passing grades on this task. 
 The most common errors involved setting incorrect frequencies in navigation 
radios.  Sometimes, this was simply a case of missing a digit in the frequency setting, but 
other times it was a result of misreading the chart and simply setting the wrong 
frequency, or setting the frequency for the wrong ground-based navaid.  Compounding 
the problem for some pilots was the availability of the GPS.  The VFR-only GPS was 
usable for situational awareness only, and using it for primary navigation was illegal.  
However, some pilots did just that, and went where the GPS guided them despite what 
the VHF navigation instruments indicated, or for that matter, how they were set.  
Conversely, some pilots made excellent (and legal) use of the GPS by setting it in 
conjunction with VHF navigation instruments so that both supplemented each other.  The 
reader is encouraged to review section 2.c. in Chapter V for more information and 
examples of pilot errors. 
 The p-value for this task is p=.176, which means that the null hypothesis can be 
rejected at the 82.4% confidence level.  Although this is a large number, it still falls short 
of the required level of confidence. 
 
Task 2.d. Performs appropriate checklist 





Rationale: The value for this task is low due to the fact that most checklist items are 
airplane, not IFR, specific and did not significantly affect the flight. 
 
Fisher Test Contingency Table: 
 Pre-test Group Test Group 
Pass 4 11 
Fail 0 0 
 
 This relatively unimportant task presented little difficulty to participants.  
Airplane checklist errors (omissions) were of minimal interest to the PI, as they had little 
impact on the IFR pilot skills of interest in this study.  Therefore, minor checklist errors 
were mostly ignored. 
 Obviously, the null hypothesis for this task is not rejected. 
 
Task 2.e. Establishes communication with proper ATC facility 
Task Importance: 2 
Rationale: Establishing communication with any ATC facility is usually sufficient 
(ATC assigns another as required) and safety of flight is rarely affected, thus the 














































Fisher Test Contingency Table: 
 Pre-test Group Test Group 
Pass 4 11 
Fail 0 0 
 
 This was another relatively unimportant task that presented little difficulty.  Since 
the simulated flight took place in a geographic area common to all participants, 
frequencies were already known and well rehearsed.  Further, ATC assigned frequencies 
as needed, and pilots had little trouble keeping up with the assigned frequencies. 
 No pilots failed this task and the null hypothesis is not rejected. 
 
Task 2.f. Complies with ATC instructions and airspace restrictions 
Task Importance: 5 
Rationale: Non-compliance with ATC and/or divergence into uncleared airspace 









































Fisher Test Contingency Table: 
Participant 
Number 








































 Pre-test Group Test Group 
Pass 4 6 
Fail 0 5 
 
p=.154 
As noted in the table above, five test group pilots failed this important task.  Most 
of these failures were related to non-compliance with ATC instructions, as there was no 
Restricted or otherwise “off limit” airspace along the route, neither of which is 
particularly relevant to IFR flight anyway (since controllers, not pilots, are tasked with 
avoiding off-limit airspace).  There were, however, excursions into uncleared airspace, 
and these are reflected in the grades.  It should be understood that technically, even minor 
en route navigation errors or altitude deviations can put a pilot in “uncleared” airspace 
and constitute “noncompliance with ATC,” but since those tasks are more specifically 
addressed elsewhere in this report, only significant non-compliance with ATC errors are 
addressed here. 
With a p-value of .154, the null hypothesis of a difference between the pre-test 
and test group pilots CAN be rejected at roughly the 85% confidence level.  Our 
willingness to reject the null hypothesis at this reduced level of confidence is directly 
related to this task‟s very high importance value as discussed in Appendix K.  The reader 
is strongly encouraged to read that appendix for a fuller explanation of the graduated 
confidence level, and how it affects the data analysis of this project. 
 
Task 2.g. Intercepts appropriate radials and bearings as published in procedures 





Rationale: The high task value of this task is due, once again, to the fundamental 








































Fisher Test Contingency Table: 
 Pre-test Group Test Group 
Pass 4 6 
Fail 0 4 
 
p=.210  
Four test group pilots received failing grades on this task, and radial intercept 
errors were common.  Usually, these errors were related to radio/indicator set-up errors 
and distinguishing between set-up and intercept errors was not always easy.  For this 
flight, published (charted) departure or arrival procedures were not assigned, so the only 
“radials as published in procedures” were those on en route and approach charts.  
Comments related to pilot performance on these tasks are fully developed in Chapter V, 
sections 1.g. and 2.c.  Readers are encouraged to reference those sections of this report to 
read more about errors in intercepting radials, and to read first-hand researcher 
observations made during the research flights.  As already noted, setting navigation 





of the flight, and errors in doing so ranged from minor set-up deviations to apparent lack 
of understanding of instrument functionality. 
The p-value for this task is p=.210, which means that the null hypothesis can be 
rejected at the 79% confidence level.  And although, once again, the confidence level is a 
relatively large number, it still falls significantly short of the required level of confidence. 
 
Area Of Operation 3: Basic Instrument Maneuvers 
Task 3.a. Adequate knowledge and skill related to attitude instrument flight 
Task Importance: 5 
Rationale: Maintaining normal and appropriately controlled aircraft attitude is of 
primary importance, thus the extremely high task value. 
 
Fisher Test Contingency Table: 
 Pre-test Group Test Group 
Pass 4 8 
Fail 0 3 
 
p=.363  
Three test group pilots received less than passing grades on this task, though all 
were able to maintain aircraft control.  For many pilots, minor heading and altitude 
deviations were common throughout the research flight.  However, since the objective of 
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this research project was to re-create a “real” IFR flight, the criteria for a passing grade 
for this task required only that pilots not routinely exceed heading or altitude deviations 
that would be excessive for the real IFR flight environment.  Three pilots exceeded these 
tolerances due to excessive and recurrent heading and altitude deviations, but not due to 
inability to maintain a normal flight attitude. 
 The p-value for this task is p=.363 and the null hypothesis is not rejected. 
 
Task 3.b. Maintains altitude +/- 200 feet, heading +/- 20°, and airspeed +/- 20 knots. 
Task Importance: 4 
Rationale: The very high task value reflects the necessity (and difficulty) of 
incorporating multiple tasks into the IFR pilot’s workload while prioritizing 
accurate aircraft control.  
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Fisher Test Contingency Table: 
 Pre-test Group Test Group 
Pass 3 7 
Fail 0 3 
 
p=.420  
As discussed above, there were multiple heading and altitude deviations 





deviations at or near the limits as stated above, and these were mostly ignored as they 
likely would be by ATC (particularly if corrected rapidly).  However, one test group pilot 
and one pre-test group pilot had altitude deviations that were as much as 500‟ and/or 
heading deviations as much as 70°.  Both of these pilots noted and corrected their errors 
without assistance, though some persisted longer than others.  Three other pilots simply 
did not demonstrate adequate aircraft control, leading to grossly errant altitudes or 
headings.  These pilots wound up cruising at the wrong altitude, climbing in an 
unchecked manner, or widely diverging from the correct heading.   
 The p-value for this task is p=.420 and the null hypothesis is not rejected. 
. 
Area Of Operation 4: Holding Procedures 
Task 4.a. Adequate knowledge and skill related to holding procedures 
Task Importance: 3 
Rationale: The task value for holding procedures is moderate for dichotomous 
reasons: while holds may be difficult to learn and execute, they are usually 
conducted in large, protected areas where even poorly executed holds are separated 
from terrain or other traffic.  Safety of flight is rarely affected. 
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 Pre-test Group Test Group 
Pass 4 3 
Fail 0 7 
 
p=.035  
Holding procedures proved to be a problematic part of the flight.  And, as 
discussed in Chapter V, a knowledge deficiency was sometimes evident in pilots who 
were quite skilled in other instrument pilot tasks.   
 It should be noted that the task importance assigned to holds is only moderate.  
This is due to the fact that holds contribute little to the completion of a flight, and are 
usually assigned by ATC as a delaying function.  Additionally, even poorly executed 
holds rarely represent a significant safety concern as they are usually assigned well away 
from terrain or conflicting traffic.   
 Still, holding procedures can be difficult, and this was evident in pilot 
performance.  A multitude of errors were committed during holds, including: visualizing 
the hold incorrectly (as explained by pilots after the flight), confusing inbound and 
outbound holding legs, incorrectly identifying the holding fix (or not at all), incorrect 
timing procedures, and others.   
 It should be noted that two of the test group pilots were never assigned holds, or 
at least were never required to conduct them, as their abilities were already taxed to the 
limit and increasing their mental workload with holding clearances/procedures was 
impractical.  As discussed in the methodology, these test group pilots received failing 





 The p-value for this task is p=.035, and since there is a statistically dependable 
(96.5%) difference between the levels of performance of the two different groups on this 
task, we reject the null hypothesis with confidence.  Also, from an observational 
standpoint, there appeared to be a clear performance difference between the pre-test 
group pilots and the test group pilots.   
 
Task 4.b. Remains within holding airspace 
Task Importance: 3 
Rationale: Protected holding areas are relatively large, and even poorly executed 
holding procedures are generally contained within them.  Task importance remains 
moderate only because deviation from protected airspace can create collision hazard 
or need for ATC intervention. 
 
Fisher Test Contingency Table: 
 Pre-test Group Test Group 
Pass 4 3 
Fail 0 6 
  
p=.049  
Grades for this task are similar to grades for task 4.a. There are some differences, 
however, as this task reflects only the pilots‟ ability to remain within protected holding 
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airspace.  Unfortunately, “protected holding airspace” is not as easily defined as might be 
expected, and only those pilots who egregiously strayed from it received failing grades.  
As noted in the grade table above, 6 test group pilots did so.  It might be noted that other 
pilots sometimes made minor deviations from established holding patterns and/or holding 
pattern entry procedures.  However, these were generally ignored since actual “protected” 
holding airspace can be significantly greater than “assigned” holding airspace, and 
because established holding pattern entry procedures are recommendations only.  The 
reader is encouraged to see Chapter V, section 4.b. for more on protected airspace and 
grading procedures for this task. 
 The pilots who received failing grades for this task were generally the same pilots 
who demonstrated a lack of knowledge regarding holding procedures (task 6.a.).  The p-
value for this task is p=.049 and the null hypothesis IS, once again, rejected at the 95% 
confidence level.   
 
Task 4.c. Recognizes arrival at holding fix 
Task Importance: 2 
Rationale: The task value for this task is low due to the relatively low priority of all 
individual holding tasks.   
 
Fisher Test Contingency Table: 
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 Pre-test Group Test Group 
Pass 4 7 
Fail 0 3 
 
p=.330  
Three test group pilots received a failing grade for this relatively unimportant 
task.  The task itself, however, was sometimes difficult to distinguish from other holding 
procedure errors, as maneuvering and other pilot actions that occurred around the holding 
fix were not always easy for the observer/grader to interpret.  In the three failures noted 
above, the fix identification that is a fundamental part of holding procedures was 
verifiably missing.   
 The p-value for this very specific task is p=.330 and the null hypothesis is not 
rejected.   
 
Task 4.d. Complies with ATC reporting requirements 
Task Importance: 1 
Rationale: Reporting requirements are generally designed to inform ATC of the 
progress of the flight.  In the radar equipped area of this simulated flight, ATC was 
not dependent on pilot reports for this information, thus the very low task value. 
 
Fisher Test Contingency Table: 
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 Pre-test Group Test Group 
Pass 4 8 
Fail 0 2 
 
p=.495  
Only two test group pilots received failing grades on this unimportant task, and 
most pilots reported as required.  It should be remembered, however, that there were a 
multitude of holding procedure errors, and some pilots were never in a position to report, 
so the lack of identifiable reporting errors may be somewhat misleading. 
The p-value for this task is p=.495 and the null hypothesis is not rejected. 
 
Task 4.e. Times holds correctly 
Task Importance: 1 
Rationale: The task value for this task is low due to the relatively low priority of all 
individual holding tasks.   
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Fisher Test Contingency Table: 
p=.176 
 Pre-test Group Test Group 
Pass 4 5 





Four pilots received failing grades on this relatively unimportant holding task.  As 
noted previously, however, holding errors were common and some timing errors 
(particularly omissions) may have gone unobserved.  Even so, four pilots made 
identifiable timing errors.  The p-value for this task is p=.176 and the null hypothesis is 
not rejected.  Once again, however, only statistical constraints keep us from doing so, as 
the confidence level of a difference between the groups is 82.4%, near the required level 
of confidence. 
 
Area Of Operation 5: Intercepting and Tracking Navigational Systems 
Task 5.a. Adequate knowledge of the elements of intercepting and tracking 
navigational systems 
Task Importance: 4 
Rationale: The high task value of this task is due, once again, to the fundamental 
importance of understanding and correctly employing VHF navigation instruments 
and systems. 
 
Fisher Test Contingency Table: 
 Pre-test Group Test Group 
Pass 4 7 













































Pilot performance regarding “Intercepting and Tracking Navigational Systems” is 
thoroughly discussed in tasks 1.g. (sets communication/navigation systems), 2.c. (uses 
and identifies correct communication and navigation facilities), and 2.g. (interprets 
appropriate radials and bearings as published in procedure).  Grades for tasks within this 
area of operation will by necessity reflect the grade assignments for similar tasks within 
the sections noted above, and for the same reasons.  In the interest of brevity, the reader is 
referred to the task narratives for tasks 1.g., 2.c., and 2.g. for the three similar tasks of 
Area of Operation 5.  Only grade assignments will be reported for the tasks within this 
section.   
 Once again, 4 test group pilots received failing grades on this important task.  The 
p-value for this task is p=.242 and the null hypothesis is not rejected. 
 
Task 5.b. Tunes and identifies navigational facility and sets & intercepts course to 
be intercepted 
Task Importance: 4 
Rationale: Fundamental importance of understanding and correctly employing 
VHF navigation instruments and systems. 
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 Pre-test Group Test Group 
Pass 4 6 
Fail 0 4 
 
p=.210 
Four test group pilots received failing grades for this task.  The probability value 
for this task is p= .210 and the null hypothesis is not rejected. 
 
Task 5.c. Intercepts course at correct angle, inbound or outbound 
Task Importance: 2 
Rationale: The course may be intercepted and maintained even with application of 
incorrect intercept angles, particularly at the speeds common during the research 
flight.  Thus, task value is relatively low. 
 
Fisher Test Contingency Table: 
 Pre-test Group Test Group 
Pass 4 7 













































Four test group pilots received failing grades for this task.  The probability value 
for this task is p= .242 and the null hypothesis is not rejected. 
 
Area Of Operation 6: Precision Approach 
Task 6.a. Adequate knowledge of precision instrument approach procedures 
Task Importance: 4 
Rationale: Most approach tasks have high importance value due to proximity of 
terrain and required skill.  This task, involving adequate knowledge of procedures, 
is fundamental to all and valued accordingly. 
 
Fisher Test Contingency Table: 
 Pre-test Group Test Group 
Pass 4 7 
Fail 0 3 
 
p=.330  
Most participants received a passing grade on this task, though certain elements of 
the precision approach proved to among the most troublesome tasks of the entire flight. 
The relatively high grades on this task reflect the fact that most participants had 
“adequate knowledge of precision instrument approach procedures.”  That is, nearly all 
understood that they were receiving radar vectors to the final approach course, which 
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they would intercept via instrument indications, and would then descend to a position 
from which they would expect to see the runway and continue visually.  Participants who 
received a failing grade on this task appeared to have a fundamental misunderstanding of 
some part of this process.   
 The p-value for this task is p=.330 and the null hypothesis is not rejected. 
 
 Task 6.b. Establishes and uses correct ATC facility & correct phraseology for 
approach 
Task Importance: 2 
Rationale: Establishing communication with any ATC facility is usually sufficient 
(ATC assigns another as required) and safety of flight is rarely affected.  Also, 
incorrect phraseology, as long as it is understood by both ATC and the pilot, is 
usually equally sufficient. 
 







































 Pre-test Group Test Group 
Pass 4 8 





This task was a relatively easy one for nearly all participants, as “using the correct 
ATC facility” is fundamental to the approach in Class C Airspace; under normal 
circumstances a pilot would likely be unable to continue without direction from the 
correct ATC facility.  “Using correct phraseology,” however, was more challenging since 
approach clearances tend to be lengthy and somewhat complicated.  Still, only two pilots 
received failing grades on this task, due either to repeated muddling of clearance 
“readbacks” or simply reading back the wrong clearance.   
The p-value for the task is p=.495.  The null hypothesis is not rejected. 
 
Task 6.c. Complies with clearance instructions and procedures 
Task Importance: 4 
Rationale: Clearance instructions and procedures are generally specific and 
conducted in a high workload phase of flight, potentially in close proximity to 
terrain.  The high task value reflects these criteria. 
Participant 
Number 











       
Test 
Group 





















Fisher Test Contingency Table: 
 
p=.126  
 Pre-test Group Test Group 
Pass 4 5 





Approach procedures are so well scripted that virtually any error is technically 
“noncompliance with procedure,” so an effort was made to identify systemic procedural 
errors, not just “mistakes.”  For this reason, “descent below minimums” was a major and 
recurring mistake that is not reflected in the grades above.  Instead, it will be assessed in 
task 6.g.   
 Procedural errors that did affect grades within this task included grossly incorrect 
set-up or interpretation of approach instruments, or incorrect response to instrument 
indications.  Both were fairly common approach errors, as noted by the 5 failing grades.  
It should be noted, however, that other test group pilots flew the approach very well 
procedurally (though a few of these pilots also went below minimums), and excellent 
grades within this task are as prevalent as failing ones. 
 The p-value for this task is p=.126 and the null hypothesis can be rejected only at 
the 87.4% level, near but still short of the required confidence level. 
 
Task 6.d. Advises ATC if unable to comply 
 Task Importance: 5 
Rationale: Due to the proximity of terrain and specificity of procedures, the pilot 
must continually determine that the approach is progressing safely and within 
established limits.  Exercising PIC authority to advise ATC of inability to continue 









Fisher Test Contingency Table: 
 Pre-test Group Test Group 
Pass 3 6 
Fail 1 5 
 
p=.462  
There are certain flight parameters that must be met during an instrument 
approach.  If they are not, a notification of ATC is required.  During the research flights, 
several instrument indications or course deviations should have triggered a call to ATC 
but did not.  Five test group pilots and one pre-test group pilot opted to press on and “fix” 
the problem without notifying ATC or seeking assistance.   
The p-value for this task is again p=.462 and the null hypothesis is not rejected. 
 
Task 6.e. Selects, tunes, and identifies correct approach facilities 
Task Importance: 5 
Rationale: Again, the proximity of terrain, as well as specificity and potential 
difficulty of approach procedures, requires a very high task value in relation to 
similar tasks during departure or en route.  This task, using correct approach 













































Fisher Test Contingency Table: 
 Pre-test Group Test Group 
Pass 4 5 
Fail 0 5 
 
p=.126 
The reader should refer to task Chapter V, section 6.c. for more information on 
(and examples of) participants “selecting, tuning, and identifying correct approach 
facilities.”  As noted in that section of the report, there were four instances of pilots not 
tuning in the LOM (OILER), and five instances of pilots not tuning in the localizer 
frequency and/or not setting the correct radial in the instrument display (with some pilots 
committing both errors).   Note that these errors can have differing levels of significance, 
since an incorrectly tuned indicator may still provide correct indications and an untuned 
LOM may be entirely insignificant.  Conversely, correctly tuning the localizer frequency 
is imperative, which is reflected in the grade importance of this task.  All of the errors 
noted above had some effect on the flight, though they did not always lead to a failing 
grade.   
 The p-value for this task is p=.126, and due to the high importance value for this 
task, the null hypothesis CAN be rejected at roughly the 87% confidence level.  The 
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reader is encouraged to see Appendix K for an explanation of how task importance 
affects the decision to reject the null hypothesis. 
 
Task 6.f. Stabilized approach with no more than ¾ scale deflection on both localizer 
and glideslope 
Task Importance: 4 
Rationale: Precision during the conduct of the final approach segment is critical to 
the correct conduct of approach, thus the high value of this task. 
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Fisher Test Contingency Table: 
 
p=.490 or .255  
To differentiate this task from tasks 6.g. (Missed approach at DH if visibility not 
met) and 7.e (Initiates missed approach at full scale), only the pilots‟ ability to intercept 
and track the localizer and glideslope have been considered for this task.  Some pilots 
who kept the needles centered went below minimums, and any who lingered at or below 
minimums without initiating a missed approach had, by necessity, a full scale needle 
deflection on the glideslope.  Therefore, pilots may receive passing grades on this task 
 Pre-test Group Test Group 
Pass 3 5 





but failing grades on similar ones that better describe what they did wrong.  In any event, 
4 test group pilots and 1 pre-test group pilot did not keep the glideslope and/or localizer 
needles adequately centered, though the pre-test group pilot‟s performance may have 
been aggravated by a controller error.  The reader is encouraged to see Chapter V, section 
6.f. for more on this error. 
The p-value for this task is p=.490 (or p=.255 if the pre-test group failing grade is 
omitted) and the null hypothesis is not rejected. 
 
Task 6.g. Missed approach at DH if visibility requirements not met 
Task Importance: 4 
Rationale: This task has both legal and safety of flight ramifications, thus the high 
task value. 
 
Fisher Test Contingency Table: 
 Pre-test Group Test Group 
Pass 3 3 
Fail 0 8 
 
p=.055  
No less than eight pilots continued their descent below the minimum approach 
altitude without meeting visual reference requirements.  Additionally, some pilots who 
Participant 
Number 






































descended below minimums appeared to do so quite deliberately.  Observations from the 
research flight are quite enlightening, and the reader is encouraged to see Chapter V, 
section 6.g. for examples and commentary on pilot performance.  
 The p-value for this important task (4) is p=.055 and the null hypothesis IS 
rejected at roughly the 95% confidence level, as this is well above the graduated 
confidence level of high-value tasks discussed in Appendix K.  Indeed, pilot performance 
on this task was one of the more striking findings of the entire project. 
  
Area Of Operation 7: Missed Approach 
Task 7.a. Adequate knowledge of missed approach procedures and prepares for 
missed approach 
Task Importance: 3 
Rationale: Required missed approach precision is less than that required for the 
actual approach, as the aircraft is from this point continually moving away from 
terrain.  The moderate task value reflects the significance of knowledge and 
preparation required. 
 
Fisher Test Contingency Table: 
 Pre-test Group Test Group 
Pass 4 4 
Fail 0 7 
Participant 
Number 









































Few test group pilots adequately prepared for the missed approach.  And, as was 
noted in the previous task, several pilots were hesitant to abandon the attempt to land and 
transition to the missed approach procedure.  Since the judgment required to initiate the 
missed approach at the proper time is an integral part of “adequate knowledge of missed 
approach procedures,” doing so was necessary for a passing grade on this task.   
As previously reported, two pilots crashed while conducting the approach.  Since 
both crashes reset the simulator computers, the missed approach could not be conducted.  
As per methodology, these two pilots received failing grades on this task. Other pilots did 
not seem to understand the integral relationship of the missed approach to the ILS 
approach and received less than passing grades.  Finally, one pilot flew a course that was 
completely different than the published missed approach procedure. 
 It should be noted that the hold included in the published missed approach 
procedure did not affect the grading of this task, as participant performance on that 
particular task element is better described and graded in task 4.a.  The reader is referred 
to that section for more information on holds. 
 The p-value for this task is p=.051 and the null hypothesis CAN once again be 
rejected at the 95% confidence level. 
 
Task 7.b. Initiates missed approach with correct control inputs 
Task Importance: 3 
Rationale: Required missed approach precision is less than that required for the 





terrain.  The moderate task value reflects the significance of knowledge and 
preparation required. 
 
Fisher Test Contingency Table: 
 Pre-test Group Test Group 
Pass 4 6 
Fail 0 4 
 
p=.210  
This PTS task is likely intended to capture an examiner assessment of pilot 
control skill at the initiation of the missed approach.  This is logical, as a grossly errant 
control input at this low altitude could be disastrous.  As can be seen in the table above, 
most pilots employed appropriate control inputs.  However, one test group pilot turned in 
an unchecked manner and another simply did not initiate a climb.  Two other test group 
pilots received failing grades for this task by crashing during the approach, and as per 
methodology, subsequent ungradable tasks were considered failed.  None of the pilots 
grossly over-controlled the airplane, but the examples noted above are deemed 
identifiable “incorrect missed approach control inputs.” 
 The p-value for this task is p=.210 and the null hypothesis is not rejected. 
 
Task 7.c. Reports to ATC 
Participant 
Number 






































Task Importance: 1 
Rationale: This pilot action provides little information to ATC (in the simulated 
Class C airspace) and contributes nothing to progression of flight, thus the very low 
task value. 
 
Fisher Test Contingency Table: 
 
p=.126 
 The initiation of a missed approach is a mandatory reporting point (Jeppesen 
Guided Flight Discovery Team, ATC Clearances, 2006).  This required pilot action must 
be known and remembered by the pilot at this busy phase of flight, as he/she is not 
prompted by ACT to report and other flight tasks likely occupy the pilot‟s immediate 
attention at this time.  Further, the pilot may be unintentionally conditioned by ATC 
during the approach process to respond to communications rather than initiate them.  
Perhaps not surprisingly then, three pilots simply did not report at the missed approach 
point and had to be contacted by ATC.  Two other pilots, as previously noted, crashed 
before initiating the missed approach.   
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Number 
































C  D 
(Fail) 
 Pre-test Group Test Group 
Pass 4 5 





The Fisher score for this task is p=.126 and the null hypothesis is not rejected, 
though once again, the p-value is close to the required confidence level threshold to do 
so. 
 
Task 7.d. Complies with missed approach clearance and procedures 
Task Importance: 4 
Rationale: The task value for this task is relatively high, as fully executing the 
missed approach clearance/procedure occurs during a high workload phase of flight 
and compliance involves multiple chart interpretation and implementation skills. 
Participant 
Number 
































Fisher Test Contingency Table: 
 
 Pre-test Group Test Group 
Pass 4 4 
Fail 0 4 
  
p=.141 
As already noted in task in task 7.b, two pilots did not comply with published 
missed approach procedures: one pilot turned indiscriminately, and another delayed the 
initial climb.  The other two pilots who received failing grades on this task, once again, 





successful completion of the missed approach (such as holding pattern entry errors), and 
received a C grade.   
 The p-value for this task is p=.141 and the null hypothesis is not rejected. 
  
Task 7.e. Initiates missed approach at full scale or anytime required tolerances not 
met 
Task Importance: 4 
Rationale: This task applies to the approach itself (not the missed approach), and 
the high task value reflects the required procedural knowledge as well as the 
potentially close proximity of terrain. 
Participant 
Number 





































Fisher Test Contingency Table: 
 Pre-test Group Test Group 
Pass 3 3 
Fail 1 8 
  
p=.143  
This specific task was easy to grade; pilots either abandoned the approach when 
instruments indicated full-scale course deviation or they did not.  Unfortunately, most did 
not.  No fewer than 8 of the 11 test group pilots and one pre-test group pilot continued the 





approach.  Sometimes, these pilots never got established on the approach course with 
acceptable needle indications, and at least once this was due (at least partially) to a poor 
vector from ATC (see Chapter V, section 6.f.).   
The Fisher score for this task is p=.143 and the null hypothesis is not rejected.  
However, it should be noted that the inability to reject the null hypothesis at the required 
confidence level is heavily influenced by the one failing grade in the Pre-test group. 
 
Area Of Operation 8: Alternate Destination 
Task 8.a. Selects legal alternate for flight plan 
Task Importance: 1 
Rationale: The selected legal alternate is not necessarily the actual alternate and 
rarely affects the progress or ultimate destination of the flight, thus the very low 
task value. 
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For the purposes of IFR flight planning an “alternate destination” is a default, 
secondary destination that meets multiple legal criteria.  The reader is strongly 
encouraged to refer to Chapter V, section 8.a. to learn more about the alternate selection 
process, as certain selection criteria is described in detail and is relevant to the grading 
process.  A reader might assume this task to be an easy one to grade as it would be 
logically assumed that that any potential alternate is either legal or it is not.  In reality, 
however, the grading of the alternate selection was complicated by the effort to 
appropriately grade the alternate selection process, and by the fact that the effort that the 
participants invested in the process was not always entirely clear.  Further, ambiguity 
regarding alternate airport legalities emerged as grades were assigned, since the 
“appropriateness” of  certain weather forecasts for determining alternate airport 
suitability are questioned within the industry.  Again, the reader is encouraged to see the 
corresponding section in Chapter V for more information. 
In any event, 2 test group pilots received failing grades on this task for choosing 
alternate airports that were clearly illegal.  Five others chose a marginally legal alternate 
destination and received a “C” grade.  Three others chose a clearly legal alternate. 
 The p-value for this task is p=.333 and the null hypothesis is not rejected. 
 
Task 8.b. Assimilates appropriate weather information to determine suitable 
alternates, including non-legal (for flight plan) alternates 





Rationale: Legally (or illegally) filed alternates rarely affect progress or destination 
of flight.  However, pilot knowledge of the selection process is considerable.  Task 
value, therefore, is a “median” value. 
 
Fisher Test Contingency Table: 
 Pre-test Group Test Group 
Pass 4 2 
Fail 0 5 
 
p=.045  
As noted in the table above, only two test group pilots spent adequate time 
assessing weather forecasts to make an informed alternate airport selection.  Most test 
group pilots checked nothing more than the provided Terminal Area Forecast before 
making their decision, and 2 still chose alternate destinations that this document showed 
to be illegal. Others offered destinations that were generally in the direction of better 
weather, but again, little or no actual weather reporting documentation was consulted.   
 The p-value for this task is p=.045, and the null hypothesis CAN be rejected at the 
95% confidence level. 
 
Task 8.c. Performs appropriate planning to proceed to suitable alternate 
Task Importance: 3 
Participant 
Number 
































Rationale: Though part of the en route structure of flight and therefore significant, 
only moderate planning for this phase of flight was required in the Class C airspace 
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Fisher Test Contingency Table: 
 Pre-test Group Test Group 
Pass 4 5 
Fail 0 3 
 
p=.255  
Since the weather information communicated to pilots clearly showed better 
weather west and southwest (and relatively close), participants needed only ATC 
authorization and routing to get there.  Little or no fuel planning or weather interpretation 
was required, and since the initial routing provided by ATC was little more than a vector 
in the chosen direction, pilots had little trouble complying.  The only pilots that failed this 
task had already crashed or landed, and as per methodology, earned a default failing 
grade.  Pilots who received a “C” grade for this task made no inquiries to ATC regarding 
current weather at the alternate. 






Task 8.d. Acquires appropriate route/clearance to proceed to alternate, and 
implements initial route to alternate 
Task Importance: 3 
Rationale: Though part of the en route structure of flight and therefore significant, 
implementation of the clearance to the alternate in the Class C airspace of the 
simulated flight was greatly simplified due to radar vectors and ATC assistance.  
Thus, task value remains moderate. 
Participant 
Number 





































Fisher Test Contingency Table: 
 Pre-test Group Test Group 
Pass 4 8 
Fail 0 3 
 
p=.363  
Grades for this task will, by necessity, reflect the grades of the previous task, 
though weather interpretation/planning did not affect the grade.  All pilots (except for 
those who had already crashed or landed) were easily able to comply with ATC 
instructions to fly an assigned heading towards their alternate destination, and all, 
therefore, received a passing grade.  Had the flight been a real one, ATC would likely 





the en route portion of the flight would have been repeated.  Since all of these tasks had 
been previously graded, the flight was terminated at this point. 













 This chapter further explains findings from the research project.  It is intended to 
provide meaningful explanation of findings already reported in Chapter IV, and the 
rationale for certain conclusions that may not otherwise be obvious.  To support these 
explanations, observations from notes made during the research flights will be included.  
While some of these observations are lengthy, they are useful in understanding exactly 
what some research participants did wrong and how certain pilot errors or omissions may 
have been unintentionally learned or not learned during training.  These observations and 
related commentary also provide some insight into what research participants were likely 
thinking during errant parts of the flight, as some pilots were “thinking out loud” or 
showed evidence of being conditioned by the location or other specifics of their training.  
This will be more fully explained in the text.  Knowing what pilots were thinking (or may 
have been thinking) is particularly useful, since tracing the links in the logic chain that 





opinions will be offered as they relate to research findings, and it is hoped that the reader 
will grant some license to the researcher to do so.  The importance grades reported in 
Chapter IV will be repeated here, as will Fisher contingency tables summarizing pre-test 
and test group pilot performance.  The p-value will also be reported.   
We turn then, to the data and conclusions of each task. 
 
Area of Operation 1: ATC Clearance 
Task 1.a. Adequate knowledge of the elements related to ATC clearances and 
pilot/controller responsibilities 
Task Importance: 4 
Fisher Test Contingency Table:  
 Pre-test Group Test Group 
Pass 4 8 
Fail 0 3 
 
p=.363 
This task is quite broad, as it deals with the “elements related to ATC clearances,” 
and comments here will serve as sort of an overview for all clearance tasks.  As such, it 
may be stated from the outset that acquiring an IFR clearance appeared to be an intuitive 
function for most instrument pilots.  This is likely due to the integral relationship of the 
IFR clearance to the IFR flight; all instrument rated pilots know that the flight does not 
proceed without it.  That is, all instrument pilots likely know that they must get this 
clearance to know what to do next, and all research participants began with this important 





Another contributor to overall pilot competence in this series of tasks is likely the fact 
that the clearance is received and radios “set up” while stationary on the ground, as there 
is little time pressure or need for the pilot to divide attention among tasks.   
Still, the fact that 5 of the test group pilots made less than perfect grades and 3 
made failing grades, suggests that not all pilots found clearance tasks to be easy.  Also, it 
should be understood by the reader that this task requires knowledge of “clearance 
elements and the pilot‟s responsibility,” not necessarily ability.  In fact, perhaps the most 
that could be said is that all pilots understood their responsibility to get a clearance.  In 
practice, several of the test group pilots exhibited some difficulty regarding “elements 
related to ATC clearances.”  As noted in Chapter IV, “six of the test group pilots did not 
set one or both navigation radios to the correct frequency before takeoff, eight did not 
pre-set navigation instruments entirely in accordance with clearance, six required 
multiple “repeats” of the clearance and/or corrections from ATC, and one requested the 
clearance on the wrong communication frequency.”  All of these errors will be analyzed 
more fully within the appropriate task section of this report; this task is really an 
overview of them all.  Thus, the overview is that pilot knowledge of clearance tasks is 
generally sufficient, but clearance knowledge application, for at least some of the test 
group pilots, needs more practice, as will be seen in subsequent tasks. 
 
Task 1.b. Copies ATC Clearance 
Task Importance: 4 






 Pre-test Group Test Group 
Pass 4 8 




All but one pilot passed this important task.  However, some struggled though the 
process (one required three complete readbacks from ATC, two required two readbacks, 
and most had a correction or two).  The reason was simple: pilots were assigned a route 
different than they had requested.  A few words about the clearance process may be 
helpful. 
Before any flight may proceed under IFR, a clearance must be issued by ATC.  
The initial request for this clearance actually occurs before the flight begins, and is 
usually made in the form of a flight plan that the pilot files verbally over the telephone 
with a Flight Service Station or online textually via DUATS .  The flight plan, as noted, is 
really more of a request than a plan, and in it the pilot requests a time of departure, an 
altitude, a route, and other relevant flight parameters.  ATC, during the time of flight plan 
filing and actual departure, attempts to harmonize this proposed flight with all other 
known traffic.  Once ATC successfully integrates the proposed flight into the “system,” a 
clearance is issued by ATC to the pilot immediately before departure.  This clearance 
may contain exactly the route and altitudes that the pilot requested and can be 
communicated to the pilot with a simple “cleared as filed.”  But it may also be very 
different.  In fact, other than the points of departure and arrival, the actual clearance 
issued by ATC may have little in common with the filed route, and may send the pilot 





completely different than what was filed.  And, while this is not an uncommon 
occurrence in the greater ATC system, it is uncommon in the semi-rural environment 
(where there is generally less traffic for ATC to harmonize) where all of the test group 
pilots trained.  In fact, anecdotal statements from the pilots before the flight suggested 
that they expected the common route clearance “as filed,” and were likely caught off 
guard by something different.   
 Even so, most of the pilots were able to adapt, and all eventually got the route “on 
paper” and read back to ATC successfully.  It should be understood by the reader that 
seeking clarification from ATC is not an error, and is in fact encouraged to eliminate 
possible ambiguity or misunderstanding (Jeppesen Guided Flight Discovery Team, ATC 
Clearances, 2006).  Therefore, all possible latitude was given the research participants, 
and grades for this task were relatively high.  At some point, however, continued pilot 
queries or ATC corrections suggest insufficient pilot knowledge or ability.  The 
definitions of C and D grades, as reported in Chapter III, are as follows:  “C- Task 
completed and/or knowledge demonstrated, but multiple attempts/clarification, and, D- 
Task partially completed and/or knowledge partially demonstrated, but elements of task 
not done or done incorrectly and/or gaps in knowledge observed or suspected.”  These 
definitions provided the basis for grade assignments for this task.  The one test group 
pilot that failed this task was finally able to record the clearance assigned by ATC (or so 
it appeared), but not without multiple attempts, corrections, and lingering errors.   
 
Task 1.c. Determines Ability to Comply 





Fisher Test Contingency Table: 
 Pre-test Group Test Group 
Pass 4 7 




 This task was difficult to grade for two reasons.  First, the ability of the airplane 
and equipment to comply (which is likely what the FAA had in mind when creating this 
task) was not a factor.  If this were all that were graded on this task, all pilots would have 
received passing grades, though little actual testing would have been involved since they 
were supplied an adequate “airplane” and assigned no impossible tasks.     
The ability of the pilot to comply was quite another matter, and while this could 
be more meaningfully graded, the validity of the grade may be questionable.  This is due 
to the fact that all pilots knew that they were conducting a simulated, data-generating 
flight.  They were therefore likely inclined to attempt it whether they thought they could 
execute the clearance or not.  The flight was, after all, an experiment, and since it was 
simulated, little was at stake.  In other words, in a real airplane, self-assessment may have 
been more accurate, and the flight may not have even been attempted, especially given 
the bad weather.  Several of the pilots pointed this out after the flight.  In hindsight, it 
may have been an informative exercise to ask pilots to make a go/no-go “ability” decision 
before the flight and glean some knowledge regarding pilot self-assessment.  Future 
researchers should consider incorporating this task. 
It should be noted that one pilot accurately self-assessed his inability to comply 





asked ATC for radar vectors to an “uncongested airport.”  This pilot‟s grade for this task 
was raised to a “D” since he did indeed correctly “determine ability to comply” and 
proceed accordingly.  Still, a D is considered a failing grade for this project as this pilot 
(and one other) was flatly unable to comply with the clearance.  The reader should be 
careful, however, to not read too much into the grading of pilot self-assessment for 
reasons noted above.  In any event, the p value for this task is p=.462 and the null 
hypothesis is not rejected. 
 
Task 1.d. Correctly Interprets/Requests Clarification of Clearance. 
Task Importance: 4 
Fisher Test Contingency Table: 
 Pre-test Group Test Group 
Pass 4 7 




This was a difficult task to grade since what the pilot correctly interpreted and/or 
needed clarification of was not readily observable.  What could be observed was how the 
pilot complied with the clearance, so the grade assignments necessarily reflect the grades 
for task 1.c.  Affecting grade assignments for this task, at least somewhat, was the 
occasional disinclination of pilots to seek clarification from ATC.  As can be seen by the 
grades, three of the pilots did not demonstrate adequate interpretation of the clearance 





The single most common error made by pilots was setting navigation radios 
incorrectly.  This was a relatively common error throughout the research flights and is 
noted multiple times in this report.  The phrase “incorrectly set radios,” however, can 
have different meanings depending on context.  Here, it means that radios were likely set 
incorrectly because of pilot confusion regarding the fix (or “route” to the fix) to which 
he/she was directed in the initial clearance.   If so, pilots should have addressed this 
confusion with queries to ATC.  Pilots who received a failing grade on this task did not, 
or at least did not do so enough. 
 
Task 1.e. Reads Back Clearance 
Task Importance: 3 




 As noted earlier, several of the test group pilots required at least a second “repeat” 
of the clearance and one required three repeats before it could be read back correctly.    
Additionally, there were multiple corrections from ATC for incorrect elements of the 
readback, and one attempt to contact ATC on the wrong frequency.  It should be 
emphasized once again that pilot requests for a clearance to be repeated or clarified is not 
necessarily a bad thing, as it is an appropriate pilot action  if there is any ambiguity 
regarding the clearance.  For that reason, “repeats” did not automatically receive a lower 
 Pre-test Group Test Group 
Pass 4 8 





grade unless the apparent need for a repeat was pilot confusion or inability to keep up 
with ATC.  Indeed, some of the pilots who received high grades on this task queried ATC 
regarding some element of the clearance.  Not coincidentally, some of these same pilots 
received higher grades in the implementation of the clearance and frequently 
demonstrated an ability to think “farther ahead” of the airplane and set up the radios and 
navigation instruments accordingly.  There appeared to be a relationship between 
receiving, copying, understanding (sometimes requiring dialogue), and implementing the 
clearance which is reflected by the grades.  The test group pilot who received a failing 
grade on this task struggled with all three elements of the clearance receipt/copy/readback 
process, and ATC had considerable doubt about the pilot‟s comprehension of it.  ATC 
accepted the pilot‟s readback so that the research “flight” could continue, but the 
readback was quite muddled and the pilot‟s struggle to execute what he had read was no 
surprise. 
 Most pilots were able to get and read back the clearance, so the Fisher score for 
this task is p=.692 and the null hypothesis is not rejected. 
 
Task 1.f. Standard Phraseology 
Task Importance: 1 
Fisher Test Contingency Table: 
 Pre-test Group Test Group 
Pass 4 10 








As reflected by the grades, few pilots had trouble with this relatively unimportant 
task.  In fact, as phraseology relates to this Area of Operation pilots shouldn’t have 
trouble, as the requirement is only to repeat back to ATC what has just been read to the 
pilot.  Of course, phraseology is a task that routinely confronts the instrument pilot, as 
elements of holding clearances, approach clearances, and landing clearances are routinely 
“read back” to ATC.  And, in fact, the only test group pilot to receive a failing grade for 
this task struggled with phraseology whenever asked to repeat elements of a clearance. 
 
Task 1.g. Sets Communication/Navigation systems & Transponder in Compliance 
With Clearance 
Task Importance: 4 
Fisher Test Contingency Table: 
 Pre-test Group Test Group 
Pass 4 5 




This task proved to be one of the more problematic, in part because of poor pilot 
technique, and also because the errors committed during the pre-take off radio set-up 
compounded other errors en route.  No less than seven of the test group pilots set 
navigation instruments incorrectly (or not at all) before takeoff, though one of them 
discovered and corrected the omission during initial climb-out.  Six also set wrong 
navigation radio frequencies (or, again, none at all), and another set almost correct 





it should be emphasized that these pre-takeoff set-up errors and/or omissions led to many 
other errors, since once underway aircraft control assumed a large part of the pilot‟s 
attention.  A few examples of these compounded errors, taken from notes made during 
the research flights, are informative: 
During pre-takeoff set up, Test group pilot 1 made no effort to align the 
course indicating arrow of the HSI to the direction of flight.  Instead, the 
arrow was aligned to the reciprocal of selected course.  This is not 
necessarily incorrect, as the HSI will still provide correct needle sensing as 
long as the course being flown is not a Localizer.  Unfortunately, TG1
 
continued the “reversed arrow” right up to and including the localizer, 
where it did initially cause reverse needle sensing.   
 Test group pilot 2 started off with nav instruments set incorrectly.  
Specifically, the SWO 118° radial was not set on either indicator.  TG2 
noticed this only at the last minute as he realized something “looked 
wrong,” and set the HSI to 118° just about the time it centered.  He 
corrected adequately and intercepted course, but continued to be “behind 
the radios” throughout the flight. 
 As Test Group Pilot 5 took off , the #1 nav. radio was set to 113.2 
(Pioneer VORTAC near Ponca City) with the OBS set to 360°, and #2 set 
to 114.4 (Tulsa VORTAC) with the OBS set to 250°.  Since the #2 nav 
indicator is a standard indicator (not HSI, see pilot #1 above) confusion is 
likely to result, and did.  The 250° radial was set in #2 nav., (which 





the radial, the CDI will be centered, but once off, reverse needle sensing 
will result, and again, it did.  TG5 intercepted V140 and turned to the 
appropriate heading, but over time he drifted off.  With the 
aforementioned reverse needle sensing of the indicator, TG5 quickly 
became confused.  ATC intervened with “Radar shows you 2 miles North 
of V140, say intentions,” to which TG5 responded that he was “going 
direct to YARNS intersection.”  TG5 was then reminded of clearance and 
given a vector to rejoin the airway.  He did so successfully, but as a 
clearance amendment (the next task) was issued, 5 again drifted off of the 
airway, struggled with reading back the clearance, and became 
disoriented. 
 At (TG6‟s) departure the radios were not set correctly, which 
greatly complicated initial navigation.  #1 nav. radio was set on 114.4 
(Tulsa VORTAC) with the OBS set to 180°.  #2 nav. radio was set to 
108.0 (?) with OBS set to 360.  However, soon after takeoff TG6 realized 
his mistake and attempted to fix it; he set #1 OBS to 118° (consistent with 
clearance) but still had 114.4 in the #1 radio.  Several minutes later, the 
radios were finally set correctly, and 6 established himself on course but 
only after confessing to ATC that he had flown through the assigned 
course.  He declined ATC‟s offer for vectors onto the course, and instead 
turned to a heading which provided an intercept angle of 120°.  In other 





tracked it in the correct direction, though again, it appeared that some pre-
takeoff planning might have avoided much confusion. 
 Once the clearance (for TG8) was copied correctly, little pre-
takeoff planning went into its execution.  Neither of the nav. radios were 
set, nor was the OBS of the VOR or HSI, nor were anticipated com. 
frequencies.  After takeoff, things improved little as the HSI was set to 
090° instead of 118° (with TG8 undoubtedly confusing heading and radial 
to intercept) without the nav. frequencies being set at all.  Indeed, about 5 
minutes into the flight, #1 nav. radio was set to the Tulsa localizer 
frequency, which produced a “nav. flag” which was ignored.  Finally, TG8 
took off with the TUL VORTAC set in the GPS (only because it was set 
during preflight demonstration), but it was soon replaced with Direct 
Tulsa airport, which was less useful information given the clearance.  
Without VHF navigation capability, TG8 simply headed to Tulsa airport 
direct via GPS.  After several minutes of this, ATC intervened with “radar 
shows you 4 NE of IBAAH, say intentions.”  TG8 responded that he was 
“tracking to IBAAH,” to which ATC again reminded that he was already 
past IBAAH.  ATC rejected TG8‟s offer to go back to IBAAH and instead 
offered vectors to V140, which were accepted.  However, without the nav. 
radios set, there was little chance to intercept the airway and TG8 was 
eventually well south of it.  [Note: after the flight, TG8 admitted that he 





advised TG8 of his whereabouts, another vector was given to V140 and 
the correct frequency and radial were dialed in.   
 Test Group Pilot 11 departed with navigation radios set incorrectly.  
#1 nav. was set correctly to 108.4, but the HSI was set to 110° instead of 
118°, introducing a small navigation error.  The #2 nav. radio/ indicator 
were not set, nor was the GPS.  However, 10 minutes after departure [and 
probably due to waning situational awareness] the GPS was set direct to 
IBAAH.  This tended to encourage “GPS direct” navigation, which 
persisted throughout the flight.  GPS direct navigation was not technically 
legal given the VFR only GPS [which was discussed with the pilot before 
the flight]. 
 Again, these excerpts from the research flights, though lengthy, are offered to 
inform the reader of the variety and number of pre-takeoff navigation errors that were 
observed.  In fairness, it should be noted that some of the navigation instrument errors 
may have been compounded by participant unfamiliarity with an HSI.  One participant 
made a reference to this during the post flight debriefing.  As required per methodology, 
all participants confirmed during the pre-flight briefing that they had at least some 
exposure to the navigation instruments and no questions regarding their use.  However, 
not all of the training aircraft in which the test group pilots trained had an HSI, and some 
may have been more familiar with it than others.  Some may have overestimated their 
understanding of the HSI, and learned their actual level of HSI expertise during the 
research flight!  Still, the HSI operates similarly to a conventional VOR indicator and 





assumed valid.  Indeed, a conventional VOR indicator was on the “aircraft” panel for any 
who preferred it to the HSI.    
 As noted, this was a problematic part of the flight, and for many pilots it set the 
tone for recurring and/or compounded errors.  The Fisher score for this task is p=.176, 
which suggests that the null hypothesis could be rejected at roughly the 82% confidence 
level.  And, while this perceived performance disparity between the groups suggests a 
verifiable difference between them, we will not reject the null at this confidence level for 
this task.   Once again, the null hypothesis is not rejected.    
 
Area of Operation 2: Compliance With Clearance/Procedures 
Task 2.a. Adequate knowledge of elements of departure, en route, & arrival 
clearance and pilot/controller responsibility 
Task Importance: 4 
Fisher Test Contingency Table: 
 Pre-test Group Test Group 
Pass 4 9 
Fail 0 2 
 
p=.524  
As can be readily seen by the grades in the table, most pilots received a passing 
grade for this important task.  The task itself, however, is quite broad and an effort was 
made to evaluate only the pilots‟ knowledge of it, as specific knowledge application is 





knowledge of what was supposed to be done, and most of the pilots appeared to know 
what ATC meant when issuing clearances.   
 Two pilots appeared to not understand either the departure, en route, or amended 
clearances.  In fact, as one of these two pilots took off, turned the wrong way and 
eventually drifted off course, he was questioned by ATC of his intentions.  His response, 
that he was “proceeding direct YARNS,” revealed that he did not understand where ATC 
wanted him to go.  This pilot had to be reminded of his clearance, but it still may not 
have been fully understood.  This was later confirmed, as ATC‟s request to get ATIS 
information was misunderstood to be more route information.  As the route clearance was 
amended, the pilot was unable to comply with the change and wound up receiving radar 
vectors from ATC as a last resort.   
 Two pilots of the test group received less than passing grades for this task and the 
Fisher score is p=.524, thus the null hypothesis is not rejected. 
 
Task 2.b. Uses correct publication 
Task Importance: 2 




 Pre-test Group Test Group 
Pass 4 10 





 Since all of the publications used during this “flight” were provided to 
participants, it is seems highly unlikely that the wrong publication could be used!  
However, one pilot managed to do just that.   
 On this relatively short flight only one en route and one approach chart was used, 
though the entire book of approach charts was supplied (in case of diversion, this being a 
“real” flight).  All participants were advised on what approach would likely be assigned 
at Tulsa, and, in fact, a large photocopy of this approach was provided.  All participants 
were allowed to review the approach before the flight.  This review is consistent with real 
IFR flight procedures since, given the weather, all pilots would naturally deduce that a 
precision approach would be required and only one ILS is aligned to the North 
(consistent with forecast wind) at Tulsa.  Still, one pilot (TG2) requested the ILS 18L 
approach (despite the strong north wind) but accidentally referred to the ILS 18R 
approach chart, and set up the navigation instruments accordingly.  He later explained 
that he requested the ILS 18L approach because he had recently practiced it and felt more 
confident in its execution.  However, the ILS 18R is not the ILS 18L, and setting up for 
one approach and flying another is most definitely not “using the correct publication.”  A 
failing grade for this task was therefore assigned.  
 The Fisher score for this task is p=.733 so the null hypothesis is not rejected.   
 
Task 2.c. Uses and identifies correct communication and navigation facilities 
Task Importance: 4 






 Pre-test Group Test Group 
Pass 4 5 
Fail 0 4 
 
p=.176 
Assigned grades for this task, as well as synopses of the flights, will reflect task 
1.g.  In fact, is it difficult to make a distinction between “sets communication/navigation 
systems…” (1.g.) and “uses and identifies correct communication and navigation 
facilities” (2.c.).  Differences between the two grade tables could be attributed to: legal 
and profitable use of GPS, diligence in identifying navigation stations, and some 
subjectivity in grading.   
 Without restating what has already been said regarding task 1.g., it should be 
reaffirmed that this was a problematic phase of the flight.  It should also be noted that the 
use of GPS played a significant role in situational awareness and overall “use and 
identification of correct navigation facilities.”   
 Since the GPS was “VFR only,” its only legal use was for situational awareness.  
However, it is probably impossible to overstate the importance of situation awareness, 
and the legal means of navigation for this flight - VHF navigation instruments - provide 
this awareness only with considerable pilot interpretation.    The GPS was very useful in 
helping pilots know exactly where they were, and for “making sense” of VHF navigation 
instrument indications.  Some pilots who did not effectively use the GPS simply could 
not correctly set or interpret navigation instruments, and ATC statements of “off course, 
say intentions” were commonplace.  Conversely, a few pilots made too much use of GPS 





pilots on course, but not technically legal.  Again, certain observations from the flights 
will be informative for the reader: 
 Test Group pilot 2 never became established at IBAAH intersection.  In 
fact, TG2 set the 140° radial off TUL since his clearance was to “Victor 
140.”  Actually, V140 is defined by the 253° radial off TUL.  TG2 
continued southeast without noticing his mistake until ATC informed him 
that he was 2 miles southeast of IBAAH and asked for his intentions.  
Without being able to provide any or figure out his mistake, he simply 
confessed that he “was way off,” and implied that he did not know how to 
fix the problem.  ATC then offered vectors to get back on the airway.  He 
accepted the vectors, but still did not dial in the correct radial, so there was 
little chance of getting on course.  Faced with this, ATC “reminded” TG2 
that Victor 140 is defined by the 253° radial of TUL, which the participant 
then set correctly and became established on the airway.  The next task, 
copying and complying with the new clearance, went no better.  Once the 
clearance was copied (with minimal difficulty), the nav. radios were again 
set incorrectly to define V532, which is necessary to identify SEARS and 
KEVIL intersections.  Given that the new route could not be implemented, 
ATC assigned “Direct TUL,” and the compliance with clearance task was 
considered failed, as per agreed methodology.   
 A “direct to TUL VORTAC” clearance was issued to Test Group 
Pilot 5 (for the same reason that it was issued to TG2; see above), which 





Instead, KTUL was entered in the GPS with a “Direct To” command.  
Note that KTUL is the airport, not the VORTAC.  After listening to ATIS 
and returning to Tulsa Approach frequency, TG5 admitted that he was 
confused and asked for “vectors to airport due to inability to control 
aircraft and lack of situational awareness.”  ATC asked if he was declaring 
an emergency, to which TG5 grudgingly agreed that he was.  He was then 
told to turn to a new heading and expect vectors to final approach course 
for ILS 36R.    TG5 asked if he could “just get vectors to an airport,” to 
which ATC reminded him of ceiling and visibility and that an instrument 
approach would be necessary. 
 A minor problem for TG7 was not setting OBS radials accurately 
enough.  This was relevant only on the initial intercept of the SWO 118° 
radial.  TG7 had the HSI set about 15° off (presumably by accident) and 
actually intercepted V140 before the radial to get to V140. 
 Unsure of the navigation instrument indications (though needle 
was beginning to center), TG8 finally asked for “vectors to SEARS” 
which ATC provided.  Again, however, V532 (the next airway) was not 
set in the nav. radios (frequency dialed in standby only in nav. radio) and 
TG8 flew through his clearance.  ATC intervened again with “radar shows 
you 2 SE of SEARS, say intentions.”  With no real plan in response, ATC 
asked TG8 if he could take a “direct to TUL VORTAC” to which TG8 





the amended clearance and accompanying hold no longer options, ATC 
told TG8 to “expect vectors to final approach course ILS 36R.” 
 Test Group Pilot 11 appeared to be navigating GPS direct, though 
he did so in a way that mostly kept him on the assigned route and quasi-
legal.  Usually, TG11 waited until the assigned fix (using GPS), then set 
GPS to next fix and followed the DTK (direct) headings.  He set VOR 
indicators and frequencies to match, which made his procedure legal (sort 
of) as long as he was on the assigned course.  Occasionally he was not, 
and using the above procedure (instead of setting indicators to charted 
radials) kept him from noticing his mistake. 
 And so it went.  Pilots who correctly visualized their position, and used GPS to do 
so, fared better than pilots who didn‟t.  Also, as was noted during task 1.g., setting radios 
and radials correctly and as needed was a fundamental instrument pilot skill that 
compounded other errors if done poorly.  Finally, it should be noted that while nearly all 
pilots attempted to identify (using audible tone) at least some navigation stations, it 
appeared that few (if any) Test Group Pilots identified them all.  This may have been due, 
in part, to the difficulty that the PI had in hearing/observing this pilot task (due to a 
simulator flaw, the tone was not audible over the headsets).  However, it was due mostly 
to the heavy pilot workload that reduced the task to such a low priority that it was 
sometimes neglected by pilots altogether. 
 The Fisher score for this task is p=.176, and as tempting as it may be to do so, at 






Task 2.d. Performs appropriate checklist 
Task Importance: 2 
Fisher Test Contingency Table: 
 Pre-test Group Test Group 
Pass 4 11 
Fail 0 0 
 
p=1.0 
This relatively unimportant task presented little difficulty to participants.  The 
simulator accurately reproduced the flight sensations of a Cessna 172, with which all of 
the participants had considerable familiarity.  Therefore, most checklist items were 
intuitive and well rehearsed by the participants.  There was, however, the occasional 
landing light left on en route (typically it should be turned on for takeoff and 
extinguished soon after) or power setting left at incorrect RPM.  However, since neither 
of these (or related) items are particularly relevant to the instrument pilot skills of interest 
in this study, they were ignored by the PI. 
 Obviously, the null hypothesis for this task is not rejected. 
 
Task 2.e. Establishes communication with proper ATC facility 
Task Importance: 2 
Fisher Test Contingency Table: 
 Pre-test Group Test Group 
Pass 4 11 






This was another relatively unimportant task that presented little difficulty.  The 
flight originated at Stillwater Regional Airport where frequencies were well known by all 
participants.  Once en route, frequencies for successive ATC facilities were verbally 
assigned by ATC as needed; participants were only required to “look up” the Tulsa ATIS 
frequency and possibly McAlester FSS frequency.  Even then, these two frequencies 
were provided by ATC if requested by the pilot.  Grades for this relatively easy task were 
high, and the null hypothesis is not rejected. 
 
Task 2.f. Complies with ATC instructions and airspace restrictions 
Task Importance: 5 
Fisher Test Contingency Table: 
 Pre-test Group Test Group 
Pass 4 6 




While a very important task, little can be said about “compliance with ATC 
instructions and airspace restrictions” that has not already been described in regard to 
specific tasks (or soon will be).  Many things can cause non-compliance with ATC 
instructions and/or intrusion into uncleared airspace, and all of these items are best 
described under specific task headings.  It should be understood that at no time was non-
compliance with ATC willful, reckless, or due to carelessness.  It should also be 





neither of which are particularly relevant to flight under IFR anyway.  Therefore, for this 
flight at least, the task element “complying with airspace restrictions” is indistinguishable 
from “complying with ATC instructions.”  As noted in the grade tables, the same pilots 
that were “non-compliant with ATC instructions” or in violation of “airspace restrictions” 
were the same pilots that were grossly off course at some point during the flight or did 
not “remain within holding airspace.”  All of these are separate tasks that are included 
within this one, and grades will necessarily show similarities. 
 The Fisher score for this broad task is p=.154 and the null hypothesis is rejected at 
roughly the 85% confidence level.  The rejection of the null hypothesis at this reduced 
level of confidence is fully explained in Appendix K. 
 
Task 2.g. Intercepts appropriate radials and bearings as published in procedures 
Task Importance: 4 
Fisher Test Contingency Table: 
 Pre-test Group Test Group 
Pass 4 6 
Fail 0 4 
 
p=.210 
Due to the similarity and/or interrelationship of tasks, grades for this section will 
necessarily reflect the grades in sections 1.g. and 2.c.  An overview of pilot errors related 
to “intercepting appropriate radials” is worth repeating here, as it was, once again, a 





 Three test group pilots set the reciprocal of actual course in a VHF navigation 
instrument during at least one part of the flight.  This error leads to reverse needle sensing 
and is a common cause of pilot disorientation and/or navigation errors.  However, this 
error had a greater impact on maintaining radials than intercepting them.  Mention of it is 
made here for the sake of completeness. 
 Six test group pilots simply set the wrong radial in a VHF navigation instrument.  
Two more set radials that were close to the correct radial (off by only 5°-10°).  This 
suggested that the pilots knew how to find and set the correct radial, but just weren‟t 
careful enough.  During an actual IFR flight, a slight “prod” from ATC would likely fix 
this problem, or ATC might ignore it altogether depending on distance from the 
navigation station and corresponding course divergence.   
 Two more test group pilots set wrong radials at some point in the flight, but 
caught and fixed their error “at the last second,” or at least before it caused a course or 
approach deviation. 
 One test group pilot employed a flatly incorrect intercept angle - 120° from the 
assigned radial. 
 Finally, one test group pilot set radials mostly correctly, but somewhat “after the 
fact.”  This pilot appeared to be navigating from fix to fix using the “Direct To” function 
of the (VFR only) GPS, and once en route, centered the CDI of the navigation 
instruments accordingly.  This procedure generally kept the pilot on course, but not 
technically legally.  It also reduced this pilot‟s grade on this task, although he did receive 
a passing grade since he “stayed on the radial” and did, at least some of the time, set and 





 Note, yet again, that multiple errors were committed by individual pilots, so the 
errors catalogued above are not to be understood to be referring to different pilots for 
each error. 
 The Fisher score for this task is p=.210, so the null hypothesis is not rejected. 
 
Area Of Operation 3: Basic Instrument Maneuvers 
Task 3.a. Adequate knowledge and skill related to attitude instrument flight 
Task Importance: 5 
Fisher Test Contingency Table: 
 Pre-test Group Test Group 
Pass 4 8 
Fail 0 3 
 
p=.363 
As suggested by the task importance, instrument pilots are taught to “fly the 
airplane first.”  The importance of this simple axiom cannot be overstated, as nearly all 
the other tasks in this exercise become irrelevant if the pilot cannot maintain adequate 
aircraft control.  Also, it must be understood that maintaining control is not always easy, 
since increasing pilot workload encroaches on the attention that a pilot can devote to 
monitoring aircraft attitude.  In fact, as aircraft types become more complex, mechanical 
autopilots and multi-member crews are commonly employed for this reason.  During the 
research flights in this study, pilots received no assistance from autopilot or crew 





heading and altitude deviations were commonplace and three pilots did receive less than 
passing grades.   
 This task, as interpreted for this project, probes the knowledge and skill required 
for adequate aircraft control.  Both involve adequate instrument scan, instrument 
interpretation, and setting appropriate pitch and bank attitudes.  And, since all of these 
skills are difficult to measure solely through observation, some subjectivity in grading is 
inevitable.  Pilots that received less than passing grades for this task had, in the judgment 
of the PI, excessively recurring heading, altitude, or attitude deviations.   Specific altitude 
or heading deviations will be more fully discussed in the next task. 
 The Fisher score for this task is p=.363 and the null hypothesis is not rejected. 
 
Task 3.b. Maintains altitude +/- 200 feet, heading +/- 20°, and airspeed +/- 20 knots. 
Task Importance: 4 
Fisher Test Contingency Table: 
 Pre-test Group Test Group 
Pass 3 7 
Fail 0 3 
 
p=.420 
As noted in the previous task, none of the pilots lost control of the aircraft.  Not 
all, however, stayed within the stated tolerances, and the three pilots who failed this task 
had excessive and/or recurring heading or altitude deviations.  Excessive enough, in fact, 
that ATC would likely intervene during a real flight.  These deviations increased 





necessarily diverted to other tasks such as navigation, chart reading, communication, etc.  
A note in the summary of one of the pilot‟s flight illustrates the difficulty of attention 
division, and may help to explain it:  
Over-controlling was the rule throughout the flight, and the attention 
required for (barely) adequate attitude control made most other tasks very 
difficult.  After the flight, [this pilot] noted repeatedly that he was 
unimpressed with the simulator‟s fidelity to real flight. 
 And, in fact, this pilot may have had a point.  Pilots in both groups occasionally 
commented on the fidelity of the simulator to a real airplane, particularly the sensitivity 
of the elevator trim control.  In truth, the simulator, at times, did not perfectly reproduce 
all of the nuances of actual flight, such as the sound of changing slipstream noise or 
engine RPM.  These sensations (and others) do tend to alert a pilot to changing speed or 
attitude in a real airplane and they are notably missing in the simulator.  However, these 
nuances are rarely reproduced in even the most sophisticated simulators, and the 
simulated flight is, after all, simulated.  And, in fairness, the simulator doesn‟t crash like 
a real airplane either, so imperfect fidelity is not all bad! 
 It should be noted that one pilot who demonstrated excellent attitude control made 
frequent use of the heading bug, and this seemed to help keep him aware of assigned 
headings and alert him to heading deviations, particularly as he divided his attention 
among other tasks. 
 The Fisher score for this task is p=.420 and the null hypothesis is not rejected 
 





Task 4.a. Adequate knowledge and skill related to holding procedures 
Task Importance: 3 
Fisher Test Contingency Table: 
 Pre-test Group Test Group 
Pass 4 3 
Fail 0 7 
 
p=.035 
Holding procedures proved to be a problematic part of the flight.  And, 
significantly, a knowledge deficiency was sometimes evident in pilots who were quite 
knowledgeable and skilled in other tasks.  At least one skilled test group pilot admitted 
during the flight that he was “weak on holds” and another noted that he had the same 
problems with holds on the research flight that he had on his instrument checkride! 
 It should be noted that the task importance assigned to holds is relatively low.  
This is due to the fact that holds are an “auxiliary” part of any instrument flight and 
contribute little to the completion of it.  They are assigned by ATC as a delaying function 
so that something else - other traffic, weather, etc. - may proceed.  However, though the 
relative task importance of holds is low, their difficulty level can be high.  All instrument 
pilots are taught standard holding procedures, and some of these procedures require 
considerable pilot “headwork” as radial reciprocals, divergence angles, intercept angles 
and other tasks must be determined and correctly executed.  Compounding the difficulty 
of these tasks for this exercise is the fact that all of the test group pilots trained at 
Stillwater Regional Airport.  At this airport, nearly all of the holds associated with 





non-standard holds (turns to the left instead of right).  As one might guess, Stillwater-
trained pilots have more experience visualizing all of the above procedures backwards, 
and the potential for these same pilots to be confused by unpracticed, standard holds is 
great.  In fact, some research participants may have never visualized anything except a 
non-standard hold due to the unintended conditioning of the holds at Stillwater. 
 Errant turns were not the only holding errors committed during the research 
flights.  In fact, errors regarding holds ran the gamut of common causes: visualizing the 
hold incorrectly (confessed during debriefing), confusing inbound and outbound radials, 
incorrectly identifying the holding fix, incorrect timing procedures, and others.  Once 
again, considering a few examples is informative: 
A hold was assigned at TUL about 15 miles before reaching it.  The 
holding clearance was “hold north, 5,000.”  This caused some confusion, 
with TG2 audibly admitting (not necessarily to ATC) that he “didn‟t know 
how to do it.”  However, the hold is published on the en route chart and 
once the participant saw this, he visualized the hold and proceeded.  He 
did not proceed correctly, however, and employed a modified teardrop 
entry to a hold with left turns (outside of protected airspace).  Further, he 
never got established on the assigned 358° radial, and he could make no 
sense of the direction of needle deflection inbound or outbound (which he 
admitted).  The needle remained at full scale throughout the task. 
 “Hold South, 5,000” was assigned and read back.  While nearing 
the fix (TUL VORTAC) TG4 asked ATC if “holding south of the fix and 





continued to be some confusion about what was assigned.  The participant 
flew past the fix headed east and continued east for one and a half minutes 
or so.  Then, a right turn was initiated to a heading of 270 which was 
maintained for a minute or so until finally the participant called ATC and 
confessed that his hold was on the “wrong radial.”  A clearance was 
requested to return to the VORTAC and try again.  A clearance to 
“proceed direct TUL VORTAC, hold south 5,000” was again issued.  
Again, the participant proceeded to the fix and then went outbound to the 
west and executed a parallel entry to a hold on the 270 radial. 
 …the holding clearance caused problems.  The clearance, which 
included instructions to “hold south, 5,000‟,” was read back as “hold 
south, 5 miles.”  ATC corrected this read back error, but there was still 
some confusion about what ATC wanted.  A few minutes later, still en 
route to the holding fix, TG6 asked ATC if he should go to the fix, then 
south for 5 miles to hold.  Again, ATC clarified what was expected, but 
plain language was required to do so. 
 This was the only phase of the flight that presented a problem for 
TG7.  While en route to both holding fixes (during en route and again 
during the missed approach), the participant asked for “vectors to the 
hold.”  Both times vectors were received, but the hold itself was not 
clearly understood.  The first holding clearance was “hold south, 5,000‟,” 
but the participant held southwest on the 210° radial, though this appeared 





throughout.  The second hold never happened, as the participant asked for 
the vector, got it and flew to the fix, but then turned the wrong way.  After 
that, ATC simply gave him an on-course vector.  After the flight, the 
participant revealed that he was visualizing the hold incorrectly, with the 
outbound instead of the inbound leg on the assigned radial. 
 …ATC intervened with “radar shows you 4.5 west of Tulsa, 
proceed to TUL VORTAC, hold south, 3,000‟.”  This clearance was read 
back correctly, but not fully executed.  Instead, TG8 flew to TUL 
VORTAC using GPS, noted station passage with mileage on GPS readout, 
and then turned left.  From there, the participant did indeed hold south of 
TUL and did get the #1 nav. correctly tuned, but employed left turns 
throughout and was generally in unprotected airspace. 
 Interestingly, TG9 performed all holding operations well but 
demonstrated notable apprehension while doing it.  While en route to the 
hold, he queried ATC to confirm that the hold he was visualizing was the 
hold that ATC assigned, which it was.  He also announced (not necessarily 
to ATC) that his experience at Stillwater was a source of confusion as 
most holds there are done to the left. 
 Clearly, there was an observable difference between the demonstrated knowledge 
of pre-test and test group pilots regarding holding procedures.  This is particularly true 
since some of the pre-test group pilots were assigned more difficult holds than were test 
group pilots (since certain route details were still evolving during the pre-test).  In fact, 





between the experienced pre-test group pilots and the less experienced test group pilots.  
Clearly, the null hypothesis can be rejected for this task.   
 
Task 4.b. Remains within holding airspace 
Task Importance: 3 
Fisher Test Contingency Table: 
 
p=.049 
Though this task is related to the previous one and shares the same task 
importance, it would appear to be a task that is much easier to grade than “knowledge… 
of holding procedures.”  An observer might assume that pilots either stayed in holding 
airspace or they didn‟t.  However, the term “holding airspace” requires some definition.   
 Whenever ATC assigns a hold, they prohibit other traffic from penetrating that 
airspace; it is thus protected for the holding aircraft.  Logically enough, this area is 
commonly referred to as “protected airspace.” The dimensions of protected airspace, 
however, are not necessarily as intuitive, and are generally known only by ATC.  
AFMAN (Air Force Manual describing civil airspace operations) 11-217 notes that 
“holding pattern sizes can vary greatly depending on the altitude of the holding pattern, 
primary aircraft the procedure was designed for, and other factors.  Pilots have no way of 
knowing the design limits of protected airspace for a particular holding pattern.”  Thus, 
the PTS term “holding airspace” could be defined rigidly as “any excursion from airspace 
 Pre-test Group Test Group 
Pass 4 3 





defined by prescribed holding procedure” or it could be defined loosely, as “deviations 
from holding procedure great enough to likely cause departure from protected airspace.”  
Further complicating the definition is the fact that “prescribed holding procedures” 
actually contain certain recommended procedures; they are not mandatory. 
For this exercise, then, deviations from holding procedures received failing grades 
only if they were egregious.  Minor deviations from holding procedures received passing, 
but less than perfect, grades.   
 Six test group pilots received less than passing grades for this task and most were 
the same pilots who demonstrated a lack of knowledge regarding holding procedures.  
However, one pilot who failed the previous task generally remained in holding airspace, 
and received a passing grade for this task.  Still, six pilots in a group of eleven is a lot.  
The Fisher score for this task is p=.049 and the null hypothesis is rejected at the 95% 
confidence level.  Holding procedures, both in theory and practice, were a problematic 
part of the flight for most test group pilots. 
 
Task 4.c. Recognizes arrival at holding fix 
Task Importance: 2 
Fisher Test Contingency Table: 
 Pre-test Group Test Group 
Pass 4 7 







This relatively unimportant task caused problems for some test group pilots.  
Indeed, the specific holding procedure error “recognizes arrival at holding fix” was all 
but lost in the confusion of other holding procedure errors.  Still, three test group pilots 
received less than passing grades for this task.  Two of these used the “direct to” function 
of the GPS to track to the holding fix, but did so poorly enough that they did not fly 
directly over the fix.  Instead, they evidently saw the GPS mileage to the fix stop 
decreasing and begin increasing and assumed they were close enough.   
 Incidentally, it is noteworthy that any of the pilots had difficulty with this task, as 
proceeding to a fix and noting station passage is a very basic instrument pilot skill. 
 The Fisher score for this very specific task is p=.330, and the null hypothesis is 
not rejected.   
 
Task 4.d. Complies with ATC reporting requirements 
Task Importance: 1 
Fisher Test Contingency Table: 
 Pre-test Group Test Group 
Pass 4 8 




This relatively unimportant task also caused problems for a few test group pilots.  
Three pilots either did not report or reported incorrectly, though only two received failing 
grades.  As previously noted, there were a plethora of holding errors, and reporting was 





passing grades on this task is misleading, as some never established themselves in a 
position to report!   
In any event, the Fisher score for this task is p=.495 and the null hypothesis is not 
rejected. 
 
Task 4.e. Times holds correctly 
Task Importance: 1 
Fisher Test Contingency Table: 
 Pre-test Group Test Group 
Pass 4 5 
Fail 0 4 
 
p=.176 
This is another relatively unimportant holding task.  Also, it is another holding 
task that can be adequately graded only if the rest of the hold is done correctly.  As noted 
previously, some pilots never actually entered the hold and some never even arrived at 
the holding fix.  Even so, four pilots made identifiable timing errors.  The Fisher score for 
this task, therefore, is p=.176 and the null hypothesis is not rejected, though it should be 
noted yet again that holding pattern procedures were generally performed poorly by many 
test group pilots. 
 
Area Of Operation 5: Intercepting and Tracking Navigational Systems 






Task Importance: 4 
Fisher Test Contingency Table: 
 Pre-test Group Test Group 
Pass 4 7 




Task 5.b. Tunes and identifies navigational facility and sets & intercepts course to 
be intercepted 
Task Importance: 4 
Fisher Test Contingency Table: 
 Pre-test Group Test Group 
Pass 4 6 




Task 5.c. Intercepts course at correct angle, inbound or outbound 
Task Importance: 2 
Fisher Test Contingency Table: 
 Pre-test Group Test Group 
Pass 4 7 








Pilot performance regarding “Intercepting and Tracking Navigational Systems” is 
thoroughly discussed in tasks 1.g. (sets communication/navigation systems), 2.c. (uses 
and identifies correct communication and navigation facilities), and 2.g. (interprets 
appropriate radials and bearings as published in procedure).  In fact, many of the flight 
note excerpts included in the description of pilot performance regarding those tasks were 
made during the en route portion of the flight.  Clearly, there is overlap among these tasks 
in various phases of an IFR flight.  Therefore, in the interest of brevity, the reader is 
referred to the task narratives for tasks 1.g., 2.c., and 2.g. in this Chapter and in Chapter 
IV for the three similar tasks of Area of Operation 5.  Only grade assignment summaries 
have been reported for the tasks within this section.   
 The Fisher score for this task is p=.242 and the null hypothesis is not rejected. 
 
Area Of Operation 6: Precision Approach 
Task 6.a. Adequate knowledge of precision instrument approach procedures 
Task Importance: 4 
Fisher Test Contingency Table: 
 Pre-test Group Test Group 
Pass 4 7 
Fail 0 3 
 
p=.330 
The precision approach proved to the most problematic part of the flight.  It may 
also be the most important, since by design an ILS Category I approach (standard ILS) 





feet (about ¼ mile).  Further, it is one of the more difficult instrument training tasks to 
reproduce in the training environment.  In actual flight conditions where an ILS approach 
(easily the most common type of precision approach, and the only one on which most 
instrument students receive training) is necessary, the flight environment may look very 
different than it does during training.  For instance, 1800 feet Runway Visibility Range 
(again, about ¼ mile) is worse than most instrument trainees (and many experienced 
instrument pilots) have ever seen, and things may look very different in actual weather 
than they did in training.  In bad visibility, visually finding the landing environment at the 
completion of an approach can be difficult, and most students who have trained in VMC 
with a hood have never done it.  Instead, the common training paradigm is to wear the 
hood (view limiting device) until the completion of the approach, at which time the flight 
instructor will direct the student to take the hood off and land or leave it on and conduct a 
Missed Approach.  Either way, the instructor winds up making the decision, not the flight 
conditions
2
.  It became apparent during research flights that many newly rated instrument 
pilots were unequipped to make this decision.  Several participants, many who were 
otherwise skilled instrument pilots, simply descended below minimum approach altitude 
without an awareness of their proximity to the ground.  Two of the pilots crashed into 
terrain, and others would have had there not been a simulator glitch that provided a bit of 
terrain clearance even at indicated altitudes below ground level.  Other pilots had 
difficulty becoming or remaining established on the approach course, set instruments 
                                                 
2
 By regulation, a precision approach must be terminated at an appropriately termed “Decision Height” 
unless certain criteria are met.  These criteria include: (1) the aircraft must be in a position to descend 
normally to a landing on the touchdown zone of the intended runway, (2) the flight visibility is not less than 
that required for the procedure, and (3) certain touchdown zone identifiers are distinguishable.  The 





incorrectly, or committed some other error.  One even set the instruments for the wrong 
approach.   
 This specific task, “knowledge of precision instrument approach procedures,” was 
generally passed by participants (task 6.g. will deal directly with flight below 
minimums).  Still, there appeared to be some knowledge gaps, as illustrated by quotations 
from participant flight notes below: 
…it appeared that a Localizer approach was being attempted (though not 
cleared), but descent continued right through localizer minimums… 
 TG6 set the localizer frequency well in advance.  However, he did 
not set the correct radial in the OBS, but rather set the reciprocal.  This is 
one of the few ways to create reverse needle sensing with an HSI, and this 
complicated the approach greatly.  At first, TG6 managed to make 
corrections away from the needle (which would be correct with HSI set as 
above).  However, as workload increased TG6 began correcting toward 
the needle, which took him farther from the approach course... 
 Note that this is only a sampling of the “knowledge errors” committed during the 
approach phase of the flight, and these will be revisited under specific tasks.  Still, they 
are helpful to the reader to understand “knowledge errors” and are thus included here.    
Overall, three test group pilots did not demonstrate sufficient knowledge of 
precision instrument approach procedures, though like all “observed knowledge” tasks, 
some grading subjectivity is inevitable.  In any event, the Fisher score for this task is 
p=.330 and the null hypothesis is not rejected, at least as it pertains to knowledge.  The 





Task 6.b. Establishes and uses correct ATC facility & correct phraseology for 
approach 
Task Importance: 2 
Fisher Test Contingency Table: 
 Pre-test Group Test Group 
Pass 4 8 
Fail 0 2 
 
p=.495 
This relatively unimportant task offered little difficulty for most participants.  
Indeed it shouldn‟t, as “using the correct ATC facility” was no more difficult than setting 
the communication radio to the frequency just assigned by the previous ATC facility.  
Using correct phraseology proved to be a bit more difficult, however, as approach 
clearances tend to be lengthy.  A typical example is: “Cessna 09OSU, Tulsa Approach.  
Six miles southeast of OILER.  Turn right heading 330° to join the localizer, maintain 
2,500‟ until established.  Cleared ILS 36R.  Report established on the localizer.”  This 
approach clearance, like all clearances, requires a “readback” from the pilot, and some 
pilots didn‟t quite get all of the information read back.  Minor corrections from ATC 
were common.  Still, most of the pilots were able to eventually read back the clearance, 
and most appeared to know what the controller was asking them to do.  Two of the 
participants received failing grades for this task, however, due to either reading back the 
incorrect approach (or not hearing the correct one) or so muddling the approach clearance 
that compliance and/or understanding was affected. 





Task 6.c. Complies with clearance instructions and procedures 
Task Importance: 4 
Fisher Test Contingency Table: 
 Pre-test Group Test Group 
Pass 4 5 
Fail 0 5 
 
p=.126  
As already noted, there were multiple deviations from clearances and/or 
procedures.  One of the more common, as seen in previous tasks, was to set navigation 
equipment incorrectly for the approach.  Four test group pilots did not tune in the LOM 
(OILER), and five set either wrong radials or frequencies or both.  Further, four pilots did 
not successfully stay on the localizer, and three did not remain established on the 
glideslope.  As already noted, one flew the wrong approach.  Multiple mistakes were 
committed by individual pilots so the above numbers are not cumulative.  In fact, five 
pilots received failing grades but five others received excellent grades.  It should be 
noted, however, that task 6. g., “Missed approach at DH if visibility requirements not 
met” was an approach “procedure” that has not been taken into consideration for the 
grading of this task.  If it were, grades would be lower.  In other words, a few pilots who 
otherwise flew the approach well went below minimums!  Again, that task will be graded 
separately.  For now, notes on approach procedural errors, though lengthy, are included 
here: 
The problems with the approach began when the localizer frequency was 





eventually given a vector onto the localizer.  However, TG5 flew through 
the approach course (with no frequency set).  Just as he passed through it 
though, he noticed his mistake and set the localizer frequency in #1.  
However, it was too late and TG5 got a full scale deflection in the 
“wrong” direction and was again confused.  At that point, ATC offered a 
new vector to join the localizer.  This time, TG5 intercepted the localizer 
and tracked it successfully, but missed the glideslope intercept indication.  
He did notice, however, the outer marker beacon sounding/illuminating 
and began a shallow descent well beyond glideslope intercept with a full 
scale deflection of the glideslope indicator.  Indeed, the glideslope 
indicator remained at full scale throughout the final approach segment. 
 Well past full scale deflection, ATC advised TG6 that he was 2 
miles east of approach course and offered a vector to get back on it (which 
ATC would probably not actually do).  This vector did indeed get TG6 
back on course, but inside the Outer Marker.  Thus, the glideslope needle 
centered while the localizer needle was at full scale.  Still, TG6 followed 
the glideslope indication down, and eventually got the localizer needle 
centered as well.  Unfortunately, the glideslope did not stay centered and a 
full scale deflection occurred. 
 As ATC vectored TG8 to the approach course, the navigation 
radios were again set incorrectly.  The localizer frequency was reset in #1, 
but in standby only (not active).  Also, the HSI was set on 090°.  The ADF 





and approach clearance, TG8 finally set the #1 radio correctly, but set the 
OBS to 055 (?).  Once established on the localizer, this caused some 
confusion as heading wandered between final approach course and 055°, 
and needle deflection ultimately went to full scale.  When it did, ATC 
again intervened with “radar shows you a mile east of approach course,” 
and another vector was provided… 
 TG11 followed radar vectors to the final approach course correctly.  
However, neither the HSI nor VOR indicators were set to the inbound 
course.  Instead, both were left on the last-used 060° setting.  Further, the 
localizer frequency was not set during vectoring.  This was problematic, 
since ultimately the localizer course began to be crossed but TG11 did not 
know it.  He did, however, catch his mistake before passing completely 
through the localizer.  However, as he looked for the charted frequency, 
heading once again drifted right to about 360° so that he was paralleling 
the inbound course on the right side of the localizer (full scale).   With the 
OBS still set to 060°, TG11 apparently didn‟t notice this and paralleled the 
course all the way to OILER.  Once there, the marker beacon alerted 
TG11 of his progress on the approach course, and he made a correction 
onto the localizer and reported established though no descent was 
initiated.  ATC then informed him that he was “inside OILER,” and asked 
him to “state intentions.”  TG11 reported intentions as “full stop landing.”  





An initially lethargic descent was then initiated until the middle marker, at 
which point the descent became aggressive… 
 During the en route phase, TG2 was instructed to listen to ATIS 
which informed him that wind was “350@16 G24,” and that the “ILS 36R 
approach was in use,” as well as “landing and departing runways 36R and 
36L.”  Still, 2 requested the ILS 18L approach, which ATC granted with 
some reluctance.  When asked his intentions at completion of the 
approach, he responded “land full stop,” which suggests that 2 did not 
really understand wind conditions and did not intend to circle.  Vectors 
were provided to the final approach course, though not without some 
problems.  2 set up for the 18R approach, with the accompanying localizer 
frequency dialed in.  In an attempt to salvage a gradable approach from the 
flight, the PI allowed 2 to continue to the 18R approach course and 
provided vectors accordingly. 
 Clearly, much confusion accompanied some of the approaches.  Still, other test 
group pilots executed approaches nearly perfectly, and the Fisher test score is p=.126.  
Despite the major errors, multiple mistakes were confined to a relatively small number of 
test group pilots and the null hypothesis is not rejected. 
 
Task 6.d. Advises ATC if unable to comply 
Task Importance: 5 






 Pre-test Group Test Group 
Pass 3 6 
Fail 1 5 
 
p=.462 
During this research flight, pilots were assigned no tasks with which they would 
technically be unable to comply.  In other words, there were no assigned speeds too fast, 
no altitudes too high, and no electronic courses that the equipment aboard the research 
“aircraft” could not identify.  Still, there were occasions when pilots should have 
confessed to ATC (and themselves) that continuing was ill-advised.  A full-scale 
deflection on an approach instrument is an example of one such occasion, as was the 
frequent realization that a course had been missed or a minimum exceeded.  However, the 
confessions rarely happened.  Instead, there appeared to be an ongoing attempt to “catch 
up to” the clearance and comply no matter how far out of hand things got.  Not 
surprisingly, the pilots with the most approach errors missed the most opportunities to 
advise ATC, and grades for this task are similar to the previous one.  The Fisher score for 
this task is again p=.462 and the null hypothesis is not rejected. 
 
Task 6.e. Selects, tunes, and identifies correct approach facilities 
Task Importance: 5 
Fisher Test Contingency Table: 
 Pre-test Group Test Group 
Pass 4 5 






As noted above and in Chapter IV section 6.c., there were multiple occurrences of 
setting approach instruments incorrectly, which included the setting of incorrect localizer 
frequencies, incorrect VOR or HSI indicator settings, or omissions of ground-based 
approach facilities.  Sometimes these errors were serious (such as setting an incorrect 
localizer frequency) and the approach could not proceed correctly.  At other times the 
error was minor (omission of an LOM frequency in an ADF), and the approach continued 
without incident.  Obviously, some evaluator discretion was necessary in grading.  In any 
event, all possible consideration was given to participants, and pilots who received failing 
grades on this task “earned” them by making some major “set-up” error that seriously 
affected the flight.   
 The p-value for this task is p=.126 and the null hypothesis IS rejected at the 87% 
confidence level.  The rejection of the null hypothesis at this reduced level of confidence 
is fully explained in Appendix K. 
 
Task 6.f. Stabilized approach with no more than ¾ scale deflection on both localizer 
and glideslope 
Task Importance: 4 
Fisher Test Contingency Table: 
 Pre-test Group Test Group 
Pass 3 5 
Fail 1 4 
 





This task proved to be difficult for some pilots.  This is somewhat surprising 
given that the practicing of instrument approaches, particularly ILS approaches, occupies 
a large part of an instrument pilot‟s training.  Most of the difficulty associated with this 
task appeared to be connected with, or compounded by, errors in judgment.  For instance, 
a few pilots were inside the final approach fix and still trying to become established on 
the approach course.   Others had the HSI or VOR indicator set incorrectly and became 
confused by needle indications. 
 It is important for the reader to understand that to differentiate this task from tasks 
6.g. (Missed approach at DH if visibility not met) and 7.e (Initiates missed approach at 
full scale) generally only the pilots‟ ability to intercept and track the localizer and 
glideslope have been considered for this task.  Some pilots who kept the needles centered 
went below minimums.  Similarly, all pilots who lingered at or below minimums without 
initiating a missed approach had, by definition, a full scale needle deflection on the 
glideslope indicator, and sometimes on the localizer.  Therefore, pilots may receive 
passing grades on this task but failing grades on similar ones that better describe what 
they did wrong. 
 It should be noted that the sole pre-test group failing grade was likely influenced 
by an ATC error.  Since the simulator does not provide the equivalent of a radar image to 
the “controller,” the person providing vectors simply does not have the same position 
information that a real ATC controller would, and must, in fact determine aircraft 
position by looking at the aircraft instrument indications (which were sometimes set 
incorrectly by the participants).  Therefore, providing the turn onto the final approach 





final vector provided to the errant pre-test group pilot actually caused the final approach 
course intercept to occur within the final approach segment, making a full scale 
instrument indication almost a certainty.  However, the failing grade assigned for this 
task was deemed justified by the fact that the pilot did not advise ATC of inability to 
comply, and in fact tended to “chase” the needle in an effort to catch it, and the 
glideslope needle remained at full scale, even through localizer approach minimums.  
Still, in fairness, the foregoing controller error should be considered in an assessment of 
this pilot‟s performance. 
   The Fisher score for this task is p=.490 and the null hypothesis is not rejected.  If 
the errant pre-test pilot‟s grade is thrown out the score is p=.255.  Either way, the null 
hypothesis is not rejected. 
 
Task 6.g. Missed approach at DH if visibility requirements not met 
Task Importance: 4 
Fisher Test Contingency Table: 
 Pre-test Group Test Group 
Pass 3 3 




The unwillingness of pilots to initiate a missed approach at decision height is 
noteworthy.  In fact, it was among the most striking observations made during the 
research flights, as some participants who were otherwise skilled instrument pilots 





most appeared to do so very deliberately.  Again, observations from the research flight 
are enlightening: 
The approach was relatively uneventful, at least until minimums.  Before 
the final approach fix, TG4 was “cleared to land,” and in later de-briefing 
revealed that he “intended to do so.”  The approach was flown quite well 
down to minimums, at which point the pilot intentionally continued 100‟ 
below minimums.  Even here, with no visibility criteria being met, there 
was not an aggressive missed approach initiated.  Instead, there was a 
lethargic level off, and an intense search for approach lights [which were 
now well behind the aircraft!]… 
 The marker beacon indicator sounded/illuminated with altitude at 
1,050‟, but the slow descent continued.  In fact, the descent continued to 
the ground and resulted in a crash.  By then, TG5 reported that he “was 
going to land,” and the descent below DH was obviously slow and 
deliberate. 
 …TG6 followed the glideslope indication down, and eventually 
got the localizer needle centered as well.  Unfortunately, the glideslope did 
not stay centered and a full scale deflection occurred.  This did not end the 
descent, however, and 6 descended to DH and beyond.  Indeed, ATC 
intervened with “radar shows you at north airport boundary… say 
intentions” when the altimeter read 640‟.  Since the TDZE for 36R is 650‟, 





 …TG8 flew the approach fairly well and avoided full scale 
deflections down to minimums.  Unfortunately, the approach did not 
terminate at minimums.  Instead, 8 leveled off at 50‟ below DH for 30 
seconds or so.  Then, there was a gradual letdown to 610‟ (!) and another 
level off. 
 …the marker beacon alerted TG11 of his progress on the approach 
course, and he made a correction onto the localizer and reported 
established, although no descent was initiated.  ATC then informed him 
that he was “inside OILER,” and asked him to “state intentions.”  TG11 
reported intentions as “full stop landing.”  ATC then cleared TG11 for the 
Localizer approach and cleared him to land.  An initially lethargic descent 
was then initiated until the middle marker, at which point the descent 
became aggressive.  In fact, the descent continued below localizer 
minimums (1300‟ MSL) with intermediate level-offs at 940‟, 700‟, and 
just below 600‟. 
 Once on the approach, the localizer and glideslope needles 
remained centered.  In fact, it appeared that TG10 would execute a 
textbook approach until 50‟ above minimums.  At that point, because of a 
simulator programming error, TG10 got a glimpse of the sequenced 
flashing lights (approach lights).  It was only a glimpse, however, and 10 
went back into IMC.  After the sighting though, 10 seemed to be “locked 
in” to landing and continued his descent well below minimums with the 





out,” acquired full view of the runway markings (at 50‟ AGL!) and 
announced “runway in sight.”  ATC reminded him that he was cleared to 
land, which he did. 
 TG 10‟s performance seemed to confirm what he and other pilots were thinking at 
minimums.  Like other pilots, TG 10 seemed to have pre-decided to land even before the 
approach began.  The glimpse of the runway before minimums during TG10‟s flight 
appeared to have only reinforced this decision to complete the approach with a landing, 
which is decidedly not what students are taught during training.  In fact, students are 
taught to make a decision at DH (Decision Height) based on their ability to see the 
runway and proceed visually.  Or, at least, the intent is to teach this to students.  In 
practice, it is very difficult to simulate this decision-making scenario during training.  
Remember that during training flights, vision is not obscured by weather but by a device 
worn by the student.  Usually, the flight instructor decides whether or not the view 
limiting device (the “hood”) will come off at the end of the approach, and sometimes this 
decision is made and announced during the approach or even before it begins.  Indeed, a 
common question posed by ATC during practice approaches in VMC weather is, “how 
will this approach terminate?” and the answer is usually announced publicly long before 
arriving at minimums.  In short, students are frequently (though unintentionally) not 
taught to decide at decision height but to comply, and perhaps consequently, decision 
making at DH on the research flights was poor.   
 It should be noted that the tendency to fly below minimums may have been 
influenced by the fact that the flight was simulated.  Obviously, there are no dire 





nor is there an enforcement action against the pilot for breaking regulations.  Further, in 
this particular simulated flight students were uniformly briefed that they would be 
conducting a flight from “Stillwater to Tulsa International.”  This may have led to the 
erroneous assumption that the flight would definitely end at Tulsa International airport, 
even though the weather forecast showed that a missed approach was quite possible.  
Finally, all participants knew that this was an experimental, data-gathering exercise 
conducted for research purposes.  All knew that their performance would be neither 
graded nor personally associated with them; they simply may not have exercised the due 
diligence of a real flight.  In short, the pre-conditioning of the training environment and 
the artificiality of the simulated flight may have been working against participants during 
this task.  At least the PI hopes so; he would like to think that these same pilots, in actual 
flight in IMC at 200‟ AGL, would not just keep descending!   
 A savvy reader might note that some pilots descended below ground elevation.  
This was due to a glitch within the simulator, but it is not a glitch that would affect 
research findings; pilots either stopped at minimums or they didn‟t.  
 The p-value for this important task (4) is p=.055 and the null hypothesis IS 
rejected at the 94.5% confidence level (see Appendix K).  Once again, pilot performance 
on this task was one of the more striking findings of the entire project. 
 
Area Of Operation 7: Missed Approach 
Task 7.a. Adequate knowledge of missed approach procedures and prepares for 
missed approach 





Fisher Test Contingency Table: 
 
p=.051 
 Few test group pilots prepared for the missed approach, and it appeared that not 
very many pilots appeared to have considered the possibility of actually conducting one!  
Instead, the missed approach seems to have been an afterthought for most test group 
participants.  Luckily, the published missed approach procedure was not difficult.  
Further, it was well illustrated on the approach chart so conducting it as an afterthought 
was entirely feasible and many pilots managed to do so.   
 The real problem, as seen in task 6.g. was initiating it!  The PI determined that the 
judgment required to initiate the missed approach at the proper time is an integral part of 
“adequate knowledge of missed approach procedures” and doing so was necessary for a 
passing grade on this task, thus several pilots failed it.  One pilot set up for the wrong 
approach but crashed while conducting it, and another crashed simply by exceeding 
minimums.  Both crashes reset the simulator computers and the missed approach could 
not be conducted.  As per methodology, incomplete tasks were thus considered failed.  
Other pilots did not seem to understand the integral relationship of the missed approach 
to the ILS approach and received less than passing grades.  Finally, one pilot seemed to 
create his own missed approach procedure and flew a course that was nothing like the 
published one. 
 Pre-test Group Test Group 
Pass 4 4 





 The Fisher score for this task is p=.051 and the null hypothesis can once again be 
rejected at the 95% confidence level. 
 
Task 7.b. Initiates missed approach with correct control inputs 
Task Importance: 3 
Fisher Test Contingency Table: 
 Pre-test Group Test Group 
Pass 4 6 




 Presumably, this task from the PTS is intended to capture an examiner assessment 
of pilot control skill at the missed approach.  In other words, the FAA appears to want 
instrument pilots to demonstrate that they have the skill to not over or under control the 
aircraft at this important phase of flight.  Also, it seems reasonable to conclude that 
turning in the correct direction is a logical part of “correct control inputs.”  Thus, with the 
foregoing criteria in mind, most pilots passed this task.  Those that did not receive a 
passing grade either did not conduct a missed approach because they crashed, or simply 
did not follow published procedure (one pilot immediately began turning and continued 
through 420°!).  Another pilot intentionally delayed the climb and continued at a 
dangerously low altitude beyond the missed approach point even after being informed by 
ATC of his position (beyond north field boundary!) and assigned a missed approach.  





 The Fisher score for this task is therefore is p=.210 and the null hypothesis is not 
rejected. 
 
Task 7.c. Reports to ATC 
Task Importance: 1 
Fisher Test Contingency Table: 
 Pre-test Group Test Group 
Pass 4 5 
Fail 0 5 
 
p=.126 
As most instrument pilots know, the initiation of a missed approach is a 
mandatory reporting point.  This required report keeps ATC abreast of the flight‟s 
progress.  During this flight in simulated Class C airspace, however, “informing” ATC of 
the missed approach is mostly a formality since comprehensive radar coverage allows 
ATC to know more about the pilot‟s progress than the pilot!  This fact influences the 
importance assigned to this task.  Still, the rule is that pilots are to report at the missed 
approach, and this was the criteria for the grade assignment.  Again, two of the pilots did 
not conduct a missed approach due to a crash.  A few others, as shown by the 
accompanying grades, did not report satisfactorily.  Indeed, a few pilots had to be 
“prodded” by ATC to initiate the missed approach, thus some dialogue did accompany 
the missed approach, but hardly the kind that would earn a passing grade on this task. 
 The Fisher score for this task is p=.126 and the null hypothesis is not rejected 






Task 7.d. Complies with missed approach clearance and procedures 
Task Importance: 4 
Fisher Test Contingency Table: 
 Pre-test Group Test Group 
Pass 4 4 
Fail 0 4 
 
p=.141 
 All of the participants in this exercise were issued the published NOAA approach 
chart, so all pilots had the procedure on paper in both textual and graphic form.  This is 
significant, as pilots were not required to copy and read back a clearance, and the printed 
procedure could be referenced at the pilot‟s discretion while (or before) executing it.  
Further, the procedure was not overly complicated and required little more than a straight 
climb to 2,000‟ and then a climbing turn to 2,500‟ direct to the Tulsa VORTAC followed 
by a hold to the East.  As previously noted, holds were not easy for some of the pilots, 
though this did not greatly influence the grades on this task since holds are specifically 
graded in Area of Operation 4.  Again, two pilots received failing grades for this task 
because they crashed before getting to it.  Another pilot completely botched the 
procedure beginning with the initial climb.  One other pilot simply delayed too long in 
implementing the assigned clearance and his grade was reduced accordingly. 






Task 7.e. Initiates missed approach at full scale or anytime required tolerances not 
met 
Task Importance: 4 
Fisher Test Contingency Table: 
 
p=.143 
 As noted in the table above, 8 test group pilots and one pre-test group pilot 
continued the approach with “approach tolerances” not being met.  Much has already 
been said regarding pilot decision making during the approach, and most of that applies 
here.  Pilots were generally unwilling to terminate the approach regardless of visibility at 
DH, deviation from approach course, or dangerous proximity to the ground.  Readers are 
referred to task 6.g. for more information regarding faulty pilot decision making during 
the approach.   
Common instrument pilot training procedures may be further indicted for pilot 
performance on this task.  Theoretically, pilots are trained to abandon an ILS approach 
any time the localizer or glideslope needles indicate a full scale deflection (greater than 
2.5° lateral or .7° vertical divergence) from the final approach course.  Doing so may not 
always be encouraged in training, however.  Instead, after conducting the initial and 
intermediate approach segments (which can be rather lengthy), instrument trainees may 
be encouraged by their instructors to “stick with” the final approach segment even when 
 Pre-test Group Test Group 
Pass 3 3 





needle deflections go to full scale.  After all, much time and effort has already been 
invested in the approach by this point, and practice on the actual localizer and glideslope 
was likely the reason the practice approach was initiated in the first place.  Further, 
abandoning the approach due to a full scale deflection equates to an admonition of having 
“failed” on the approach, and in practice for the instrument checkride, few instructors are 
inclined to teach students to do that!  It may be, then, that students simply are not taught 
this during training; it may be taught it in theory, but not in practice.  It was certainly 
under-practiced on the research flight! 
 The Fisher score for this task is p=.143 and the null hypothesis is not rejected.  
Once again, however, pilot performance on this task was poor. 
 
Area Of Operation 8: Alternate Destination 
Task 8.a. Selects legal alternate for flight plan 
Task Importance: 1 
Fisher Test Contingency Table: 
 
p=.333 
  As might be logically assumed, an alternate destination is a sort of fail-safe “plan 
B” in case the primary destination can‟t be reached.  However, due to the intended “fail-
safe” nature of the legal alternate, a pilot‟s actual intended alternate is often an entirely 
 Pre-test Group Test Group 
Pass 4 4 





different destination.  Some explanation of the alternate selection process, along with 
certain legalities, is in order. 
 An alternate destination must be filed with an IFR flight plan any time weather 
forecasts indicate that certain ceiling and visibility minimums at the primary destination 
may not be met.  In general, these minimums are, from one hour before to one hour after 
the planned time of arrival a ceiling at least 2,000‟ and visibility of at least 3 miles 
(Federal Aviation Regulations 91.169 (b)).  For the simulated research flight, then, an 
alternate was definitely required.  As might also be logically expected, the alternate itself 
must meet certain visibility and ceiling requirements.  Generally, the weather at the 
alternate at the time of arrival (remember, it is an alternate destination; a pilot must 
estimate his arrival time considering time to and from the primary destination first) must 
be no worse than 600‟ ceiling and 2 miles visibility if the proposed alternate airport has a 
precision approach, or 800‟ ceiling and 2 miles visibility if it has only a non-precision 
approach (Federal Aviation Regulations 91.169(c)).  It is worth noting here that not all 
cloud bases are ceilings, but only those classified as “broken” or “overcast”; pilots must 
know this legal tidbit, too.  Finally, many airports have alternate minimums different than 
that noted above.  Indeed, they can be as the FAA dictates and these “non-standard” 
alternates are published, and pilots must know how to find and read them.  In short, 
before a pilot declares an alternate he/she must know certain legalities and check the 
weather and the potential alternate for compliance.  The pilot must first determine where, 
at the estimated time of arrival, the weather is better.  Then, some thought must be given 
to the suitability of any given airport within that “better weather region” as an alternate 





airports are “conditional” alternates with conditions being anything from specific weather 
minimums to time of use.  Before filing one, a pilot had better know those conditions.  
As noted earlier, the filed alternate may not be the pilot‟s intended alternate, 
which explains the low importance value for this task.  Though it further complicates the 
discussion, it should be understood that many of the technicalities prohibiting the listing 
of a given airport as an alternate do not affect the airport‟s utility as, well, an airport.  
Pilots routinely do not proceed to the alternate that they went to considerable trouble to 
legally choose.  Instead, they proceed to airports that are close by, or have approaches 
with lower minimums, or that ATC recommends, or any combination of these reasons.  
Instrument trainees or newly rated instrument pilots may know much of the above in 
theory only.  The savvy required to query ATC about a potential plan B, or contact a 
Flight Service Station to develop one on the fly, may not be learned during training, but 
through experience.   
Not surprisingly then, the pre-test group pilots fared better than the test group 
pilots on this task.  Indeed, most of the test group pilots went to remarkably little effort to 
select an alternate, though it was sometimes unclear just what was being checked and 
how thoroughly.  Some simply volunteered an alternate airport without checking 
anything, or at least no more than a quick glance at forecast weather.  Presumably, their 
choice was an airport with which they had some familiarity.   
Both in terms of consideration given and airport selected, test group pilots chose a 
diverse group of alternates.  One of the test group pilots chose Okmulgee Regional 
airport as his alternate.  However, had the pilot checked the approach charts for this 





minimums are Not Authorized due to unmonitored facility or absence of weather 
reporting service.”  In other words, Okmulgee is not a legal alternate.  Further, there is no 
terminal weather forecast for Okmulgee and the weather reported there before takeoff 
was 200‟ broken, which is well below legal alternate minimums.  Four test group pilots 
chose Stillwater Regional airport as their alternate.  This was a better choice than 
Okmulgee, since the weather at the time of departure was VFR and forecast to improve.  
However, the ILS approach at Stillwater was not authorized for determining the 
suitability of this airport as an alternate after the tower closed, nor were any of the 
approaches if local weather was unavailable.  For this flight, the Tower would be open at 
time of arrival and reported weather could be assumed available.  However, forecast 
weather is available at Stillwater only in the form of an Area Forecast, leading to some 
ambiguity as to the legality of this airport as an alternate
3
.  Pilots who selected Stillwater 
as an alternate were given an admittedly ambiguous “C” grade.  One of the test group 
pilots chose Richard LLoyd Jones Jr. (Tulsa Riverside) airport as the alternate.  This was 
a poor (and illegal) choice due to low ceilings.  Three pilots chose Will Rogers (in 
Oklahoma City) as their alternate.  This was a good choice, since weather was above 
legal alternate minimums (though non-standard minimums applied) and forecast weather 
would obviously be available at a large, metropolitan airport.   
 In general, the alternate airport selection process, which is critical to the grading 
of this task, appeared to receive diverse amounts of attention among the participants.  
Some likely selected a legal alternate by “luck.”  However, this project contained no 
                                                 
3
 14 CFR 91.169 (c) lists the alternate airport minimum weather requirements that must be stated in an 
“appropriate weather report or forecast.”  However, detailed terminal forecasts are not reported for some 
airports, and forecast weather must therefore be gleaned from less specific “area” forecasts.  Various 
opinions exist as to the “appropriateness” of these forecasts for alternate airport legality, and the FAA 





mechanism for penalizing (or determining) accidentally correct answers and participants 
were graded accordingly.  Only one pilot spent considerable time studying forecast 
weather for alternate selection purposes, and he explained his decision making process in 
picking a legal one.   
Finally, none of the pilots of either group were unable to proceed somewhere 
(unless they had already crashed), and all were generally headed to better weather and an 
airport where an approach could be completed.  It should be noted, however, that ATC 
assisted pilots in proceeding to the alternate, which would likely be the norm in actual 
Class C airspace.  Usually, ATC was queried by pilots as to suitable alternate destinations 
and/or weather at area airports or “where people were getting in.”  All of the pre-test 
group pilots did this.  Two test group pilots simply asked for vectors to Stillwater without 
asking any questions about area airports.  One pilot had to be dissuaded from attempting 
the same approach again with a report of worsening weather.  As noted earlier, three 
pilots did not proceed anywhere since they had already crashed or landed.  These three 
pilots did receive a grade for this task, as the alternate selection process occurred before 
the flight. 
 The Fisher score for this task is p=.333 and the null hypothesis is not rejected 
 
Task 8.b. Assimilates appropriate weather information to determine suitable 
alternates, including non-legal (for flight plan) alternates 
Task Importance: 3 






 Pre-test Group Test Group 
Pass 4 2 




As previously noted, some test group pilots did not do well on this task.  The 
training environment may have contributed to this, as all of the test group pilots had only 
recently been student instrument pilots who may have been unintentionally conditioned 
to conduct “canned” flights as outlined by their instructor.  Thus, when these same pilots 
were told that they were conducting a flight from Stillwater to Tulsa, they may have 
logically assumed that it would end at Tulsa with few considerations beyond that.  The 
admonition that it was a “real” IFR flight may have made little impact, especially since 
all pilots knew that it was really only a simulated “real” IFR flight! 
 The importance value for this task is somewhat elevated because of the required 
pilot knowledge, which is considerable.  However, the weather reported to pilots during 
the pre-flight planning did not require intense scrutiny (or weather knowledge) as it 
clearly showed better weather west and southwest, and most pilots earned passing grades 
on this task with no more than a glance at the weather.  In retrospect, more challenging 
weather and/or more complicated weather reports might have led to more telling grades 
for this task.  As the task was conducted and evaluated, however, the Fisher score is 
p=.045 and the null hypothesis can be rejected at the 95% confidence level. 
 
Task 8.c. Performs appropriate planning to proceed to suitable alternate 





Fisher Test Contingency Table: 
 Pre-test Group Test Group 
Pass 4 5 
Fail 0 3 
 
p=.255 
 This proved to be an easy task for most pilots.  The weather forecasts showed 
much better weather west and southwest and not very far away.  Therefore, any pilot who 
managed to get headed in that direction demonstrated “appropriate planning to proceed to 
suitable alternate.”  Further, since the pilots were in class C airspace with comprehensive 
radar coverage, ATC determined the routes and communicated them via radar vectors 
with little pilot planning required.  Had the flight to the alternate continued, more specific 
routing could have been communicated and graded.  However, these tasks were already 
graded under Areas of Operation 1, 2, and 5.  The only pilots who did not receive passing 
grades this on this task crashed or landed off airport and thus demonstrated 
“inappropriate planning to proceed to alternate.” 
 The Fisher score for this task is p=.255 and the null hypothesis is not rejected. 
 
Task 8.d. Acquires appropriate route/clearance to proceed to alternate, and 
implements initial route to alternate 
Task Importance: 3 







 Pre-test Group Test Group 
Pass 4 8 
Fail 0 3 
 
p=.363  
Little can be said of this task that was not said about the previous one.  All pilots 
who did not crash or permanently land were given radar vectors in the appropriate 
direction and told by ATC to expect a route clearance.  Since route copying and 
execution had already been graded, the PI decided to terminate the flight at this point.  
Therefore, all pilots who proceeded to alternates received passing grades, and those pilots 
who did not received a failing grade as per agreed methodology. 











 The purpose of this study was to acquire information that can be used to evaluate 
the effectiveness of airman instrument rating training and testing.  Specifically, answers 
to the following research questions were sought: 
 1. Did the recently certified instrument pilot have the skills and knowledge  
 required to successfully complete a simulated, non-training, point-to-point, IFR  
  flight? 
2. Did the training that the recently certified instrument pilot receive adequately 
prepare him/her to apply the skill and knowledge required by 14 CFR FAR 61.65 
(b) and (c) to successfully surmount common challenges during a real-world IFR 
flight? 
 Answering these questions will require a careful analysis of pilot performance for 
each Area of Operation, with comparison of pre-test and test group pilot performance 





 performance for each area of operation in a pass/fail format; pilots must have passed all 
tasks within an area of operation to receive a passing grade.  Fisher contingency tables 
showing pass/fail summaries will be also be included, as will calculated p values.  It 
should be noted that pilots who received “C” grades on individual tasks (neither pass nor 
fail in Chapter IV) received a passing grade for this summary; pilots had to genuinely fail 
a task to fail the Area of Operation.  Finally, text summarizing overall pilot performance 
and the degree of confidence at which the null hypothesis may be rejected or retained will 
be included.   
 We turn, then, to the data summaries of each Area of Operation: 
 
Area of Operation 1: ATC Clearance 
 
Fisher contingency table: 
  Pre-test Group Test Group 
Pass 4 7 
Fail 0 4 
 
p=.242  
This area of operation required receiving, copying, reading back, understanding 
and implementing an IFR clearance.  As can be seen in the table above, all of the pre-test 
group pilots successfully completed these tasks, but four of the test group pilots did not.  
Participant 
Number 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Pre-Test 
Group 
Pass Pass Pass Pass        
Test 
Group 





Failing grades were assigned for multiple reasons, but the most common were related to 
the tasks “setting communication/navigation systems in compliance with clearance,” and 
the more general “adequate knowledge of the elements related to ATC clearances and 
pilot responsibilities.”  Applying the data for the entire area of operation to the Fisher 
Exact Test (as was done for individual tasks in Chapter IV), shows that the level of 
confidence at which a statistically significant difference between the pre-test and test 
groups may be detected is 76% (p=.242).  While statistical constraints keep us from 
rejecting the null hypothesis, it is unlikely that any flight school would be satisfied with 
being 36% confident that randomly tested instrument pilots can acquire and execute an 
IFR clearance!  Indeed, observations made during the test suggest that a significant 
number of test group pilots had difficulty with clearances.  Note this observation from 
Chapter IV: “… six of the test group pilots did not set one or both navigation radios to the 
correct frequency before takeoff, eight did not pre-set navigation instruments entirely in 
accordance with clearance, six required multiple “repeats” of the clearance and/or 
corrections from ATC, and one requested the clearance on the wrong communication 
frequency.  …[this performance] suggests that most of the test group pilots could use 
more practice in acquiring and implementing IFR clearances.”  The reader is reminded 
that the above errors do not necessarily reflect tabulated pass/fail performance, since 
some pilots made multiple errors and some errors were not deemed grounds for failure.   
Many instrument training flights do not include adequate practice on these tasks, 
but instead incorporate rehearsal of stand-alone simulated IFR tasks.  For instance, the 
“clearance” in a training flight may be nothing more than an overview of tasks to be 





time pressure.  As most instrument pilots will attest, a real clearance from ATC is 
definitely not the same.  Training opportunities for student exposure to the flight plan 
filing/clearance receiving process may be limited by the fact that the student cannot 
legally file IFR (the instructor must do it or oversee the process), as well as by the 
aircraft, instructor, and student time constraints inherent at a busy flight school.  It 
definitely appears that instructors (and school administrators) need to be aware of the 
student “seasoning” that occurs simply through repeated exposure to the “real thing,” and 
make time for these learning opportunities.  Also, the training syllabus should mandate 
that certain IFR tasks actually be conducted by the student a minimum number of times, 
and not simulated.  A summary of recommendations inspired by pilot performance in this 
area of operation, therefore, includes: 
 More exposure to the process of actually acquiring IFR clearances.  This process 
must include creating an IFR route using federal airways, and must also include 
receiving and understanding the route communicated, and potentially modified, 
by ATC. 
 More practice in implementing the clearance.  The practice should include 
translating the stated route into its charted equivalent and setting up navigation 
equipment accordingly. 
 During the FAA practical test for the instrument rating, acquiring and implementing an 
IFR clearance should be required, and an appropriate evaluation of the applicant‟s ability 
to do so should be made by the examiner through observation, not simulation.   Further, 
the regulations (14 CFR 61.3 (e)) and the Examiner‟s Handbook (8710.3D) should be 





this precedent already exists as student pilots taking Sport, Recreational, or Private pilot 
practical tests are allowed to legally serve as pilot in command (and log PIC time) 
without meeting the requirements of 14 CFR 61.51 (e)(4). 
 As noted in chapter II, the flight training syllabus in use at the school where this 
project was conducted requires instrument trainees to actually file and receive an IFR 
clearance three times.  This is simply not enough!
4
  Interestingly, the same syllabus 
(during later or concurrent Commercial pilot training) recommends 47 hours of 
combined dual and solo cross country training under VFR.  Clearly, some of this VFR 
practice should be IFR practice, since there is no equivalent clearance acquisition and 
implementation under VFR.  Notably, the FAA seems to have reached the same 
conclusion (independently) as a just-released notice of proposed rulemaking 
recommends an allowance for 10 hours of post-instrument complex aircraft training be 
replaced with 10 hours of “advanced instrument” training. 
 
Area of Operation 2: Compliance with Clearance Procedures 
 
Fisher contingency table: 
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 Post flight comments revealed that most test group pilots who did well during the research project 
received, either voluntarily or at their instructor‟s insistence, significantly more IFR experience (though 
less than the maximum allowed 25 hours) than the minimum required by the syllabus during or soon after 
receiving their instrument rating.  
Participant 
Number 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Pre-Test 
Group 
Pass Pass Pass Pass        
Test 
Group 





 Pre-test Group Test Group 
Pass 4 6 
Fail 0 5 
 
p=.154  
 This area of operation involved multiple tasks related to compliance with a 
clearance.  These tasks, though somewhat diverse, include using correct publications, 
navigation facilities, checklists, communication procedures, airspace, and radials.  
Overall, the Fisher test suggests that differences between the pre-test and test groups for 
this area of operation are evident at the 85% confidence level (p=.154), which is not 
enough to reject the null hypothesis for this series of tasks given the mean task value, but 
is enough to suggest that changes to the pilot training paradigm should be considered. 
 By far, the most common pilot errors involved the tasks “intercepting appropriate 
radials as published in procedure” and “using the correct navigation facilities.”  As was 
noted in Area of Operation 1, test group pilots appeared to simply need more practice on 
both.  Summaries of test group pilot performance within these two specific tasks include 
the following: 
 A few pilots set navigation frequencies incorrectly (wrong frequency set or set in 
standby only) and were simply too busy to identify the station and discover their mistake.  
Sometimes this was a major error and sometimes a relatively minor one if it was quickly 
noticed and corrected.   
 Three test group pilots set the reciprocal of actual course in a VHF navigation 
instrument during at least one part of the flight.  Six test group pilots simply set the 





set radials that were close to the correct radial (off by only 5°-10°), which suggests that 
they knew how to do it but just weren‟t careful enough.  Two test group pilots set wrong 
radials at some point in the flight, but caught and fixed their error “at the last second,” 
one test group pilot used a flatly wrong intercept angle (120°), and one appeared to set 
radials only as a formality and navigated via (VFR only) GPS.  It should be remembered 
that some test group pilots made multiple errors, so not all of the above numbers are 
cumulative and explains why only five total pilots failed this area of operation. 
 To address these errors, more practice on tuning radios and setting navigation 
instruments in accordance with clearance and charted routing is needed.  The first two 
recommendations made for Area of Operation 1 (more exposure to the process of 
acquiring IFR clearances and more practice in implementing the clearance) are just as 
applicable here, and for the same reasons.  It should be noted that while these (and other) 
tasks appear under-practiced, they needn‟t be.  Using IFR en route charts and employing 
the charted airways and navigation facilities can be easily practiced in even the most 
rudimentary training aircraft.  In fact to practice these skills, unlike the skills in Area of 
Operation 1, filing IFR is not required.  The recommendation here is to incorporate the 
use of IFR charts and navigation procedures in certain advanced VFR training flights, as 
well as the previous recommendation (Area of Operation 1) to incorporate more training 
under IFR.  
 








Fisher contingency table: 
 Pre-test Group Test Group 
Pass 4 8 
Fail 0 3 
 
p=.363 
 Applying the overall data for this Area of Operation to the Fisher test reveals that 
the null hypothesis can only be rejected at the 64% confidence level (p=.363), thus it is 
not.  Further, while the test group flights included multiple altitude and heading 
deviations, basic instrument flying skills appeared to be sound.  Deviations that did occur 
were likely aggravated by the less-than-perfect fidelity of the simulator to a real aircraft 
as noted in Chapter V, section 3.b.  Pilot competence in attitude instrument flight is not 
surprising given that all receive no less than 35 hours (most receive considerably more) 
of practice flying the aircraft by instrument reference during their instrument training, 
plus additional practice during previous Private pilot certification and concurrent 
Commercial pilot certification; instrument trainees receive ample practice in attitude 
instrument flight.  The heading and altitude deviations noted in this project, when they 
occurred, were almost always related to pilot workload; the attention required to decipher 
charts, find and set radials and frequencies, and other tasks simply over-taxed the pilot 
attention that needed to be focused on attitude instruments.  Recommendations from this 
Participant 
Number 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Pre-Test 
Group 
Pass Pass Pass Pass        
Test 
Group 





area of operation are similar to previous ones: more practice on specific instrument pilot 
competencies such as chart reading, clearance implementation, and navigation instrument 
and radio manipulation.   Once pilots can deftly perform these tasks while dividing their 
attention between them and aircraft attitude control, heading and altitude deviations will 
likely disappear. 
 
Area of Operation 4: Holding Procedures 
 
Fisher contingency table: 
 Pre-test Group Test Group 
Pass 4 3 
Fail 0 8 
 
p=.026 
Tasks involving holding procedures proved to be a problematic part of the flight.  
As noted by the table above, no less than 8 test group pilots failed one or more tasks in 
this area of operation, and the failures included pilots who were quite skilled in most 
other tasks.  The reasons for task failures included general knowledge relating to holds 
(7), inability to remain in holding airspace (6), inability to recognize arrival at holding fix 
(3), reporting errors (2), and timing errors (4).  Results from the Fisher test suggest that 
the null hypothesis of a difference between the pre-test and test groups can be rejected at 
Participant 
Number 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Pre-Test 
Group 
Pass Pass Pass Pass        
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the 97% confidence level (p=.026).  Clearly, something was amiss with the training 
and/or task execution of test group pilots regarding holding procedures, especially 
considering that none of the pre-test group pilots failed any holding tasks. 
 As alluded to in Chapter V, part of the problem with holding procedures was 
likely the non-standard holding patterns incorporated almost universally in the instrument 
approaches at Stillwater Regional airport, where all of the test group pilots trained.  Non-
standard holding patterns incorporate left turns (instead of standard right turns), and since 
entering and executing holds involves considerable pilot visualization and multiple time-
specific tasks, thinking through a mirror image execution of the same tasks can be quite 
daunting!   
 Still, it is likely that not all of the pilots‟ problems with holds can be blamed on 
the left turns.   It may be that some test group pilots are competent in practiced holds 
only.  This possibility is more plausible than one might think, since most of an instrument 
pilot‟s training is focused on instrument approaches.  The holds that that same trainee 
most commonly (only?) performs are the ones that are part of those same approach 
procedures.  Thus, when these holds are practiced enough times, the holding pattern entry 
procedures, headings, altitudes, and timing may involve only rote, not applied, 
knowledge.  Further, instrument rating candidates‟ instructors may be incentivized to 
assign for practice only those holds that are known, or highly suspected, to be assigned 
during their student‟s practical test.  Again, due to the need for test efficiency, these holds 
are likely to be the ones that are part of instrument approaches so that multiple tasks may 





may be unable to apply the knowledge required to perform unpracticed holds.  Certainly, 
many of the test group pilots were unable to apply this knowledge.   
 The recommendations ensuing from findings from this task are twofold: 
(1) Incorporate more unpracticed holds during instrument training, and (2) vary the types 
and difficulty level of practiced holds.  Incorporating both recommendations would be 
easy to do.  Indeed, the training syllabus in use at the flight school where research 
participants trained already includes no less than 10 lessons that require practice on 
holding procedures, and the practice area around Stillwater contains a variety of 
navigation facilities/fixes at which holds may be assigned.  Further, holding fixes that are 
part of familiar instrument approaches could be employed more creatively, thereby being 
equally time efficient, but considerably more challenging.  For instance, instructors 
should assign right turns, or holds to the east or west (instead of the usual north or “as 
published”).  Additionally, intersection holds should be assigned and practiced.  Finally, 
these assignments should occur “on the fly,” so that students must visualize the hold and 
think through the entry and timing procedures while dividing attention among other tasks.  
The fact that the thinking must be done before arriving at the holding fix also adds an 
element of time pressure, which increases the hold difficulty and better simulates how 
holds are actually assigned by ATC.  Again, all of these recommendations may be easily 
incorporated, and should be mandated in the flight training syllabus.  
 








Fisher contingency table: 
  Pre-test Group Test Group 
Pass 4 7 
Fail 0 4 
 
p=.242 
 As can be seen in the accompanying data tables, generally the pilots who failed 
this task also failed Area of Operation 2, and generally for the same reasons.  Little can 
be said here that was not said in the summary of that section.  To restate those 
conclusions, the reader is reminded that “… the most common pilot errors involved the 
tasks „intercepting appropriate radials as published in procedure‟ and „using the correct 
navigation facilities‟… test group pilots appeared to simply need more practice on both.”  
And that is, in fact, the recommendation generated by findings from this Area of 
Operation: more practice on en route IFR procedures, particularly the use of federal 
airways and other charted routes. 
 The null hypothesis of a difference between the pre-test and test groups can only 
be rejected at the 76% confidence level (p=.242) for this area of operation.  However, like 
other instrument pilot skills, “intercepting and tracking navigation systems” appears to be 
one that would profit from the inclusion and/or emphasis of specific en route VHF 
navigation tasks within the training syllabus.  That is the recommendation. 
Participant 
Number 
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Area of Operation 6: Precision Approach 
 
Fisher contingency table: 
  Pre-test Group Test Group 
Pass 3 3 
Fail 1 8 
 
p=.143  
The null hypothesis of a difference between the pre-test and test groups CAN be 
rejected at the 86% confidence level.  While this is well short of the normal 95% 
confidence level usually required in the social sciences, the high mean task value (4.1) for 
this series of tasks justifies the conclusion that a measurable performance difference 
exists between the experienced pre-test pilots and the less experienced test group pilots 
(see Appendix K).  Indeed, 8 of the 11 test group pilots and even one experienced pre-test 
group pilot failed on this important Area of Operation.  In fact, it was the failure of the 
pre-test group pilot (given the weight of all pilot data in the very small pre-test pilot 
group) that reduced the confidence level at which the null hypothesis could be rejected to 
less than 95%.  Further, it should be remembered that the pre-test group pilot who failed 
met the “second tier” pre-test group criteria only (active pilot with no less than 900 hours 
total time and 200 under IFR), which tends to suggest that experience is, in fact, a major 
Participant 
Number 
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Group 
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predictor of instrument pilot skill and may be the real teacher of basic instrument 
competencies.   
Further, the PI feels some urgency to point out just how critically important 
certain tasks within this Area of Operation really are!   Consider that the mean task 
importance grade for the area of operation “Precision Approach” is 4.1, with only one 
task having an importance grade lower than 4.  The mean of the other Area of Operation 
task importance grades are 3.4 (ATC Clearance), 3.3 (Compliance with 
Clearance/Procedures, 2.0 (Holding), 3.8 (Intercepting and Tracking Navigational 
Systems), 3.0 (Missed Approach), and 2.5 (Alternate Destination).  Only Basic 
Instrument Maneuvers had a higher mean importance grade at 4.5, and no pilots failed 
any task within that Area of Operation.  Conversely, 8 pilots failed tasks within the 
Precision Approach Area of Operation, with 2 flying into the ground and others kept 
from doing so only by a simulator glitch that provided terrain clearance even at indicated 
altitudes below ground level!   
The reader should remember that ILS approaches routinely guide instrument rated 
pilots, regardless of experience or skill level, to within 200‟ of the surface.  For most 
pilots, being 200‟ above unseen terrain is a sobering experience, and one that demands 
well-honed pilot skills and an understanding of the potential dangers involved.  
Therefore, observing multiple pilots descending below minimums during this project was 
alarming, and suggests that the traditional instrument training paradigm could be 
improved.  If pilot performance on this task is an accurate indicator, flight training 
providers need to create training techniques that replace post-graduation experience as 





embrace and utilize technological advances in flight simulation, (2) provide opportunities 
for students to exercise aeronautical decision making.   
 Besides descending below minimums, pilots in the test group found other ways to 
fail this Area of Operation: 3 displayed inadequate knowledge of approach procedures, 2 
used incorrect ATC facility or phraseology, 5 were not compliant with approach 
instructions or procedures, 5 were unwilling to advise ATC of approach errors and/or 
need to terminate approach, 5 did not tune the correct approach facility, and 4 were 
unable to keep the localizer and glideslope indicators within acceptable limits (above 
numbers are cumulative; some pilots made multiple errors).  Still, the most troubling 
errors involved descent below minimums with, again, no less than 8 individual test group 
pilots doing so.  As noted in Chapter V, this is possibly a result of the training 
environment being markedly different than the actual IMC flight environment in two 
major ways.  Both will be described below. 
 First, pilots in the simulator know that they are insulated from both crashing and 
from the legal ramifications of violating regulations.  Possibly, participants were 
particularly emboldened to do both during this research project since they were told that 
they would definitely not be graded, and because they obviously knew that the aircraft 
and airspace weren‟t real.  It may be (and the PI hopes!) that the same pilots could do 
better than the simulator flight suggests.   
 Second, there is simply not a realistic way, in a real airplane in VMC weather 
(where the vast majority of instrument training takes place) to simulate the low visibility 
recognition of approach lights and/or touchdown environment inherent in a real 





conduct all of their training in actual aircraft have never actually made the decision to 
continue or abort as per 14 CFR 91.175 (c) and (e)
5
.  Indeed, they may be unintentionally 
pre-programmed by their training to have this decision made for them by their instructor.  
For safety reasons, flight schools are hardly encouraged to expose students (or 
instructors) to the actual in-flight weather conditions that would teach these skills.   
 The obvious solution to this problem, and the recommendation offered here, is to 
teach these skills in a flight simulator or flight training device.  Modern flight simulators 
and FTD‟s can very accurately simulate severely reduced visibility, which can be quite 
eye-opening for students who have never seen it!   
 Surprisingly, the current flight training syllabi in use at many FAA approved 
schools require that no lessons be conducted in a simulator, though they do allow the use 
of a simulator or FTD and identify the lessons that are bested suited to it.  Under 14 CFR 
141 Appendix C, the regulations quite liberally allow 50% of the training required for an 
instrument rating to be conducted in a simulator, 40% of the required training to be done 
in an FTD, or 50% of the required training to be done in a combination of the two.  And, 
while this allowed use of flight simulation represents a potential cost savings for the 
student and enhanced realism for some training tasks, “simulated” flight appears to 
remain unpopular with students.  Unfortunately, flight students at the flight school where 
this research was done eschew the simulator for the real airplane.  Flight instructors do 
too, since logged “airplane time” is commonly assumed to be more valuable than 
“simulator time” in furthering their employability.  Thus, part of this recommendation 
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 This regulation requires a pilot to determine that (1) the aircraft is in a position to land, (2) flight visibility 
is at or above published minimums, and (3) the specifically defined landing environment is visible before 
descending below the minimum altitude of an instrument approach procedure.  If these conditions are not 





involves limitations on the student‟s and/or instructor‟s choice between airplane and 
simulator.  Students should be required to perform specific training operations in the 
simulator, and these should include exposure to ½ mile visibility (or less) and unplanned 
missed approaches, initiated by the trainee, due to on-the-fly evaluation of weather at 
minimums.  A simple checklist or matrix within the student‟s training record could 
document that the training is done (and done to minimum standards), while allowing 
maximum use of actual training aircraft if that is what the student prefers.  
 As noted, other common reasons for task failures within this Area of Operation 
included the apparent disinclination of test group participants to advise ATC if unable to 
comply with clearance or procedure, the oft-mentioned inability to set navigation 
(approach) instruments correctly, and the unwillingness to break off the approach when 
localizer or glideslope indications became excessive.  In general, these errors appear to be 
symptoms of “training syndrome,” in which the final disposition of the flight is assumed 
even before takeoff.  For instance, if a student is training on an ILS approach and makes a 
serious error, breaking off the approach (and informing ATC accordingly) is rarely 
considered.  Instead, the student is more apt to continue the approach for training 
purposes.  The instructor is also incentivized to dissuade a student from voluntarily 
terminating an approach for fear that doing so on a checkride is grounds for failure.  In 
general, then, the planned flight in the training environment usually ends just as the plan 
dictates.  For the research flight, participants were universally told that the flight “was to 
Tulsa International Airport,” and the idea that it might end somewhere else may have not 
even been considered!  Such is the training environment.  The savvy needed to modify 





taught at all!  Perhaps a needed recommendation is to better emphasize sound 
aeronautical decision making, and guide pilots through specific scenarios where it must 
be employed.  These scenarios should be specified in the training syllabus (and include 
missed approach decision making in the simulator, as noted above) and constructed with 
appropriate rewards for sound decision making, not just “stick-and-rudder” skills, during 
training and/or testing. 
 
Area of Operation 7: Missed Approach 
 
Fisher contingency table: 
 Pre-test Group Test Group 
Pass 3 3 
Fail 1 8 
 
p=.143 
 For this area of operation the null hypothesis is not rejected.  However, several 
pilots had considerable difficulty with it as no less than 8 of the test group pilots failed at 
least one task.  The most commonly failed task was “initiates missed approach at full 
scale or anytime required tolerances not met,” which is in many ways equivalent to the 
Area of Operation 6 task, “missed approach at DH if visibility requirements not met.”  
Participant 
Number 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Pre-Test 
Group 
Pass Pass Pass Fail        
Test 
Group 





Again, “training syndrome” is likely culpable here, and the reader is encouraged to 
review the Area of Operation 6 summary and section 7.e. in Chapter V for more on this 
phenomenon.   
 Even so, many of the test group pilots showed a marked lack of planning for the 
missed approach quite apart from their unwillingness to initiate it.  Most of this is likely 
due to pilot workload; pilots busy with the approach had little opportunity to plan for 
what came after.  A logical recommendation, once again, is to create unscripted scenarios 
in the simulator in which trainees are exposed to “continue or miss” decision making at 
minimums and are thus taught (and forced!) to plan accordingly.  It might also be noted 
here that the simulator scenarios should employ unfamiliar approaches so that trainees are 
not allowed to simply conduct memorized missed approach procedures.  In short, the 
recommendations described in Area of Operation summary 6 are just as applicable here. 
 
Area of Operation 8: Alternate Destination 
 
Fisher contingency table: 
 Pre-test Group Test Group 
Pass 4 5 





1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Pre-Test 
Group 
Pass Pass Pass Pass        
Test 
Group 





Once again, “training syndrome” may have been affecting pilot decision making 
regarding this task.  It appeared that most of the test group pilots automatically assumed 
that the flight would terminate at the destination, just as they almost always do in 
training.  Therefore, the selection of the alternate may have been assumed a formality 
with the corresponding effort invested.  In truth, the legal alternate submitted on the IFR 
flight plan usually is a formality, and the odds of actually landing there are often slim.  
The reader is encouraged to see Chapter V section 8.a. for more on legal alternate 
selection.   
 In any event, only two of the test group participants chose clearly illegal alternate 
destinations.  Four others chose legal (but questionable) alternates, three chose perfectly 
legal alternates, and nearly all spent remarkably little time making their choice, especially 
when one considers the potential legalities affecting this decision.   However, the 
methodology for this exercise includes no mechanism for penalizing accidentally correct 
answers, so participants who selected correctly, whether by accident or design, profited 
accordingly.  The null hypothesis for this task is not rejected, as this could only be done 
at the 91% confidence level (p=.092).   
Future researchers should consider different methodology for evaluating this area 
of operation.  Selecting a legal alternate is mostly a matter of applied knowledge, and 
knowledge is difficult to observe!  Further, some participants may not have applied the 
knowledge that they possessed, since neither legalities nor safety during a simulated 
flight require them to do so.  Future researchers are encouraged to create a more realistic 
“flight” environment for this task, with appropriate motivators to apply subject 






 The following table represents the collective data of each task and Area of 
Operation within this research project, showing passing grades only for pilots who passed 
all tasks:  
 
Fisher contingency table: 
 Pre-test Group Test Group 
Pass 3 0 
Fail 1 11 
 
p=.009  
As can be seen, 3 pre-test group pilots and 0 test group pilots passed all tasks.  
Based on these results, the null hypothesis of a difference between the two groups can be 
rejected at the 99% confidence level (p=.009).  The reader is cautioned, however, against 
concluding that none of the test group participants in this research project are competent 
instrument pilots, as several are.  Indeed, all of the pre-test group pilots and several test 
group pilots often demonstrated impressive instrument skills.  Several failed only a few 
tasks during the flight (while others failed many!), and some of these may have been 
influenced by the “artificiality” of the simulated flight, as discussed in Chapter V, section 
6.g.  Indeed, the average aggregate (all tasks combined) grade point average of the top six 
test group pilots was 3.48.  The one pre-test group pilot who received failing grades was 
Participant 
Number 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Pre-Test 
Group 
Pass Pass Pass Fail        
Test 
Group 





also a skilled pilot; this pilot‟s aggregate GPA was 3.55.  Conversely, the aggregate GPA 
of the other five test group pilots was 1.37; it was these pilots who committed most of the 
errors!  Clearly, a measurable skill difference was evident in the research participants, 
and as the project progressed, three distinct levels of pilot skill emerged: the experienced 
pre-test group pilots with an aggregate GPA of 3.88, the less experienced but skilled new 
instrument pilots with an aggregate GPA of 3.48, and the unskilled new instrument pilots 
with an aggregate GPA of 1.37.   
In summary, experience and fundamental pilot skill are both important in 
developing instrument pilot competencies.  To better integrate both into instrument pilot 
training, the following recommendations have been made: 
 Modify instrument rating and/or Commercial certification training syllabi to 
include:  
o More lessons that specifically require instrument trainees to acquire and 
implement actual IFR clearances, issued by ATC, that include routing on 
federal airways. 
o More practice on reading, understanding, and implementing (particularly 
manipulating radios and navigation instruments) the information on IFR 
en route charts. 
o  More practice on holding procedures, with specific requirements to vary 






o Specific scenarios designed to teach aeronautical decision making, 
particularly scenarios, due to approach errors and/or full-scale instrument 
deflections, in which a missed approach should be executed. 
o Practice of and greatly increased exposure to en route IFR procedures for 
post-instrument rated pilots. 
 Make better and more specific use of a flight simulator or flight training device 
during instrument training.  A mandatory training matrix (or specific syllabus 
items and minimum standards) should be developed to provide documentation 
that each instrument trainee has received, in the simulator, exposure to: 
o ½ mile or less visibility at Decision Height 
o Approach procedures that terminate, alternately and randomly, with a 
missed approach or a descent to a landing depending on and determined 
by the trainee‟s ability to identify the landing environment described by 
Federal Aviation Regulation 91.175 (3) (i-x).  
 Modify Federal Aviation Regulation 61.3 (e), 61.5,1 and/or The Designated Pilot 
and Flight Engineer Examiners‟ Handbook (8710.3D) so that instrument rating 
applicants may file IFR and legally act as pilot-in-command for the instrument 
rating practical test. 
 
Conclusion 
Clearly, more research is needed on new instrument pilot ability.  Findings from 
this project strongly suggest that a measurable skill difference exists between experienced 





lack certain fundamental instrument pilot competencies. Unfortunately, the 
generalizability of findings from this project is hampered by the small sample size, which 
was a result of the small population of available instrument rating graduates.   
To illustrate this, consider the task “Missed Approach at DH if Visibility 
Requirements not met.”  On this task, 3 of the pre-test group pilots earned a passing grade 
and none received a failing grade.  Conversely, only 3 of the 11 test group pilots earned a 
passing grade while 8 eight earned failing grades.  This performance disparity between 
the groups suggests a statistically significant difference between them, and an analysis 
using the Fisher Test supports this assumption.  Indeed, the p value for this task is p=.055 
which suggests that the null hypothesis - that there is no difference the groups – can be 
rejected at the 94.5% confidence level.  But had there been twice as many participants in 
the test and the pass/fail ratio had remained exactly the same, the p value would be 
p=.002, which would allow the null hypothesis to be rejected at a compelling 99.8% 
confidence level!  Clearly, future researchers should broaden the scope of this project to 
include more participants, as both the findings and their potential ramifications suggest 
that more research should be done on this subject.  Indeed, the recommendations noted 
above may represent important modifications to the current instrument rating training 
paradigm.  As noted in Chapter II, “instrument rated pilots are allowed to fly without 
outside visual references; this one fact mandates an entirely new set of skills.”   It may be 
that those skills are better taught with an entirely new curriculum, one that emphasizes 
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Conduct Of The Flight 
  The research participant was briefed on the flight, including destination, filed 
route, and filed altitude.  To assure that all test group participants received the same 
information, the briefing was in a written format (appendix B) and provided to the 
participant to read before the flight.   
The participant was provided a nearly-complete flight plan (appendix C).  The 
flight plan, however, did not list an alternate.  The participant was required to interpret 
TAF‟s (Terminal Aerodrome Forecasts, Appendix D) and select a suitable alternate based 
on weather and other legalities.  A participant could select any alternate destination.  The 
participant was graded on his/her pre-flight alternate selection in block 8a (grading 
matrix), based on legalities and suitability.  All other flight plan information was made 
available to the participant, as well as any required charts, approach plates, TAF‟s, or 
supplementary data.  The Participant was allowed to review the proposed route and 
related information as much as he/she felt necessary (within a one hour time limit), and 
was in fact, allowed to ask questions or seek clarification before the exercise began, 
though care was taken to not divulge details about the “challenges” within the flight.  
After takeoff, questions could only be posed to ATC or Flight Service Station in the same 
manner (phraseology, content, etc.) that they would be posed during an actual flight.  
Responses from ATC -whose verbal interaction with participants was provided by the 
principal investigator- followed this same format.  All instructions and clearances 
initiated by ATC were based upon actual communications with Kansas City ARTCC, 
Tulsa Approach Control, and Stillwater and Tulsa Control Towers, though they were 





 The participant was made aware of his/her responsibilities during the flight.  In 
short, they were the same responsibilities that any single-pilot PIC assumes during an IFR 
flight.  These responsibilities include setting correct navigation and communication 
frequencies and transponder codes, identifying navigation stations, navigating, 
maintaining aircraft control, and interacting with ATC.  It was emphasized to participants 
that clearances, headings, altitudes, etc. could be questioned or clarified without fear of 
reprisal.  Further, and significantly, it was made clear that clearances could be refused for 
whatever the participant believed to be legitimate reasons.  It was pointed out to the 
participant that there would be no attempt to “trick” or mislead him/her into an error or 
violation.  Further, it was explained that there would be no equipment failures or planned 
emergencies, though nothing was to prevent the participant from declaring an emergency 
if he/she deemed it necessary.  Again, the intent was to make the flight as much like a 
real IFR flight as possible, with the same (but no extra) resources or challenges. 
 The route that the participant “filed” was not the route that he/she received.  
Instead, ATC assigned a very specific route (see Learning Objective 1 below) that 
approximated a simple “pilot nav” departure procedure and Victor Airway routing.  The 
weather at the point of departure, en route, and destination was IFR (visibility less than 3 
miles and ceilings lower than 1,000‟) or marginal VFR (visibility 3-5 miles and ceiling 
from 1,000‟-3,000‟), though this was mostly irrelevant operationally, since the pilot was 
in IMC soon after takeoff and remained there throughout the flight.  There was no 
“dangerous” weather (such as embedded thunderstorms, icing, or complete obscurations) 
forecast or encountered along the route, though an AIRMET containing icing in an area 





Objective 2.  There was, of course, the possibility of weather below minimums at the 
destination (which was indeed the case); pilots were expected to glean this from the 
provided weather reports.  The participant was informed of the weather and filed route, 
but not the route change or pending missed approach. 
 The participant was informed that he/she was allowed to use most of the avionics 
installed in the simulator.  These include a Garmin 430 GPS/NAVCOM with a “VFR 
Only” database, a dedicated King KX 155 navigation/communication radio, a King KX 
87 ADF, and a King KX 76C transponder.  The simulator was also equipped with an HSI.  
The participant was not allowed to use the autopilot, and it was placarded “inoperative” 
as per 14 CFR 91.213.  Further, participants were not allowed to use the Nav 2 page on 
the GPS.  The Nav 2 page presents a moving map display with course guidance lines and 
other helps.  It was determined that these helps might constitute a sort of “synthetic 
vision” for this exercise, and while this could be very helpful during a real flight, it might 
have been a bit too helpful for this research flight.  These helps could have been used to 
circumvent (or make it impossible to grade) some of the required instrument pilot 
competencies that this exercise sought to test, thus they were not allowed.  This was 
explained to the participant.   
 It was verified through oral questioning that all participants had exposure to the 
avionics, and that there were no unanswered questions regarding their operation.  If a 
participant was unfamiliar with a device, or for any reason was uncomfortable in its use, 
he/she was not required to use it as long as it was not required by regulation, and this was 





 Once the “flight” began, the research participant was to start the simulated C-172 
using a checklist (if desired).  He/she was immediately positioned for takeoff on runway 
17 at the Stillwater airport with no taxiing required.  Using this particular position as a 
starting point for the flight was necessary since the simulator database includes few 
ground graphics, making many ground operations impractical.  Also, extraneous ground 
operations were not being tested during this exercise; the elements of Learning Objective 
1 relating to clearances are the only ground operations that were tested.   
 Once start-up was complete, the participant requested a clearance to his 
destination (Tulsa International Airport, as described in the briefing).  The participant 
was not prompted to do this, and no response was provided if selected frequencies were 
incorrect (which was the rule throughout the flight). 
 The flight was finished once the pilot was established in the hold at the Tulsa 
VORTAC after the missed approach off Runway 36R at Tulsa International, and a 
suitable alternate destination had been determined and the pilot was en route to it.  This 
alternate could (and probably was) different than the filed alternate, which was selected 
based on legal requirements, not practicality (the reader is encouraged to see Chapter V, 
section 8 for more on the legalities and technicalities of alternate airport selection).  The 
intent here was to require the participant to apply some ADM (Aeronautical Decision 
Making) to provide an informed answer to the question “what next?”  The participant‟s 
decision was graded as per the grading scale above, with his/her use of available 
resources (Flight Service Station, Approach Control, etc.) affecting the grade.  Since it 
was anticipated that a savvy pilot might elect not to proceed elsewhere, but to hold and/or 





the primary destination, all were told at this stage of the flight that weather in the Tulsa 
area was deteriorating and, if necessary, were encouraged to state other intentions.  The 
intent, of course, was to complete the “proceed to alternate” task.   
 If the pilot was unable to complete a segment of the flight, that segment was 
terminated after the allotted time or equivalent completion of task.  If possible, the 
participant was then advanced to the next segment and the “flight” continued, if possible.  
This happened once, when a pilot successfully landed and was asked to take off again and 
complete the missed approach segment of the flight.  In two other cases, pilots actually 
crashed and the crash reset the simulator computers to the extent that continuing the flight 
was impractical. In every case, the time allotted for the segment was allowed unless, of 
course, the segment was completed early, which was the norm, or the participant crashed.  
The participant was informed of possible stopping, repositioning, and restarting in the 
event of uncompleted objectives, though this was never actually done.  When objectives 
simply could not be completed due to participant ability (or in the case of the crashes, the 
reset simulator computers), objectives not tested were considered failed and graded 
accordingly.  The graded objectives for this flight, imbedded within the planned conduct 
of the flight, follows: 
 
Learning Objective 1:  AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL CLEARANCES AND 
 PROCEDURES 
Time allowed for completion: 8 minutes 
Individual items to be tested:  





  a. Exhibits adequate knowledge of the elements related to ATC clearances  
  and pilot/controller responsibilities (…). 
  b. Copies correctly, in a timely manner, the ATC clearance as issued. 
  c. Determines that it is possible to comply with the ATC clearance. 
  d. Interprets correctly the ATC clearance received and, when necessary,  
  requests clarification, verification, or change. 
  e. Reads back correctly, in a timely manner, the ATC clearance in the  
  sequence received. 
  f. Uses standard phraseology when reading back clearance. 
  g. Sets the appropriate communication and navigation systems and  
  transponder codes in compliance with the ATC clearance. 
 Procedure: 
 Once Clearance is requested, ATC will respond: “November 09OSU is cleared to 
the Tulsa International airport via heading 090 to join SWO 118° Radial to IBAAH 
Intersection, Victor 140 Tulsa.  Climb and maintain 4,000’, expect 5,000’ 10 minutes 
after departure.  Departure frequency Kansas City Center 127.8, Squawk 4777.” 
 Participant will copy clearance and respond (1a, 1b, 1c, 1d, 1e, 1f). 
 Participant will correctly set navigation radios and transponder (1g). 
 ATC will respond as appropriate, either with “Read back correct, contact Tower 
when ready,” or with correction.  If correction is required, participant will correctly copy 
and comply before proceeding to segment 2. 
  





 AND ARRIVAL PROCEDURES AND CLEARANCES 
Time allowed for completion: 40 minutes 
Items to be tested:  
  Participant: 
  a. Exhibits adequate knowledge of the elements related to ATC routes,  
  and related pilot/controller responsibilities. 
  b. Uses the current and appropriate navigation publications for the   
  proposed flight. 
  c. Selects and uses the appropriate communication facilities; selects and  
  identifies the navigation aids associated with the proposed flight. 
  d. Performs the appropriate aircraft checklist items relative to the phase of  
  flight. 
  e. Establishes two-way communications with the proper controlling  
  agency, using proper phraseology. 
  f. Complies, in a timely manner, with all ATC instructions and airspace  
  restrictions. 
  g. Intercepts, in a timely manner, all courses, radials, and bearings  
  appropriate to the procedure, route, or clearance. 
 Procedure: 
 Participant will contact Tower on 125.35 and request Takeoff clearance. 
 ATC will respond: “Cessna 09OSU, cleared for takeoff runway 17, leaving 1,500’ 
left turn-out approved”. 





 The research participant will initiate take-off and departure.  He/she will 
climb, turn, and level-off as directed (2a, 2d, 2e). 
 ATC will direct: “Cessna 09OSU, contact Kansas City.  Good day.” 
 Participant will respond. 
 Participant will navigate as directed (2b, 2c, 2f, 2g). 
 Participant will contact Kansas City Center (2e).  ATC will respond: “Cessna 
09OSU, Kansas City Center.  Radar contact 2 SE of Stillwater, Climb and maintain 
5,000’, proceed on course”. 
 Participant will respond. 
 After proceeding past Yarns intersection, ATC will amend the clearance as 
follows: “Attention all aircraft: The National Weather Service has issued AIRMET Zulu 
from20 West of Tulsa, to 50 North of Bartlesville, to 40 Southeast of Razorback to 20 
West of Tulsa in effect until _____ Zulu (two hours will be allotted for Airmet).  
Freezing rain from freezing level’ to 12,000’ covering 30% of area.   Expect traffic 
delays.”   
 Break. 
 “Cessna 09OSU, advise when ready to copy clearance.” 
 Participant will respond. 
 ATC will direct: “Cessna 09OSU is cleared to Tulsa International airport via 
V140 to SEARS Intersection, V532 KEVIL intersection, V14 Tulsa.” 
 Participant will respond and comply with amended clearance (2a, 2b, 2c, 2e, 
2f, 2g). 





 Participant will respond. 
 
 Learning Objective 3: BASIC INSTRUMENT FLIGHT MANEUVERS 
 Time allowed for completion: N/A; will be assessed throughout flight. 
 Items to be tested: 
   Participant: 
   a. Exhibits adequate knowledge of the elements related to attitude  
   instrument flying during straight-and-level, climbs, turns, and   
   descents while conducting various instrument flight procedures. 
   b. Maintains altitude within +/- 200 feet during level flight,   
   headings within +/- 20°, and airspeed within +/- 20 knots. 
   c. Uses proper instrument crosscheck and interpretation, and   
   applies the appropriate pitch, bank, power, and trim corrections  
   when applicable.  
 Procedure:  
 Participant will correctly and safely control the aircraft throughout the flight 
using instrument references.  Any loss of control or inability to achieve or maintain 
a required flight attitude will be grounds for failure of this segment (3a, 3b, 3c). 
 
 Learning Objective 4: HOLDING PROCEDURES 
 Time allowed for completion: 15-20 minutes 
 Items to be tested: 





   a. Exhibits adequate knowledge of the elements related to holding 
    procedures. 
   b. Uses an entry procedure that ensures the aircraft remains  
   within the holding pattern airspace for a standard, nonstandard, published,  
   or non-published holding pattern. 
   c. Recognizes arrival at the holding fix and initiates prompt entry into the  
   holding pattern. 
   d. Complies with ATC reporting requirements. 
   e. Uses the proper timing criteria, where applicable, as required by altitude 
   or ATC instructions.  
 Procedure:  
 Upon arriving at KEVIL intersection, the participant will be advised by 
ATC: “Cessna 09OSU, weather is causing multiple traffic delays in the Tulsa area. 
Expect holding instructions.   Advise when ready to copy clearance.” 
 Participant will respond. 
 ATC will direct: “Cessna 09OSU, proceed direct to the TULSA VOR.  Hold 
South of Tulsa, 5,000.  Expect further clearance ____ minutes after the hour, time now 
____ (one hour will be allotted between current time and EFC time).” 
Participant will comply with clearance, demonstrating correct navigation 
technique, holding pattern entry, and compliance with reporting requirements (4a, 
4b, 4c, 4d).  Once established in the hold, participant will demonstrate correct 






 Learning Objective 5: INTERCEPTING AND TRACKING  
 NAVIGATIONAL SYSTEMS 
 Time allowed for completion: N/A; will be assessed throughout flight. 
 Items to be tested: 
   Participant: 
   a. Exhibits adequate knowledge of the elements related to intercepting and  
   tracking navigational systems (…). 
   b. Tunes and correctly identifies the navigation facility. 
   c. Sets and correctly orients the course to be intercepted into the course  
   selector or correctly identifies the course on the ADF. 
   d. Intercepts the specified course at an appropriate angle, inbound or  
   outbound from a navigational facility. 
   e. Determines the aircraft position relative to the navigational facility. 
 Procedure: 
 Participant will correctly tune and identify appropriate navigation facilities, 
as well as intercept and track assigned courses and radials.  Inability to tune, 
identify, intercept or track the appropriate navigation facility, course, or radial 
will be grounds for failure of this segment (5a, 5b, 5c, 5d, 5e). 
 
 Learning Objective 6: PRECISION APPROACH 
 Time allowed for completion: 15 MINUTES 
 Items to be tested: 





   a. Exhibits adequate knowledge of the precision instrument approach  
   procedures. 
   b. Accomplishes the appropriate precision instrument approaches as  
   selected by the examiner. 
   c. Establishes two-way communications with ATC using the proper  
   communications phraseology and techniques, as required for the phase of  
   flight or approach segment. 
   d. Complies, in a timely manner, with all clearances, instructions, and  
   procedures. 
   e. Advises ATC anytime that the applicant is unable to comply with a  
   clearance. 
   f. Selects, tunes, identifies, and monitors the operational status of ground  
   and airplane navigation equipment used for the approach. 
   g. Maintains a stabilized final approach, from the Final Approach Fix to  
   DA/DH allowing no more than three-quarter scale deflection of either the  
   glide slope or localizer indications. 
   h. Initiates immediately the missed approach when at the DA/DH, and  
   the required visual references for the runway are not unmistakably visible  
   and identifiable. 
 Procedure: 
 While en route, ATC will direct: “Cessna 09OSU, verify you have information 





 Participant will respond.  If participant does not have information Bravo 
(current weather information), he/she will be instructed to get it.  If he/she has 
already reported receipt of ATIS information, the above dialogue will be omitted.  
In either case, the participant will be informed of the following weather at Tulsa 
International airport: 
“Tulsa International  airport information Bravo, 1352z.  Wind 350@16, Gusting 24.  
Visibility ¾ variable to 2 miles, light rain and mist.   Sky condition overcast 200.  
Temperature 02.  Dew point minus 04, altimeter 29.90.  Rain began 30 minutes after the 
hour.  ILS 36R approach in use, landing and departing runways 36L and 36R.  Taxiway 
Alpha closed north of main ramp, unlighted tower 4 miles northeast.  Departing aircraft 
contact Clearance Delivery 134.05 before contacting Ground Control.  Report on initial 
contact you have information Bravo.” 
 Participant will inform ATC that he/she has acquired information Bravo, as 
appropriate. 
 ATC will direct: “Cessna 09OSU, expect Radar Vectors final approach course 
ILS Runway 36R.  Turn right (or left, as appropriate) heading 180, descend and 
maintain 3,000’.” 
 When the aircraft is approximately 5SE of OILLR, ATC will provide final 
Radar Vector to approach course (though intermediate vectors may be provided to 
create a correct vector onto the localizer): “Cessna 09OSU, 5 miles southeast of 
OILLR. Turn right heading 330 degrees to join the localizer, maintain 3,000’ until 





 Participant will respond as appropriate.  Participant will comply with 
clearance, as appropriate.  Participant will become established on localizer and 
report established (6c, 6d, 6f).   
 ATC will respond: “Cessna 09OSU, descend and maintain 2,500’, cleared for the 
ILS 36R approach.  Contact Tower 121.2”  
 Participant will comply.  
 ATC will respond with, “Cessna 09OSU, Tulsa Tower, cleared to land 36R.” 
 Participant will conduct the ILS 36R approach (6a, 6b, 6e, 6g).  At DH, the 
participant will not be able to meet the required criteria to descend below Decision 
Height.  Participant will initiate a missed approach (6h).   
 
 Learning Objective 7: MISSED APPROACH 
 Time allowed for completion: 20 MINUTES 
 Items to be tested: 
   Participant: 
   a. Exhibits adequate knowledge of the elements related to missed  
   approach procedures associated with standard instrument approaches. 
   b. Initiates the missed approach promptly by applying power, establishing  
   a climb attitude, and reducing drag in accordance with the aircraft   
   manufacturer‟s recommendations. 
   c. Reports to ATC beginning the missed approach procedure. 
   d. Complies with the published or alternate missed approach procedure. 





   clearance, restriction, or climb gradient. 
 Procedure:  
 Participant will initiate the missed approach at the DH (7a, 7b), and report 
the missed approach to ATC (7c).   
 ATC will respond: “Execute published missed approach.  Contact Departure 
124.0”    
 Participant will comply.  After contacting Departure, the participant will be 
instructed: “Cessna 09OSU, Tulsa Departure. Upon reaching Tulsa VORTAC hold as 
published. Report established in the hold. Expect further clearance ____ minutes after 
the hour.”  (20 minutes will be allotted for missed approach and hold). 
 Participant will respond and proceed to Tulsa VORTAC and enter the hold 
(7d, 7e). 
 
 Learning Objective 8: “Preflight” Preparation (Determination of/Proceeding 
to alternate) 
 Time allowed for completion: 30 MINUTES 
 Items to be tested: 
   Participant: 
  a. Correctly analyzes the weather information pertaining to the route of  
  flight and destination airport, and selects alternate destination as  
  appropriate. 
   b. Correctly analyzes weather information (in flight), and determines  





   c. Determines the calculated performance is within the aircraft‟s capability  
   and operating limitations. 
   d. Correctly interprets (and applies) charts (and procedures) to proceed to  
   suitable alternate destination. 
 Procedure: 
 After the participant has reported established in the hold, ATC will inform 
and query: “Cessna 09OSU, National Weather Service has issued amended AIRMET 
Zulu 2 at 1440 Zulu, for low IFR conditions due to fog and low clouds, and decreasing 
ceilings and visibility in the Tulsa area, and to the area North and East of Tulsa.  Say 
intentions.” 
 Participant will respond.  If participant asks to leave frequency to contact 
FSS, this request will be granted and weather report with generally better weather 
west and south will be provided.  If participant seeks weather information from 
ATC, only local conditions will be provided.  If participant persists with ATC, 
he/she will be told that “Permission granted to leave frequency for 5 minutes.  Contact 
McAlester Radio (FSS) 122.2.  Report returning this frequency.”  
 Participant will contact McAlester Flight Service Station.  He/she will be told 
icing conditions persist to the North and East of Tulsa.  Participant will be asked 
by ATC to “Say intentions.” 
 Participant will respond.  If more weather information is required, it will be 
provided, and will generally show better weather West and South.  If the 
participant asks for weather at specific destinations, it will be provided as follows: 





 “Pogue (Sand Springs), 100’ overcast, 1 mile visibility, mist.” 
         “Claremore Regional, estimated ceiling 100’ overcast sky obscured, ¼ mile 
visibility, freezing rain.” 
 “Okmulgee Regional, 300 overcast, 3 miles visibility, light rain and mist.” 
 “Stillwater Regional, 1,500’  overcast, 5 miles visibility.” 
 The participant, or course, may choose some other alternate destination.  If 
so, the weather at that airport will follow the general trend of better weather west 
and south.  If the participant elects to try a nearby airport, they will be told to 
“expect radar vectors to final approach course” and told which approach to 
expect.  If the participant selects an alternate more than 25 nautical miles away 
from Tulsa, he/she will be given a “Direct” or appropriate radial or airway route 
clearance.  If the participant elects to continue holding to wait for better weather 
and another attempt at the same approach, he/she will be informed that weather 
conditions are deteriorating. 
 Once the Participant has gleaned weather information and determined, 
communicated (8 b, c), and correctly (though only initially) implemented his/her 
route to the alternate destination (8d), the exercise is complete.   Grades will be 
assigned for the alternate selection based on weather, general suitability, and 
legalities. 






































Instructions Provided to Research Participants 
“You have been asked to participate in a research project dealing with newly 
certified instrument rated pilots and their ability to operate in the IFR environment.  Your 
task will be to conduct an IFR flight in a “flight simulator” from Stillwater Regional 
Airport to Tulsa International Airport.  The flight will take approximately 1 to 1.5 hours 
and will involve the normal IFR flight tasks: acquiring an IFR clearance, interaction with 
Air Traffic Control, manipulation of the appropriate aircraft controls, instruments and 
avionics, the interpretation of charts, etc. All of the paperwork needed for the flight will 
be provided. This will include a completed flight plan and flight log, en route and 
approach charts, and printed weather forecasts.  Important details about the flight, 
including route, altitude, time, etc. will be found in the flight log and flight plan.  
Questions may be asked about these details before the flight begins, but not after.   One 
detail that will be notably absent from the flight plan is an alternate destination.  You will 
be asked to select an appropriate alternate based on weather or any other relevant data.   
Note that the flight is designed to be a fairly challenging IFR flight with IMC 
weather prevailing.  However, there will be no planned dangerous weather such as 
embedded thunderstorms or unforecast icing.  Further, there will be no attempt to “trick” 
the pilot, nor will there be any equipment failures or planned emergencies.  Nothing, 
however, is to prevent the pilot from declaring an emergency if it is deemed necessary.  
Again a routine, but challenging, IFR flight is the intent.  Superfluous ground operations, 
such as taxi and runup, will not be conducted.  In fact, the IFR clearance will be received 





Throughout the flight, you will interact with ATC just like during a real flight.  
This may mean amendments to your clearance and other instructions.  You will be 
expected to select and set correct frequencies and use standard pilot phraseology.  If you 
set wrong frequencies you may get no response- just like in the real world.  All ATC and 
Flight Service station services will be provided, and the principal investigator will act as 
both ATC controller and FSS specialist.  To enhance the realism of the flight, headsets 
will be worn. 
Navigation radio frequencies and radials will need to be set correctly as well.  The 
GPS is VFR only and is so placarded.  You may not use the moving map display on the 
GPS (nav. page 2) as this could influence certain research conclusions.  All other avionics 
may be used or not used at the pilot‟s discretion.  Additionally, you are asked to NOT 
discuss specifics of the flight with anyone until after the research project has been 
completed, as knowledge of flight tasks leaked to subsequent participants could also 
affect research conclusions.  
Your actual interaction will be only with the principal investigator listed above 
(and possible assistant to operate simulator or play the part of ATC), and the flight is not 
a test that can be failed or academically graded in any way.   Any errors you may 
make during the flight will be recorded for research purposes only, and will not be 
associated with you personally.  In fact, your identity will in no way be associated with 
collected research data or published in research findings. 
Participation is voluntary and you can discontinue the research activity at any 


























































































































METARs & TAFs For Tulsa Area Weather 
 
(Stillwater Weather) 
KSWO 241355Z AUTO 30012G18KT 10SM BKN016 OVC033 06/M03 A2992 RMK AO2 
SLP135 T0038M0028 
 
(Tulsa International Weather) 
KTUL 241352Z 01012G18KT 1SM BR BKN002 OVC004 02/M01 A2990 RMK AO2 
SLP135 T0018M0008 
 
KTUL 2414Z 2414/2514 02008G16 3SM -SHRA BR BKN003 OVC004  
     TEMPO 2415/2417 02018G24KT 2SM BR OVC002 OVC30 OVC080  
     FM2417 35012G18KT 3SM VCSH OVC006 OVC008 OVC200  
     TEMPO 2420/2501 31016G24KT 1/2SM SHRA BR OVC001 OVC120  
     FM2501 30015G26KT 1SM -RA BR BKN005 OVC010  
     FM2510 32012KT P6SM SCT010 BKN060 BKN120  
 
(Tulsa Riverside Weather) 
KRVS 241352Z 01012G18KT 1SM BR BKN002 OVC004 02/M01 A2989 RMK AO2 
SLP135 T0018M0008 
 
KRVS 2414Z 2414/2514 02010G18 2SM -SHRA BR BKN002 OVC004  
     TEMPO 2415/2417 01020G30KT 2SM OVC002 OVC30 OVC080  
     FM2417 35012G18KT 2SM VCSH OVC005 OVC008 OVC200  
     TEMPO 2420/2501 31016G24KT 1/2SM SHRA BR OVC001 OVC120  
     FM2501 30015G26KT 1SM -RA BR BKN005 OVC010  
     FM2510 32012KT P6SM SCT010 BKN060 BKN120  
 
(Bartlesville Weather) 
KBVO 241352Z 01010G18KT 1/2SM BR OVC 001 OVC004 01/M01 A2989 RMK AO2 
SLP135 T0018M0008 
 
KBVO 2414Z 2414/2514 02010G18 1SM -SHRA BR OVC002 OVC004  
     TEMPO 2415/2417 01020G30KT 1/2SM OVC001 OVC30 OVC080  
     FM2417 35012G18KT 1SM VCSH FZDL OVC005 OVC008 OVC200  
     TEMPO 2420/2501 31016G24KT 1/2SM SHRA BR OVC001 OVC120  
     FM2501 30015G26KT 1SM -RA BR BKN005 OVC010  
     FM2510 32012KT P6SM SCT010 BKN060 BKN120  
 
(Wichita Weather) 
KICT 241352Z 01010G18KT R31/2400 –RABR OVC 001V002 01/M01 A2989 RMK AO2 
SLP135 T0018M0008 
 
KICT 2414Z 2414/2514 02010G18 1SM -SHRA BR OVC002 OVC0040 
     TEMPO 2415/2417 01020G30KT 1/2SM OVC001 OVC30 OVC080  
     FM2417 35012G18KT 1SM VCSH FZDL OVC005 OVC008 OVC200  
     TEMPO 2420/2501 31016G24KT 1/2SM SHRA BR OVC001 OVC120  
     FM2501 30015G26KT 1SM -RA BR BKN005 OVC010  
     FM2510 32012KT P6SM SCT010 BKN060 BKN120  
 
(Okmulgee Weather) 
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Fisher’s Exact Test 
 Due to the small sample sizes used in this project and the pass/fail nature of pilot 
testing, the Fisher exact test is uniquely suited to analyze the results.  As suggested by the 
name, Fisher‟s test is an “exact test,” which means that the significance of the deviation 
from a null hypothesis can be calculated exactly rather than by determining a relationship 
between the test result and a supposed theoretical distribution (such as a chi-squared 
distribution or a Student‟s t-distribution).  Although the Fisher test can be used in a fairly 
general set of experiments, it is especially useful when comparing the dichotomous 
distribution of outcomes between two relatively small groups of test subjects.  For large 
sample sizes, the Fisher test reduces to the well-known chi-squared test.  
 The test‟s namesake, R.A. Fisher, is said to have devised the test to determine if 
his friend, Muriel Bristol, could detect whether the tea or milk had been poured into her 
cup first, as she claimed she could.  In that simple case, the dichotomous outcomes are 
(tea, then milk) or (milk, then tea), and the two “subject groups” are the actual division 
and that claimed by Mrs. Bristol in a taste test. The test result, then, showed whether or 
not there was an association between the two distributions of ordered pourings, and 
therefore quantified Mrs. Bristol‟s ability to discern between milk first or tea first through 
a taste test. 
 In this study, Fisher‟s test was used to determine whether or not the results from 
the experienced pre-test pilot group and the less experienced test pilot group are similar.  
For each task, the dichotomous outcome is the ability or inability of a pilot to 
satisfactorily complete that task.  In Chapter III, the basis for the various grade 





completed and/or knowledge partially demonstrated, but elements of task not done or 
done incorrectly and/or gaps in knowledge observed or suspected.”  The F grade 
definition is simpler: “task never completed or knowledge never demonstrated.”  And, 
since the Fisher test requires a dichotomous relationship between outcomes, an F or D 
grade assigned for any participant task was converted to a “Fail” in the Fisher 
contingency tables.  Pilot performance that met A or B grade criteria, defined in chapter 
III as “A- task easily completed or knowledge easily demonstrated” or “B- task fully 
completed and/or knowledge demonstrated, but at least one extra 
attempt/clarification/query required” respectively, was converted to a “Pass” grade.  
More troubling was the C grade.  In chapter III, C performance was defined as “task 
completed and/or knowledge demonstrated, but multiple attempts/clarification required.”  
Admittedly, this level of performance could be considered passing or failing on an airman 
certification test depending on task importance, performance on other tasks, grading 
subjectivity, or some other variable.  Therefore, it was decided to simply omit ambiguous 
C grade performance from the Fisher contingency tables; C‟s weighted neither the pass 
nor fail groups. 
 To better understand how the Fisher test works, a somewhat lengthy explanation 
is in order.  To begin, consider this crude example: suppose it is hypothesized that 
experienced pilots can fly an instrument approach within PTS tolerances but 
inexperienced pilots cannot.  A test is then logically constructed in which experienced 
and inexperienced pilots, individually, are asked to fly an approach in a flight simulator.  
As predicted, all five members of the experienced pilot group fly the approach within 





approach.  Our test (and common sense) suggests that we have “proven” that experienced 
pilots can fly an instrument approach better than inexperienced pilots.  But our test has 
not really proven anything because, at best, our test can only suggest to varying degrees 
that something else (such as pure chance) did not determine the test results.  And when 
working with small sample sizes, the occasional “outlier” in the data can make even the 
most intuitive hypothesis hard to “prove,” or, more accurately, hard to suggest to a high 
degree of certainty. 
 Consider again the results of our hypothetical test.  A table showing the test data 
would look like this: 
Table 1- Pilot Experience Test 
 Experienced pilots Inexperienced Pilots Marginal Total 
Approach flown 
within limits 
5 3 8 
Approach not flown 
within limits 
0 4 4 
Marginal Total 5 7 12 
 
 All five (100%) of the experienced pilots “passed” the test, while only 3 (43%) of 
the inexperienced pilots did.  While these numbers might lead one to assume a 
statistically significant difference in the groups, we must first define what we mean by 
“statistically significant.”  Once again, to conclude that something besides chance caused 
the results, we must be quite sure.  In the social sciences, “quite sure” is commonly 
interpreted as at least 95% sure, though even this number is considered quite low in some 





 Consider all the possible experiments in which a total of 8 pilots correctly flew 
the approach and 4 did not, which are the numbers we observed.  Note that to construct 
tables (like the one above) showing this, we must keep the horizontal marginal totals (5 
and 7) and the vertical marginal totals (8 and 4) the same.  If we were to do so, the 
possible tables (besides the actual table) that we could create would look like this: 
Table 2 
 Experienced pilots Inexperienced pilots Marginal Total 
Approach flown 
within limits 
4 4 8 
Approach not flown 
within limits 
1 3 4 
Marginal Total 5 7 12 
 
Table 3 
 Experienced pilots Inexperienced pilots Marginal Total 
Approach flown 
within limits 
3 5 8 
Approach not flown 
within limits 
2 2 4 
Marginal Total 5 7 12 
 
Table 4 
 Experienced pilots Inexperienced pilots Marginal Total 
Approach flown 
within limits 
2 6 8 
Approach not flown 
within limits 
3 1 4 







 Experienced pilots Inexperienced pilots Marginal Total 
Approach flown 
within limits 
1 7 8 
Approach not flown 
within limits 
4 0 4 
Marginal Total 5 7 12 
 
Our “null hypothesis” is that there is no difference between the groups; any 
variation in the pass/fail ratio of the different groups is due to random variations.  And, 
with the possible numbers in place, we can now consider just how probable or 
improbable (mathematically) these results might occur, if in fact the null hypothesis - that 
there is no difference between the groups - is true.  Consider table 1.  Of the 8 
participants that successfully flew the approach, 5 were experienced and 3 were not.  
How many ways are there of dividing eight participants into groups of size 5 and 3, 
respectively?  The answer is referred to as “8 choose 5” and   
5
8
 is used to denote it.  If 
we are to randomly select five objects from a group of eight, there are eight ways to 
select the first object, seven ways to select the second object (remember, one has been 
previously selected), six ways to select the third object (two previously selected), five 
ways to select the fourth object (three previously selected), and four ways to select the 
third object (four previously selected).  This means that there are 8×7×6×5×4 = 6,720 
ways of selecting all five in order.  But in this experiment, order is irrelevant; there is no 
significance in picking the objects in any certain order so long as the correct objects are 





which pilots passed or failed the test.
6
  The significance is in which group - experienced 
or inexperienced - that the pilots belonged to.  Therefore, the odds of picking, by chance, 
the correct five in any order is determined by dividing the number just calculated (6,720) 







 =  
120
720,6
 = 56 
 
different ways of choosing the objects, again, if we accept the null hypothesis and order 
doesn‟t matter.  In general, we construct the “possible chance selections” as a fraction 
with the numerator determined thusly: the product of “entire group” numbers, starting 
with the entire group, and then successively decreasing by 1 as the group shrinks after we 
make selections.  The denominator is determined by the product of how many we are 
choosing from the group, with each successive selection attempt showing the decreasing 
number left to choose.  We should note also the special cases in which zero or all are 
selected 
                                                 
6
 At least there is no significance in theory.  In practice, pilot order does matter if pilots later in the 
sequence of our test “network” about what is required in the experiment and prepare accordingly.  This 
networking could provide an unfair advantage to the later pilots and therefore skew test data.   
There is some evidence that networking did occur in the actual experiment in this project.  Test 
group pilot number 4, who did well on the flight, made the comment during a difficult task that “his 
roommate told him to expect it” (his roommate was an earlier participant).   Because of this comment and 
its implications to test data, the principal investigator considered omitting the pilot 4 data from the test 
results.  He did not, however, for two reasons: (1) any improvement in pilot 4‟s performance caused by the 
illicit networking would argue against rejecting the null hypothesis, and not in support of any “pet” 
hypothesis of the investigator, and (2) advance information of the flight could improve pilot performance 
operationally, but not technically.  In other words, advance knowledge of the flight might help a pilot 
prepare for operations such as route changes or holds, but it would have little effect on pilot technique such 












there is only one way of not selecting anybody (or, equivalently, of selecting everybody). 
 Alternatively, we can calculate the number of ways of choosing the 3 






 = 56,  




Remember, we are suggesting in this example that 
chance is the only determiner, so the odds of selecting one group or the other should be 
the same, which they are.    
 Returning to table 1, we see that the number of ways of selecting 5 successful 
approach flyers from eight (the passes), and no unsuccessful approach flyer from four 






 = 56 1 = 56. 
Now, in the hypothetical experiment there were 12 participants, predivided into groups of 
5 (the experienced pilots) and 7 (the inexperienced pilots).  The total number of ways of 









 = 792   or   
1234567
6789101112







Since the null hypothesis dictates that any of these 792 groupings is equally likely, the  












 = .071 
Applying the same formula to the other possible tables (for reasons we will see in a  
























































Notice that the sum of all the probabilities in bold equals 1, as required.  We might also 
notice that the sum of the numerators equals the denominator (792), which is also 
required and provides a useful check on the accuracy of the math. 
 But we are not done yet.  Even though the results of the hypothetical test are duly 
reported in Table 1, what we really want to know is how probable they are.  Or, more 





we are interested in the probability of getting a result at least this extreme.  By extreme, 
we mean more biased toward a difference between the experienced and inexperienced 
pilots.  A perusal of the tables shows that none of the tables is more extreme.  So, the 
probability of getting a result at least as extreme as was actually observed is p=.071.  
Thus, there is only about a 7% chance that this result was due to chance; we are 93% 
confident that there really is a difference between the approach flying abilities of the 
experienced pilots and the inexperienced pilots.  And while 93% sounds like a lot, we 
should remember that we noted earlier that in the social sciences we should be at least 
95% certain before we stake any claims on our findings.  And in this case (and 
occasionally in the actual study) , we cannot say at the desired level of confidence that 
chance alone did not determine the test results, as tempting as it may be to do so, and as 
frustrating as it may be that we can‟t!  Sometimes, the unfortunate researcher may be left 
with the difficult decision of either professing positive findings at a lower confidence 
level or null findings of which he is highly suspect.  Such are the perils of small sample 
size!  Potentially compounding the researcher‟s dilemma may be the gravity of the 
subject matter; flying an instrument approach is not just an academic exercise!  The 
interested reader is encouraged to see Appendix K for more on this conundrum, and to 
see how the PI attempted to resolve it in this study. 
 The p-values for all tasks in this project were calculated in a similar manner.  To 
avoid tedious calculation of all the combinatoric values, the website at 
http://www.physics.csbsju.edu/stats/fisher.form.html was used, which not only calculates 





at least as extreme, thereby giving the overall p-value for the Fisher test.  (The p=0.071 






























































































































Instrument Rating Training and 
Testing Study 
Be part of an important airman 
certification study 
 
 Are you18 years old or older? 
 Have you earned an Instrument Rating within 
the last 6 months? 
 Have you logged less than 25 hours as PIC 
under IFR? 
 
If you answered yes to these questions, you may 
be eligible to participate in an Instrument Rating 
Study being conducted at Oklahoma State 
University. 
 
The purpose of the study is to gauge the 
effectiveness of current Instrument Rating 
training and testing procedures.  Participants 
will be able to log 1-1.5 hours of simulated flight 
time and will not be subject to any kind of 
written or flight test. 
 












































Mark Uhlman, M.S. Applied Educational Studies; Aviation and Space Education.  
(Current research being conducted pursuant to Ed.D. Applied Educational Studies; 




The Oklahoma State University “Sim Room,” located at the North end of the OSU 




A study is being conducted to determine the effectiveness of instrument flight training 
and certification testing.  This study involves research into the readiness of newly 
certificated instrument pilots to actually operate an aircraft under instrument flight rules.  
You have been asked to participate in this research because you meet certain criteria 
regarding recency and grade of certification (instrument rating earned within past 6 
months and less than 25 hours PIC under IFR).  During this research, it is hoped that 
certain findings may emerge from your conduct of a simulated instrument flight (in a 
flight simulator) that can be used to determine the readiness of newly certificated 
instrument pilots to actually conduct non-training, IFR operations under moderately 
challenging conditions. 
    
Procedures: 
 
You will be asked to conduct a routine point-to-point flight in a full motion “flight 
simulator” (Advanced Aircraft Training Device).  The flight will take approximately 1 to 
1.5 hours and will involve acquiring an IFR clearance, interaction with Air Traffic 
Control, manipulation of the appropriate aircraft controls, instruments and avionics, the 
interpretation of charts, and possible diversion to another destination with the associated 
revision of tasks. The entire session will require 2.5 to 3 hours including the flight and 
pre-flight planning and briefing.  All of the operations will be simulated only, with the 
intent being an accurate duplication of a typical IFR flight.  Your actual interaction will 
be only with the principal investigator listed above, and the flight is not a test that can be 
failed or academically graded in any way.   Any errors you may make during the flight 
will be recorded for research purposes only, and will not be associated with you 
personally. 
 





There are no risks associated with this project which are greater than those ordinarily 




Findings gleaned from this research, if any, may be used to improve instrument rating 




No record will be kept of your name.  Identifying data such as gender, flight hours, scores 
on flight tests, etc. will be neither gathered nor maintained.  Any reference in published 
research to your performance will refer to a randomly assigned code name (e.g., “Pilot 
A”).  Observations noted during your performance will be compiled and kept in an 
electronic or paper format in a non-network accessible location (hard drive or paper 
records in possession of the principal investigator).  The records will be kept only until 
the project is complete (projected completion August 2009) and will then be destroyed.  
During this time, only the principal investigator will have access to the records. 
Additionally, you are requested to not discuss the “flight” in any way after its 









Principal Investigator Mark Uhlman, (580) 336-2118.  For information on subjects‟ 
rights, contact Dr. Sheila Kennison, Institutional Review Board Chair, 219 Cordell North, 




Participation is voluntary and you can discontinue the research activity at any time 
without reprisal or penalty.  There are no risks related to withdrawing from the activity.  




I have read and fully understand the consent form.  I sign it freely and voluntarily.  A 
copy of this form has been given to me. 
 
__________________________   _________________ 






I certify that I have personally explained this document before requesting that the 
participant sign it. 
 
__________________________   _________________ 























































Explanation of p-value Gradient 
A problem which plagued this study was the recurring inability to reject the null 
hypothesis.  Not that the PI wanted to reject the null - an unbiased test was valued far 
higher - but there were times when it seemed like he should.   For many of the tasks, 
there appeared to be an observable knowledge or skill difference between the experienced 
pre-test group pilots and the test group pilots that could not be “proven” by the data.  At 
least, it could not be proven at the 95% confidence level (p=.05) that is commonly 
required in the social sciences (Creswell, 2002).  Instead, performance differences 
suggested at the 70, 80, or even 90% confidence levels were frustratingly common, and 
conclusions of “thus, the null hypothesis is not rejected” accompanied many task 
summaries without, potentially, telling the whole story. 
The problem was the small sample size.  During the data collection phase of this 
project, potential participants who met the requirements of either the pre-test or test 
groups were in short supply, and all who were eligible were asked to participate.  Most 
did.  Still, the relatively small number of participants required a near-unanimous task 
failure of the test group set against a near-perfect score for the pre-test group to achieve 
the necessary 95% certainty of a difference between the two.  To illustrate this 
mathematical constraint, consider the following example (which uses numbers which 
occurred often in the study): 
Suppose all four of the pre-test group participants pass a task but six of the eleven 
test group participants do not.  As duly (and repeatedly) reported in Chapter IV, this data 
set, when entered into the Fisher contingency tables at 





translates into a confidence level of 91%, well short of the required 95%.  But had there 
been twice as many participants (in both groups) and their performance had yielded 
exactly the same pass/fail ratio, the p-value would be .007, which would allow us to 
reject the null hypothesis at a whopping 99.3% confidence level!  And, while the ratio of 
passes to fails was eyebrow-raising throughout the study, the statistical results of the 
small sample size (and the required confidence level of 95%) repeatedly called for the 
rejection of the conclusion that there was a difference between the two groups.   
Not surprisingly, the PI was frequently left with the “gut feeling” that the 
objective results said one thing, but the subjective results said something else.  And, while 
any responsible researcher knows that he/she should publish the former and ignore the 
latter, researcher responsibility in this study seemed to require more.  After all, the 95% 
confidence level is a social science construct, but this study only peripherally involves a 
social science.  It is as much a study within the technical sciences, as the reader of 
Chapter V will likely agree.  Indeed, it was often the technicalities of instrument flying - 
not human behavior - that caused problems for participants.   
And big problems they were, as several pilots flew dangerously close to (or into!) 
terrain or were unable to execute fundamental instrument pilot procedures.  To be sure, 
some errors were bigger than others (and some consequences more grave) as indicated by 
the task values that accompany each task.  Indeed, an effort was made to justify the 
assigned value of each task, and the task value rationalization is dutifully published in 
Chapter IV.  Admittedly, these task values (as well as the rationales) are subjective, but it 





important than others, and that he/she will grant some latitude to the PI to assign values 
to them.   
Ultimately, the PI decided that not only were task values relative, but that the 95% 
confidence threshold should be equally and proportionately so.  His reasoning went like 
this: if it is to be concluded that certain tasks warrant a higher task value due to the 
potential consequences of doing them poorly, then surely the rigidity of the 95% 
confidence threshold should be equally, though inversely, proportional.  In other words: 
the higher the task value, the greater the willingness to reject the null hypothesis at a 
lower confidence level.   
The foregoing principal is illustrated in the accompanying graph (page 269).  On 
this graph, the task values of 1 through 5 are arranged on the x-axis (horizontally).  The 
data points on the y-axis (vertical) reflect overall participant scores as stated by the p-
value (probability) for each task (remember that the lower the p-value numerical score, 
the greater the probability of a difference between the pre-test and test groups).  The 
traditional social science probability threshold of 95% is illustrated by the horizontal grey 
line.   
As one moves farther right on the graph, task values increase.  Since, for reasons 
noted above, we are willing to reject the null hypothesis at a lower confidence level at 
these higher task values, the lighter diagonal line represents the modified confidence 
threshold at which the PI proposes that the null hypothesis be rejected.  As can be seen, 
this line slopes from the 95% confidence level (p=.05) for tasks with a value of 1 to 85% 
(p=.15) for tasks with the highest task value of 5.  Three task summaries that would 





been modified to suggest otherwise, and this is duly noted in the text of the study.  The 
astute reader of Chapters IV and V will likely agree, as the three tasks are: 2.f. “Complies 
with ATC instructions and airspace restrictions,” 6.e. “Selects, tunes, and identifies 
correct approach facilities,” and 6.g. “Missed approach at DH if visibility requirements 
not met,” all tasks that were, arguably, indicted by subjective research observations 
regardless of the p-value! 
Exploring the graph further shows four general quadrants that illustrate both task 
significance and general participant ability.  Data points biased towards the upper left 
corner are generally in the low importance/good performance region.  Data points biased 
towards the upper right quadrant are in the high importance/good performance region, 
and data points biased towards the lower right are in the low importance/bad performance 
region.  Notably, there was only one point in the lower right region and none in the lower 
left (low importance/bad performance).  An overall visual summary of the graph shows 
that most points reflect reasonably good performance across the spectrum of task 
significance, which the PI finds heartening. 
In summary, it should be noted yet again that the PI is fully aware that a 
graduated confidence threshold is definitely not the norm in quantitative research.  It was 
employed in this project only after considerable deliberation, and only for the reasons 
noted above, which the PI deemed compelling.  The PI is also aware that arguments 
could be made against both the assigned task values and their rationale, both of which are 
published in Chapter IV and/or the accompanying graph.  It is hoped that the reader will 
grant some license to the PI to determine both, imperfect though they may be, for the 
















































































Definition of Terms and Acronyms Table 
























































































A Flight Training Device that has an 
interactive outside visual reference 




conditions, such as clouds or fog, that 
require the pilot to control and navigate 
the aircraft with instrument references 
only. 
 
An instrument in an aircraft cockpit that 
receives and interprets signals broadcast 
from a non-directional beacon for the 
purpose of navigation or position 
verification. 
 
A systematic approach to the mental 
process used by aircraft pilots to 
consistently determine the best course 
of action in response to a given set of 
circumstances. 
 
Printed and/or electronically 
disseminated non-regulatory 
aeronautical information and “best 
practices” procedures published by the 
FAA. 
 
Height in feet above terrain. 
 
A comprehensive manual published by 
the FAA providing definitions, 
explanations, and procedural guidance 
for many aeronautical terms and 
concepts.  It is written in layman‟s 
language, and is frequently published in 
conjunction with Federal Aviation 
Regulations, forming the FAR/AIM. 
 
A notice issued to pilots (either airborne 

































































































regarding weather meeting certain 
criteria that make it potentially 
hazardous to light aircraft, or aircraft 
having limited capability because of 
lack of equipment, instrumentation, or 
pilot qualifications. 
 
A charted route between, and defined 
by, very high frequency navigation 
facilities forming the basis of the IFR 
route structure.  Victor Airways are 
assigned alphanumeric names, and will 
appear in this study as “V140,” “V532,” 
etc. 
 
A specific ATC function and/or facility 
that controls the movement of aircraft in 
flight in the vicinity of an airport 
through the use of radar observation and 
verbal commands, usually to facilitate 
the sequencing of aircraft inbound to an 
airport. 
 
Any one of a combination of flashing or 
colored light configurations designed to 
distinguish the approach end of a 
runway to aid a pilot in the recognition 
of the landing environment. 
 
An automated weather observation and 
reporting system that continually 
broadcasts local weather conditions on 
a dedicated frequency. 
 
A function of the national airspace 
system that sequences, separates, and 
controls the movement of aircraft, 
usually through controller observation 
and verbal instruction to pilots.  “ATC” 
may also be a generic reference to any 
one of the specific ATC facilities that 
together constitute the air traffic control 
system, such as Ground control, Tower, 
Center, Approach Control, Departure 


































































































The continuous broadcast of recorded 
non-control information in selected 
terminal areas.  Its purpose is to 
improve controller effectiveness and to 
relieve frequency congestion by 
automating the repetitive transmission 
of essential but routine information. 
 
An employee of the FAA tasked with 
the oversight of specific aviation 
operators or operations.  Among other 
tasks, certain Aviation Safety Inspectors 
may administer practical tests to airman 
applicants and provide oversight of 
designated pilot examiners. 
 
A component of the VOR indicator 
within the aircraft that shows relative 




A specific ATC facility that controls the 
movement of aircraft en route between 
terminal areas, usually through the use 
of radar observations and verbal 
commands. 
 
An airman certified to provide initial 
and recurrent flight training for certain 
grades of airman certification. 
 
A Certified Flight Instructor who has 
earned an instrument rating on his/her 
instructor certificate, thereby earning 
the privilege to provide training towards 
instrument rating certification or 
currency. 
 
A knowledge and skill based test, 
including both an oral and 
demonstration component, that is 
administered by the FAA or an FAA 
delegate to an applicant for an airman 


































































































An authorization to proceed under the 
stated limitations and/or instructions. 
 
A specific ATC function and/or facility 
in a terminal area that serves to 
integrate other ATC functions by 
collecting certain flight information 
from pilots and “delivering” it to 
controllers, or delivering related 
information back to pilots in the form of 
clearances. 
 
A grade of airman certification that 
allows the holder to act as PIC or 
crewmember for most for-hire aircraft 
operations.  A Commercial certificate 
may be modified with ratings, such as 
instrument, multiengine, etc. 
 
A non-directional beacon co-located 
with a marker beacon for the purpose of 
establishing position on an instrument 
approach.  All Compass Locators are 
given 5-letter names, e.g. “OILLR,” 
“BLAKI,” etc. 
 
A specific ATC function and/or facility 
that controls the movement of aircraft in 
flight in the vicinity of an airport, 
usually within visible distance of the 
physical facility and usually through the 
use of observation and verbal 
commands. 
 
A flight in an aircraft involving 
different points of departure and arrival, 
a certified pilot, and some form of 
navigation.  For training purposes in 
airplanes, cross country generally 
means a flight more than 50 nautical 
miles. 
 
The indicated altitude at which, at the 
completion of an instrument approach, a 
pilot must decide whether or not to 
































































































Expect Further Clearance 
execute a missed approach.  The two 
terms are generally used synonymously 
and interchangeably, though they have 
specific reference to the publisher of the 
approach chart being used. 
 
A specific ATC function and/or facility 
that controls the movement of aircraft in 
flight in the vicinity of an airport 
through the use of radar observation and 
verbal commands, usually to facilitate 
the sequencing of aircraft outbound 
from an airport. 
 
In this study, “direct” refers to routing 
instructions in a clearance or flight plan.  
“Direct” usually means that following a 
charted route or airway is unnecessary. 
 
Equipment (airborne and ground) 
employing the timing of electronic 
transmissions used to measure the slant 
range distance of an aircraft from the 
DME station.  DME stations are 
sometimes co-located with VOR 
stations creating VOR/DME‟s, and 
DME signals may also be received from 
TACAN stations, making VOR/DME‟s 
(for civilian pilots) synonymous with 
VORTAC’s. 
 
As used in this study, an actual or 
simulated flight or training session 
involving an on-board instructor. 
 
A weather information and flight plan 
processing service contracted by the 
FAA for use by pilots and other 
authorized users. The DUAT Service is 
a telephone- and Internet-based system 
which allows access to a database to 
obtain weather and aeronautical 
information and to file, amend, and 
cancel domestic flight plans. 
 































































































Flight Management System 
 
informs a pilot of when to expect 
further instructions, or when to 
terminate or begin a procedure, 
particularly in the event of losing 
communication capability with ATC. 
 
A published chart showing airways, 
navigation facilities, airports and related 
data to be used for en route aerial 
navigation under Instrument Flight 
Rules. 
 
A delegate of the FAA with authority to 
administer airman certification practical 
tests and to issue new certificates and/or 
ratings to successful test applicants. 
 
An agency of the United States 
government with oversight authority 
over domestic aviation regulation, 
certification, operation, and 
infrastructure. 
 
Acronym for Federal Aviation 
Regulation, which is a reference to the 
more formal Title 14 of the Code of 
Federal Regulations or some element of 
its contents. 
 
Refers to a pilot‟s intention to fly under 
instrument flight rules (as opposed to 
the more common visual flight rules), 
and the submission of the IFR flight 
plan to do so. 
 
A means of determining a “fixed” and 
identifiable point in space, and involves 
some type of navigation device as well 
as a charted or otherwise communicated 
identifiable point.  Usually, multiple 
“fixes” are identified by the pilot while 
en route and during an instrument 
approach procedure. 
 
A computer system that uses a large 

































































































programmed and fed into the system by 
means of a data loader.  The system is 
constantly updated with respect to 
position accuracy by reference to 
various navigation aids. 
 
A full-size replica of the instruments, 
equipment, panels, and controls of an 
aircraft including the hardware and 
software for the systems installed, that 
is necessary to simulate the aircraft in 
ground and flight operations that has 
been approved by the administrator for 
airman  training. 
 
A specific function and/or facility 
within the ATC system that primarily 
(1) collects flight plan information from 
pilots for the creation of ATC 
clearances, and (2) disseminates 
weather information both to pilots in 
flight and on the ground for flight 
planning purposes. 
 
A ground-based navigation device that 
projects an electronic signal (usually at 
a 3° angle) from the approach end of 
the runway for the purpose of providing 
vertical guidance to an aircraft on an 
instrument approach to that runway. 
 
A satellite-based navigation system that 
employs timed electronically 
transmitted data to inform a pilot of 
position, speed, course or related and/or 
projected information.  “GPS” may 
refer to the system or to the receiver in 
the cockpit. 
 
A specific ATC function and/or facility 
that controls the movement of aircraft 
and vehicles on the surface of an 
airport. 
 
A movable marker on a heading 






























































































IFR Flight Plan 
 
 
heading for future reference by the 
pilot. 
 
A maneuver performed in flight, usually 
consisting of an oval shaped track over 
the ground, which keeps an aircraft in a 
relatively small, isolated area.  A hold is 
usually assigned to an aircraft as a 
delaying mechanism so that other 
events may transpire, e.g., improvement 
of the weather, ATC attention devoted 
to other traffic, etc. 
 
A view limiting device that is used to 
restrict outside visual references and to 
therefore simulate IMC for training, 
testing, and currency purposes. 
 
A commonly encountered navigation 
instrument that simultaneously displays 
heading, selected course, and deviation 
from course and glideslope. 
 
An intersection of VOR radials on a 
victor airway in the vicinity of 
Stillwater, Oklahoma. 
 
A comprehensive set of rules and 
procedures that pertain to flight without 
the adequate outside visual references 
necessary for navigation or aircraft 
control.  “IFR” may also be a 
generalized description of a situation 
with cloud heights below 1,000‟ and 
visibility less than 3 miles. 
 
An authorization to proceed under 
instrument flight rules, issued in a 
standardized format including route, 
altitude, relevant frequencies, certain 
clearance limitations, and other 
information. 
 
A prescribed body of information 
including aircraft type, altitude, route, 

































































































that must be submitted by the pilot to 
ATC for approval or modification 
before flight under IFR may be 
authorized. 
 
A precision instrument approach system 
which consists of ground based 
navigation devices to provide lateral 
and vertical guidance, range 
information, and visual cues to a pilot 
descending to an airport.  The 
components of an ILS normally include 
a localizer, glideslope, marker beacons, 
and approach lights.  See individual 
listings under these headings. 
 
Weather-related flight conditions that 
eliminate or seriously inhibit outside 
visual references. 
 
A charted procedure designed to guide 
an aircraft through the descent and 
approach to landing phase of flight, 
commonly employed during periods of 
reduced visibility and/or low clouds 
when a pilot cannot navigate with 
outside visual references. 
 
A legal authorization, in the form of a 
printed “rating” on an airman 
certificate, for a pilot to operate an 
aircraft under IFR with or without 
outside visual references. 
 
As used in this study, the intersection of 
VOR radials that has been charted for 
the purpose of establishing an 
identifiable, fixed position, usually on 
an airway. 
 
An intersection of VOR radials on a 
victor airway in the vicinity of Tulsa, 
Oklahoma. 
 
The alpha-numeric code assigned to the 

































































































codes are assigned to all airports and 
are commonly used in avionics 
databases and FAA publications. 
 
A computer based, knowledge-only test 
administered by the FAA through its 
computer test center delegates.  Most 
grades of airman certification and rating 
require a passing grade on a knowledge 
test as a prerequisite for certification. 
 
An instrument approach that employs a 
localizer that is not aligned with a 
runway, requiring a pilot to maneuver 
to land after the completion of the 
instrument approach procedure. 
 
A ground-based navigation device that 
projects an electronic signal, usually for 
the purpose of providing lateral 
guidance to an aircraft on an instrument 
approach to a runway aligned with the 
Localizer. 
 
A marker beacon co-located with an 
NDB and situated along an approach 
course at the outer maker position. 
 
A ground-based navigation device 
employed in an instrument approach 
procedure.  It transmits an elliptical 
beam vertically that triggers a device 
within the aircraft to alert the pilot, 
through a colored light and audible 
signal, of the aircraft‟s location along 
the approach course. 
 
A charted procedure consisting of route, 
altitude, and other information to 
employ in the event that, at the 
completion of the final segment of an 
instrument approach, due to either 
weather, pilot error, or other 
circumstances, the aircraft is not in a 


































































































Elevation in feet relative to the average 
sea level datum. 
  
An aviation specific, combination 
navigation and communication radio 
that operates within the very high 
frequency band width. 
 
A ground-based navigational device 
transmitting an electronic signal 
through 360° for the purpose of 
navigation or establishing position.  A 
non-directional beacon is sometimes co-
located with a marker beacon to form a 
Compass Locator, and is used to 
establish position on an instrument 
approach. 
 
An information dissemination process 
used by the FAA to inform pilots and 
crew members of non-charted 
regulatory and/or advisory information 
pertaining to a flight, i.e. runway 
closures, change in charted altitudes, 
etc.  Notices to Airmen are published 
electronically and on paper, and are 
routinely disseminated by FSS 
specialists during weather briefings. 
 
A component of the VOR indicator 
within the aircraft that may be 
manipulated to align the instrument 
with a desired course.   
 
A specific compass locator in the 
vicinity of the Tulsa International 
airport.   
 
An on-board aircraft crewmember 
exercising control over its operation, or 
a crew member otherwise meeting the 
legal definition of “pilot-in-command.”  
In this study, it refers to the on-board 
crewmember with sole and/or ultimate 


































































































A grade of airman certification that 
allows the holder to act as PIC or 
crewmember during non-commercial 
aircraft operations.  A private certificate 
may be modified with ratings, such as 
instrument, multiengine, etc. 
 
Within the context of this study, the 
Practical Test Standards are a 
publication of the FAA, available in 
both paper and electronic format, that 
outline the content, minimum 
completion standards, and conduct of 
practical tests.  Specific Practical Test 
Standards are published for each of the 
various grades and relevant ratings of 
airman certification. 
 
As used in this study, a device that 
provides graphic location, positive 
identification, and other information to 
ATC for the purpose of sequencing and 
separation of aircraft. 
 
As used in this study, a condition 
caused by incorrectly setting a VHF 
navigation instrument in which the 
depicted position from a selected course 
appears to be exactly opposite the actual 
position.  Reverse needle sensing is a 
common cause of pilot confusion. 
 
A method of navigation which permits 
en route or approach operations on any 
charted or approved flight path by 
means of electronic signals 
“interpreted” by area navigation 
equipment within the aircraft.  Area 
Navigation is commonly understood to 
mean that circuitous en route navigation 
is unnecessary. 
 
An intersection of VOR radials on a 



































































































Any of a series of approach light 
configurations using ground-based 
fixed lights flashing in a sequence that 
“leads” a pilot‟s attention, particularly 
in reduced visibility, to the runway 
threshold.   
 
The simulation of flight conditions that 
artificially restrict, usually with the use 
of a view limiting device, outside visual 
references for training and/or testing 
purposes. 
 
A published chart and/or procedure 
showing routing, navigation facilities, 
airports and related data to be used for 
terminal area aerial navigation under 
Instrument Flight Rules. 
 
A VOR in the Stillwater, Oklahoma 
area. 
 
The FAA‟s repository of regulations 
pertaining to the oversight of domestic 
aviation.  The regulations are organized 
into “parts” according to that part of the 
aviation infrastructure to which they 
pertain.  The parts that will be 
referenced in this study include: 
Part 61- Certification: Pilots, Flight 
Instructors, and Ground Instructors. 
Part 91- General Operating and Flight 
Rules. 
Part 141- Pilot schools. 
 
A device in an aircraft that replies to 
radar interrogation with an enhanced 
signal.  The signal normally includes an 
assigned code and other information for 
the purpose of informing ATC of the 
aircraft‟s location and altitude. 
 
The elevation above mean sea level of 
the highest point of the first 3,000‟ of 

















































































Very High Frequency Omni-
















Charted or uncharted airspace that is not 
usable for civil air navigation, 
frequently for national security reasons.  
TFR‟s have generally become more 
prominent and restrictive post-911. 
 
Guidance provided to a pilot by ATC 
through the use of radar depiction and 
verbal commands.  Radar vectors are 
commonly provided to a pilot in lieu of 
pilot-based navigation. 
 
A comprehensive set of rules and 
procedures that may be used when 
weather conditions permit the use of 
outside visual references. 
 
The radio frequency range from 30 
MHz to 300 MHz, of which a select 
band width (108-137 MHz) is reserved 
for aviation communications and 
navigation. 
 
Weather-related flight conditions that 
permit flight under VFR.  For certain 
applications, a generalized assessment 
of weather conditions better than 5 
miles visibility and 3,000‟ ceiling. 
 
A ground-based electronic navigation 
aid transmitting navigation signals 
through 360° oriented to magnetic 
north.  Used as the basis for navigation 
in the National Airspace System, and 
therefore figuring prominently in the 
charting and flying of IFR airways, 
approaches, and other procedures. 
 
A ground-based navigation device 
combining a VOR and a TACAN 
(Tactical Air Navigation).  TACAN is 
an ultra high frequency device with 
little civilian application other than 
DME.  Therefore, for the purpose of 
this study, VOR and VORTAC may be 



















A computer-based knowledge test 
administered by a delegate of the FAA 
which must be satisfactorily passed for 
eligibility for certain airman certificates 
and/or ratings. 
 
An intersection of VOR radials on a 
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Findings and Conclusions:  The results of the study indicate that instrument pilot training 
involves too much artificiality and not enough real-world experience.  Specific 
tasks that proved under-practiced by new instrument pilots include the execution 
of IFR clearances, and elements of holds and instrument approaches.   It was 
concluded that the current instrument training paradigm should be modified to 
include more practice on certain instrument pilot competencies, particularly the 
execution of clearances involving federal airways, unfamiliar holding procedures, 
and go/no go decision making at approach minimums. 
 
